CUTS INTERNATIONAL

RESEARCH REPORT

REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN INDIAN FINANCIAL SECTOR
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Chapter 1: Need for RIA in Indian banking sector

1.1. Role of banks in an economy

Indian financial sector comprise several laws and regulations governing its different segments viz. banking, insurance, payments, securities and capital markets et al. Studies indicate that over 60 primary laws regulate financial sector, which government is in the process of rationalising. Banking comprises a significant part of Indian financial sector, and with reach across the length and breadth of the country, from poor to the rich, has gained humungous size. Financial intermediaries like banks perform necessary asset transformation function in an economy. Asset transformation is the process of creating a new asset (loan) from liabilities (deposits) with different characteristics by converting small denomination, immediately available and relatively risk free bank deposits into loans - relatively risky, large denomination asset - that are repaid following a set schedule.

The cycle of asset transformation is complete when banks receive promised and timely returns from risky assets to repay their liabilities, and the earn margins in the process. See Figure 1.1 for diagrammatic representation.

![Figure 1.1: Asset transformation function of banks](image)

1.2. Weaknesses in borrower interface in India

A successful asset transformation is dependent on efficient conduct of depositor and borrower interface by banks. While Indian banks have been successfully conducting borrower interface functions in the past, and have kept their ‘Non Performing Assets (NPAs)’ under check, the efficiency in this function has seen diminution lately.

While the Gross NPA (GNPA) ratio (as a percentage of gross advances) of scheduled commercial banks declined steadily from 15.70 percent at end March 1997 to 2.35 percent at end March 2011, it spiked to 4.11 percent at the end of March 2014. In addition, the ‘restructured but standard loans’ (as a percent of gross advances) increased considerably from 1.14 percent in March 2008 to 5.87 percent in March 2014. Further deterioration in asset quality was recorded during April 2014 to March 2015 period wherein the GNPA ratio and restructured advances ratio increased to 4.45 percent and 6.45 percent respectively, at the end of March 2015. As such, the overall stressed advances have remained high with considerable increase in the recent period to 10.90 percent for the banking system as at the end of March.
The level of distress is not uniform across the bank groups. It is more pronounced in respect of public sector banks (PSBs). The Gross NPAs for PSBs as on March 2015 stood at 5.17 percent while the stressed assets ratio stood at 13.2 percent, which is nearly 230 bps more than that for the system. This indicates to the increasingly deteriorating quality of the borrower interface function, required to successfully run asset transformation business by banks.

1.3. Fixing accountability of borrowers

When borrowers default on loans, the lenders typically re-negotiate the contract. If renegotiation fails, they sell the pledged collateral to recover their money. Alternatively, the lenders resort to various legal forums or extra-judicial measures, available for recovery of debt due.

To enforce repayments and recovery of debts, banks could approach Lok Adalats or debt recovery tribunals (DRTs), or invoke the provisions of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act). Over the years, the percentage of debt recovered through these modes has steadily decreased. See table 1.1 for details.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage of amount recovered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>24.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>31.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>23.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>21.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>18.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistical tables relating to banks in India, RBI

While the percentage of amount recovered has steadily decreased, the number of matters referred and the value of amount involved has increased significantly over the years. As is evident from figure 1.2, while the number of cases and the amount involved in the cases referred at DRTs has increased significantly, no considerable increase can be observed in the amount recovered.
In absolute terms, the total number of matters referred under various mechanisms of debt recovery during fiscal 2014 was around 1.86 million, involving amount of around Rs. 1,731 billion. The total amount recovered during fiscal 2014 was meagre Rs. 311 billion.

As the process of possessing and selling collateral or legal enforcement of debt contract becomes more difficult, it adds frictions to debt markets that impede the efficiency of the market. Delay in recovery or under-recovery of due amount is not merely a problem between contracting parties, i.e. a lender/bank and borrower. Entwined with this contract is the general welfare of the public, out of whose deposits the bank loan has been granted (as indicated in figure 1.1 above).

On account of delay in recovery, while the banks lose an opportunity to earn income in alternative investments, the security and collateral may also lose value and hence banks may incur capital loss as well. More importantly, the delays in recovery proceeds can lead to liquidity crisis in the bank, run on the bank and consequent failure of the bank. From the society’s angle, the productive assets are held up, not producing value, and not creating employment and income. From the government’s perspective, if such loan losses cascade and turn into systemic risk and endanger the financial and economic stability, the tax payers’ money will have to be used up for rescuing these banks, otherwise the depositors, meaning the ordinary, general public will have to bear losses. Thus from many perspectives, timely recovery of loans are critical for the borrower, the bank, the society and the government. In order to prevent the problem of low and slow debt recovery escalate to such levels, immediate long-term fixes for such regulatory failure need to be developed.

The banking sector suffers with other infirmities as well, such as, limited competition, high entry barriers, differential treatment of public sector banks, product based regulation, limited consumer protection. However, as indicated above, the problem of the low and slow debt recovery...
recovery, if not immediately addressed, has the potential to achieve systemic proportions. Consequently, this study focuses on the problems of debt recovery.

1.4. Regulatory impact assessment (RIA)

In order to correctly understand the causes of regulatory failure in the area of debt recovery, a systematic approach is required. Critical legislations in-place will have to be analysed to identify sub-optimal provisions, or issues which remain unaddressed in such legislations. Thereafter, legislative alternatives to the identified provisions will have to be designed, to fix the problem of low and slow debt recovery. In order to avoid repetition of regulatory mistakes, it must be ensured that costs imposed by the proposed regulatory changes, will be outweighed by the benefits, and concerns of stakeholders should be taken into account. The cost-benefit analysis must be a means to achieve the end of good regulation.

One of the systemic approaches to critically assess the positive and negative effects of regulatory proposals and existing regulations/ legislations/ policies, is Regulatory Impact Assessment. It is an important element of an evidence-based approach to policy making, as it essentially comprises stakeholder engagement in policy making and review. RIA aids in devising optimal regulatory interventions to alter natural state of market to achieve desired objectives. As regulatory interventions change behaviour of stakeholders, and thus impose additional costs on them, it helps in designing most justifiable regulatory intervention, benefits of which can outweigh their costs. Analysis shows that conducting RIA within an appropriate systematic framework can underpin the capacity of governments to ensure that regulations are efficient and effective in a changing and complex world.14

Figure 1.2 below shows the trend in adoption of RIA by various OECD jurisdictions15

![Figure 1.2: Trend in adoption of RIA in OECD countries](image-url)
Non-OECD countries are now increasingly realising benefits of RIA. Some of the non-OECD countries have started experimenting with RIA.\textsuperscript{16} Experts have recommended adoption of RIA for emerging economies, including India.\textsuperscript{17}

\textit{Types of RIAs}

RIAs are implemented during development as well as review/amendment of policies/legislations/regulations. An RIA implemented during development of regulation is known as ex-ante RIA, while an RIA conducted to amend an existing regulation is known as ex-post RIA. While both are the substantially similar in their approach, certain differences remain.

More often than not, ex-ante RIAs are motivated by market failures/imminent market failures,\textsuperscript{18} or the need to fulfill specific regulatory objectives. On the contrary, ex-post RIAs are usually adopted in the event of regulatory failures/imminent regulatory failure, i.e. when existing regulations are not able to meet the desired objectives. For instance, as the existing debt recovery legislations/regulations have not been able to meet their desired objectives of the speedy debt recovery, ex-post RIA will be useful to ascertain the weakness in existing legislations and development of optimal regulatory alternatives, having the potential to achieve the desired objective of achieving speedy debt recovery, with maximum net benefits on the stakeholders involved.

While ex-ante RIA compares estimated costs and benefits of regulations with existing no-regulation scenario, ex-post RIA involves comparison of the estimated costs and benefits with those of prevailing regulations. Consequently, ex-post RIA is beneficial to rationalise sub-optimal, archaic, and costly, multiple regulations, which exist in developing countries today.

RIAs essentially involve stakeholder consultations in a structured manner, and thus aid in adoption and implementation of regulatory prescriptions. In addition, RIAs ensure clarity in objectives, putting in place appropriate tools/powers to achieve the objectives, and adequate accountability mechanism to prevent misuse of powers/tools.

\textit{Process of RIA}

Figure 1.3 below sets out the process of undertaking RIA. As can be observed, the process is significantly similar in ex-ante as well as ex-post RIA.
Figure 1.3: Process of conducting RIA

- **Problem definition**: The first and the most critical step in any RIA is defining the problem. Problem definition sets out the objective and scope of RIA exercise, stakeholders involved and applicable legislations (in case of ex-post RIA).

- **Evaluating the baseline**: This involves identification of issues, understanding the costs and benefits of the as-is/ prevailing scenario, by stakeholder interaction, in-depth literature review and analysis of relevant provisions in select legislations (in case of ex-post RIA).

- **Developing alternatives**: Multiple alternatives intending to achieve desired change in the baseline scenario are developed. Alternatives could be no-regulation, co-regulation, direct regulation etc. Costs and benefits of the alternatives are estimated.

- **Comparing and selection**: The alternatives are compared inter-se and with the baseline scenario using various tools, such as the cost-benefit analysis, cost-effective analysis, multi-criteria analysis etc, for selection of the alternative having the potential to result in greatest net benefit.

While this chapter defines the problem of low and delayed debt recovery and sets the stage for conducting RIA in banking sector, the subsequent chapters delve and implement in detail, the next steps of RIA.

In the following chapters, two primary legislations significantly impacting debt recovery by banks in India will be selected and an in-depth RIA on such legislations will be conducted. The intention is to keep the project focused, and thus two legislations will be selected for conducting RIA. The RIA will conclude with suggesting legislative alternatives to select provisions of the identified legislations, on the basis of comparison of costs and benefits of the baseline scenario and different alternatives.
Chapter 2: Selection of legislations

1. Background

More than a dozen primary and secondary legislations have been enacted in connection with the banking sector in India, which have laid a firm foundation of this pivotal sector. However, the genesis of many of them can be traced back to more than half a century, and even prior to adoption of the Constitution. As a result, these laws like the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, the State Bank of India Act, 1955, the State Bank of India (Subsidiary Banks) Act, 1959, etc., have been amended from time to time to keep pace with changing realities. However, their legal foundations remained more or less static with serious fractures in the system in the form of lack of clarity on responsibility and powers of regulators, inter-regulatory disputes, growing shadow banking in financial sector, and constantly changing needs of market participants. This has led to a framework which is complex, sub-optimal, ambiguous, inconsistent, and open to regulatory arbitrage.

It seems that taking advantages of loopholes in the old banking laws, PSBs weren’t agile enough to prevent accumulation of a large volume of NPAs. As discussed in previous chapter, the problem of low recovery of debts due to banks and financial institutions is further making life difficult for the banking sector and consequently the economy. As evidenced by the 1991 and 2009 financial crises, performance of banks impacts not only the financial sector but on the economy as a whole, including taxpayers and society. Therefore, there is a need to ensure that the banking sector: (i) is cautious in making lending decisions, (ii) recognises financial distress early, (iii) takes prompt corrective action, and (iv) is able to speedily recover the outstanding amount.

As discussed earlier, the scope of this study is limited to debt recovery. Laying down of rigorous provisions in the law and ensuring their strict enforcement to facilitate quicker recovery of debts could benefit the entire banking fraternity and the overall economy.

This chapter discusses in brief relevant primary legislations that deal with the issue of debt recovery in India. This is followed by a comparison of such legislations based on certain indicators and vetting by subject experts, for selection of two legislations for the purpose of undertaking RIA. The primary legislations (accompanied by respective rules issued by the Central Government from time to time) in relation to the issue of debt recovery include:

- the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (SICA),
- the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987,
- the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (DRT Act),
- the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act / Securitisation Act), and
- the Companies Act, 2013 (the 2013 Act) - Chapter XIX - Revival and Rehabilitation of Sick Companies

As highlighted earlier, the study aims to undertake RIA of primary legislations only. Accordingly, review of the secondary laws is outside the ambit of the study. However, with a view to demonstrate a comprehensive debt recovery framework, outlined below are certain draft / existing relevant regulations, guidelines and circulars pertaining to debt recovery, issued by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI).
Master Circular on ‘Prudential norms on Income Recognition, Asset Classification and Provisioning Pertaining to Advances’,
Prudential guidelines on Restructuring of Advances by Banks and Financial Institution,
Guidelines for Compromise Settlement of Dues of Banks & FIs through Lok Adalats,
Guidelines on Restructuring of Advances by NBFCs,
Framework for Revitalising Distressed Assets in the Economy - Guidelines on Joint Lenders’ Forum (JLF) and Corrective Action Plan (CAP)
Master Circular on ‘Wilful Defaulters’, etc.

Also, the capital markets regulator, Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has recently issued a discussion paper on ‘wilful defaulter’ with a view to impose restrictions on wilful defaulters from accessing the capital market. The objective of imposing the restrictions is to limit the ways wilful defaulters can raise money, and avoiding any possibility of such money, remaining unrealised in future as well.

2. Brief description of key legislations

This section provides a brief description of key banking primary legislations dealing with the issue of debt recovery in India.

2.1. The Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (SICA)\textsuperscript{24}

In line with the recommendations of the T. Tiwari Committee\textsuperscript{25}, the Central Government enacted a special legislation namely the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (SICA), with the objective of reviving sick industrial companies. It was expected that upon turnaround, such companies would have been in a position to repay borrowed amount, thus facilitating in debt recovery.

SICA\textsuperscript{26} provides for an automatic stay/ suspension of all kind of recovery and distressed proceedings (including debt recovery), once the reference filed by the company is registered in the Board for Industrial & Financial Reconstruction (BIFR). This could act as a huge impediment in debt recovery as the aforesaid provision could lead the BIFR to become a safe haven for defaulting companies. The companies could easily file reference with the BIFR, sometimes by manipulating their accounts to reflect net worth erosion, resulting in attracting this immunity against the recovery action by the creditors.\textsuperscript{27}

Further, SICA is predominantly a remedial and ameliorative law in so far as it empowered the quasi-judicial body (BIFR) to make appropriate measures for revival and rehabilitation of potentially viable sick industrial companies. This includes provision of financial assistance by way of loans, advances or guarantees from the government, any scheduled bank or any other bank, public financial institution or any other authority\textsuperscript{28}. This provision may be prejudicial to the asset quality of the banks/ financial institutions as such financial assistance may not be adequately secured, and increase the exposure of banks/ financial institutions to relevant sick industrial company.

Consequently, as often happens with many such laudable measures, there was a wide gap between the aim and performance under SICA. Though the BIFR was set up to deal with
revival and rehabilitation of sick industrial companies, in reality the whole process became very slow and painful for all the genuine stakeholders, including the lenders, and this lengthy process, lack of timely commencement of proceedings and poor enforcement mechanism defeated the basic purpose of SICA.\textsuperscript{29}

2.2. The Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (the LSA Act)

The LSA Act was enacted in the year 1987 to provide a statutory base to legal aid programmes throughout the country on a uniform pattern. Lok Adalats (formed and given statutory status under the LSA Act\textsuperscript{30}) are one of the important forums where disputes / cases (including matters relating to debt recovery) pending at various courts or even at pre-litigation stage are settled amicably. Under the LSA Act, the Lok Adalats are vested with the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, while trying a suit. Every award of Lok Adalat is deemed to be a decree of a civil court and no appeal is possible to any court against the award made by Lok Adalat.\textsuperscript{31} Lok Adalats help banks to settle disputes involving account in a “sub-standard”\textsuperscript{32}, “doubtful”\textsuperscript{33} and “loss”\textsuperscript{34} category, with outstanding balance of INR 2 million or more\textsuperscript{35}. Interestingly, about 88 per cent of cases relating to debt recovery are referred to Lok Adalats\textsuperscript{36} as these help in resolving disputes between the parties by conciliation, mediation and compromise, and ensure amicable settlement. However, despite being such a popular method, banks find difficulty in bringing the parties together when Lok Adalat meets.\textsuperscript{37} Consequently, this channel of debt recovery has not proven to be effective vis-à-vis other channels like DRTs, measures under SARFAESI Act, etc. The recovery using this channel is merely around 4.50 per cent of the total recovery of debts (Rs.311 billion) during the financial year 2013-14\textsuperscript{38}.

2.3. The Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (RDBFI Act / DRT Act)

The Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, (DRT Act) came into force on June 24, 1993\textsuperscript{39}. It allowed the Central Government to establish debt recovery tribunals (DRTs), and debt recovery appellate tribunals (DRATs, together with DRTs, referred as RTs) to help banks and financial institutions in recovering their dues speedily without being subject to the lengthy procedures of civil courts.

The recovery tribunals (RTs i.e. DRTs and DRATs) were set up as quasi-judicial institutions to deal exclusively with debt recovery cases. They are quasi-judicial in the sense that they were established by the executive arm of the government and fall under the purview of the Ministry of Finance, unlike civil and criminal courts which are part of the judiciary (under the ambit of the Ministry of Law & Justice).

Studies have shown that the RTs have reduced the time taken to process the debt recovery cases, and simultaneously reduced delinquency by 3 to 11 per cent in loan repayment as these were set up as special purpose tribunals to deal with debt recovery matters only.\textsuperscript{40} The amount recovered from cases (including cases related to earlier years) decided in 2013-14 by RTs was around Rs.30,590 crore, which is merely about 13 per cent of the total amount at stake, that is, Rs.2,36,600 crore\textsuperscript{41}. Given this substantially low recovery under the DRT mode, it seems that the DRT Act have certain sub-optimal provisions and implementation bottlenecks that impede speedy debt recovery.

To make the debt recovery swifter, the government passed the SARFAESI Act, 2002 (commonly known as the Securitisation Act). This was intended to enable banks and financial institutions enforce their security interest without having to resort to courts and tribunals so that debts could be recovered speedily. The Securitisation Act allowed banks and financial institutions to take possession of the collateral security offered by the defaulting borrowers and sell these assets without having to go through protracted legal procedures.

The total amount recovered (including cases related to earlier years) is merely around 26 percent of the total outstanding amount under the SARFAESI mode during the financial year 2013-14. Considering this low recovery, SARFAESI Act also seems to have certain sub-optimal provisions, having the potential to delay the debt recovery.

Furthermore, it is noteworthy that SARFAESI Act has an overriding effect on the SICA, and Chapter XIX of the Companies Act, 2013. This means any reference made or to be made to the BIFR (under SICA) and NCLT (under Companies Act, 2013) shall stand abated, once the secured creditor has taken any measure, or the securitisation / reconstruction company has taken over any financial asset under the provisions of the Securitisation Act.

2.5. The Companies Act, 2013 (the 2013 Act)

The Companies Act, 2013 (the 2013 Act) lays down the provisions for ‘Revival and Rehabilitation of Sick Companies’. While the coverage of the SICA was limited only to industrial companies, the 2013 Act covers the revival and rehabilitation of all companies irrespective of their sector. On revival of sick companies, they would have been in a position to repay borrowed amount, thus facilitating in debt recovery.

In relation to determination of sickness of a company, it would no longer be based on a situation where accumulated losses exceed net worth (as mandated under the SICA, 1985), but on the basis whether the company is able to pay its debts. In other words, the determining factor of a sick company has now been shifted to the secured creditors and / or banks and financial institutions with regard to assessment of a company as a sick company.

Further, once the application is made by the applicant company under the provisions of the 2013 Act, no suit for the recovery of any money or for the enforcement of any security against the company shall lie or be proceeded with. Accordingly, the 2013 Act supersedes the proceedings under the DRT Act. However, such stay would be operative for 120 days only.

The aforesaid legislations directly or indirectly deal with the issue of debt recovery. While procedure relating to revival and rehabilitation of sick companies is governed by the SICA and Companies Act, 2013, the DRT Act provides for setting up of special tribunals to facilitate speedy adjudication of debt recovery cases and swift execution of verdicts. Taking a step further, the SARFAESI Act was enacted to empower the secured creditors to foreclose non-performing loans by enforcing the security interest without going through a lengthy judicial and tribunal process. The Securitisation Act also provides for setting up of Securitisation Companies / Reconstruction Companies (SC / RC), which would acquire the non-performing loans from secured creditors by issue of Security Receipts. Whereas, the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 provides for establishment of Lok Adalats which help
in resolving disputes by conciliation, mediation and compromise, and ensures amicable settlement.

3. Selection of legislation for regulatory impact assessment

3.1. Indicators for comparison

A bank loan is not just a contract between the bank and the borrower. Entwined with this contract is the general welfare of the public, out of whose deposits the bank loan has been granted. Timely recovery of bank loans is important for the economy as a whole including the secured creditor, the society, the government and the borrower as well. In this regard, SICA, 1985, Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, DRT Act, 1993, SARFAESI Act, 2002 and Companies Act, 2013 are the most crucial primary legislations. Banks and financial institutions restore to one or more of aforesaid modes to recover their outstanding debts.

The research project envisages assessing impact (costs and benefits) of provisions of primary legislations in the banking sector. Relevant primary legislations (as discussed in the previous section) relating to debt recovery have been identified post literature review and interaction with several sector experts, including the national reference group (NRG) for the project. In order to select most relevant primary legislations amongst these for conduct of RIA, apparent burden of these legislations needs to be assessed and compared, and those legislations must be selected for conduct of RIA which have the potential to impose maximum costs on concerned stakeholders. This approach was also ratified during the stakeholders’ consultation undertaken as a part of the project.

Literature on assessment and comparison of cost of doing business suggests comparison of relevant legislations on the basis of three broad indicators, viz. time, costs and recovery rate. Time includes average time taken until the actual payment of some or all of the money owed to the bank is made. Potential delay tactics by the parties, such as the filing of dilatory appeals or requests for extension, are considered. Costs include court fees, fees paid to the lawyers, insolvency administrators, auctioneers and assessors, and all other fees and costs. The recovery rate is the proportion of amount recouped by secured creditors through reorganization, liquidation or debt enforcement proceedings.

On this basis, and upon suitable modification in discussion with subject experts, following indicators were developed for the purpose of comparison of selected legislation:

- Time –Statutory time period within which the order is required to be passed by the respective authorities
- Procedures –Authorities involved in the proceedings. As number of authorities in the debt recovery process also indicates the complication in the procedures involved, this indicator has been added.
- Costs – Fees paid to the lawyers, insolvency administrators, auctioneers and assessors, court fees, and facilitation payments.
- Focus on debt recovery – Legislations exclusively framed for dealing with the problem of debt recovery. As focus of the study is debt recovery, this indicator has been added.
- Legislations in force / evidence of implementation – Relevance of legislations for undertaking RIA, and existence of evidence of implementation is necessary to conduct ex-post RIA. Consequently, this indicator has been added.
3.2. Comparison of legislations

On the basis of indicators developed above, the comparison of various primary legislations (as discussed in section 2 of this chapter) is set out in Table 2.2 below. For ease of comparison, each of the indicators has been assigned weights ranging from 1 to 3 points. The weights increase with the perceived cumbersomeness of provisions of the legislations, i.e., more cumbersome/ burdensome the provision, higher the weights and vice-versa. The two legislations with highest weights would be potentially be most cumbersome, and consequently would be selected for the purpose of study.

Below table shows the basis on which weights are assigned to indicators.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of Provision</th>
<th>Weights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less burden/ cumbersome</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasonable burden/ cumbersome</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant burden/ cumbersome</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.2 sets out the comparison of legislations with respect to debt recovery
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>SICA</th>
<th>LSA Act</th>
<th>DRT Act</th>
<th>SARFAESI Act</th>
<th>2013 Act</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No specified time limit within which BIFR / AAIFR is required to conclude the proceedings. <em>(Weight 3)</em></td>
<td>Expeditious compromise / settlement between parties. However, no specific time limit is stipulated. <em>(Weight 2)</em></td>
<td>1. RTs should <strong>endeavour</strong> to dispose of the cases within 180 days (recommendatory timeline). 2. DRATs should <strong>endeavour</strong> to dispose the appeal within 6 months (recommendatory timeline). <em>(Weight 2)</em></td>
<td>1. 60 days for discharging the unpaid liabilities (from the date of notice issued u/s 13(2) of the Act). 2. 15 days for disposing of the objections, if any, (from the receipt of objection pursuant to the notice u/s 13(2)). 3. No time limit is prescribed for the DM / CMM to take possession of the secured assets / documents and forward the same to the creditor. <em>(Weight 3)</em></td>
<td>More than 1 year. <em>(Weight 2)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Procedure</strong></td>
<td>BIFR and AAIFR <em>(Weight 2)</em></td>
<td>Lok Adalat <em>(Weight 1)</em></td>
<td>DRT and DRAT <em>(Weight 2)</em></td>
<td>CM / DMM <em>(Weight 1)</em></td>
<td>NCLT and NCLAT <em>(Weight 2)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cost</strong></td>
<td><em>Not Applicable</em> <em>(Weight 1)</em></td>
<td>No Fee <em>(Weight 1)</em></td>
<td>1. Application Fee - INR 150,000 (max.) 2. Fee for filing appeal - INR 30,000 (max.) <em>(Weight 2)</em></td>
<td>No Fee <em>(Weight 1)</em></td>
<td><em>Not Applicable</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recovery Rate</strong></td>
<td><em>Not Applicable</em> <em>(Weight 3)</em></td>
<td>6.03% <em>(Weight 2)</em></td>
<td>9.58% <em>(Weight 2)</em></td>
<td>25.79% <em>(Weight 2)</em></td>
<td><em>Not Applicable</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2.2. Comparison of legislations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>SICA</th>
<th>LSA Act</th>
<th>DRT Act</th>
<th>SARFAESI Act</th>
<th>2013 Act</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Weights</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*No score is assigned if information is not available in public domain.


Indicator 4 –Focus on debt recovery

While the scores of Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 and SARFAESI Act, 2002 are equal, the SARFAESI Act is directly attributable to the problem of debt recovery (problem identified for undertaking RIA). No other statute was specifically legislated for the purpose of dealing with debt recovery procedure, other than DRT Act and SARFAESI Act, making them more relevant than others for the current project.

Indicator 5 –Legislations in force and evidence of debt recovery

- SICA, 1985 was repealed and replaced by the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Repeal Act, 2003. However, legal hurdles prevented the 2003 Act is yet to be made effective. Consequently, performing RIA on SICA would not be relevant.
- A prerequisite for ex-post RIA is availability of evidence of effectiveness of implementation of the legislation. As the Companies Act, 2013 was enacted as late as in 2013, given the limited time of its implementation, especially with respect to chapter XIX in relation to sick companies, it might be too early to undertake detailed impact assessment of the legislation.

Selection:

Based on the above, the DRT Act and SARFAESI Act, having the highest score in the comparison under table 2.2, i.e. 8 and 7, respectively, indicating high burdensomeness, and given their relevance to the issue and availability of evidence of their implementation, seem to be most appropriate legislations for the purpose of this study. In addition, during the NRG meeting organised for validation of research methodology, the experts attending the meeting agreed with the aforementioned approach of undertaking RIA of the aforesaid two legislations.

The following chapters will discuss in detail the provisions of Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (DRT Act) and the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act / Securitisation Act) in addition to the rules framed in the respective statues, in detail and highlight potential sub-optimal provisions and issues that might have been left uncovered under these legislations.
Chapter 3: Description of select legislations

1. Background

As described in the earlier chapter, legislations selected for undertaking RIA under the project are the DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act. Prior to undertaking in-depth RIA and loopholes in these legislations, it is imperative to understand the process envisaged in the select legislations to achieve their desired objective of speedy recovery of debts to deal with the problem of NPAs being faced by banks and financial institutions. This chapter summarily describes the procedure envisaged under these legislations.

Further, in order to effectively undertake ex-post RIA on the existing legislations, review of the law making process, in general vis-à-vis the law making process of select legislations, in particular, is crucial, in order to understand the extent of analysis, stakeholder involvement and impact assessment prescribed/undertaken during formulation of these legislations. This chapter intends to highlight the general law making process in India. Also, an attempt has been made to compare the same with the law making procedure of the DRT Act and SARFAESI Act, assessed on the basis of available literature and stakeholder consultations, in subsequent sections of this chapter.

2. Procedure envisaged under select legislations

This section provides the process enshrined in relation to debt recovery under select legislations – the DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act.

2.1. RDBFI Act / DRT Act

The DRT Act was enacted to facilitate speedy recovery of debts due to banks and financial institutions. The RTs were set up under the DRT Act to ensure speedy adjudication of the cases and swift execution of verdicts. These tribunals are quasi-judicial institutions set up to process the legal suits filed by banks and financial institutions against defaulting borrowers. Such tribunals are supposed to exercise their jurisdiction, power and the authority conferred on them as per the relevant provisions of the Act.

As regards the composition of DRT, it is headed by a Presiding Officer (PO) who acts as the adjudicatory officer of the tribunal. It also consists of a number of staff in the Registry which is responsible for accepting applications and filing of cases with the DRT. The Registry is headed by a Registrar, who performs the functions of a Judicial Officer till the case is transferred to the Presiding Officer for final hearing. The DRT Act also provides for the Recovery Officers (RO) for executing the decree and eventually realising the debt amount from the defaulting borrowers.

Further, the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunals (DRATs) were also established under the DRT Act, 1993. These appellate tribunals have appellate jurisdiction on all matters concerning the recovery of debts in India. An appeal against the order of DRT can be made before the DRAT within 45 days from the date of DRT order. A DRAT is headed by a Chairperson, to be appointed by the Central Government, by issuing notification in this regard. The DRT Act requires the DRAT to deal with appeal filed expeditiously and endeavour should be made to dispose it within six months from the date of receipt of appeal.
For a diagrammatic representation of the process of debt recovery under the DRT Act (including appellate proceedings before the DRAT), see Figure 3.1 below.

2.2. SARFAESI Act / Securitisation Act

The SARFAESI Act was legislated to enable banks and financial institutions to enforce their security interest without having to resort to courts and tribunals so as to recover their dues rather speedily. The Act provides three alternative methods for recovery of debts due to banks / financial institutions, namely:-

- Securitisation
- Asset Reconstruction
- Enforcement of security interest without intervention of court

SARFAESI Act also provides for setting up of Securitisation Companies/ Reconstruction Companies (SC/RC), which acquire the NPAs from banks and financial institutions by issuing security receipts, representing undivided interest in such financial assets. It enables SC/RCs to take possession of secured assets of the borrowers including right to transfer and realise the secured assets. SC/RCs act as debt aggregators of the banks or financial institutions focused in the resolution the problem of NPAs.

In addition, under the SARFAESI Act, banks/SCs/RCs are given the power to take over possession of secured assets from the defaulter and sell such securities for the purpose of recovery of the loan, without going through the stringent court procedure. The bank can take...
possession within 60 days of serving the notice to the defaulter with the assistance of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate / District Magistrate (CMM/DM). Once a request for taking possession or control of secured asset is received by the CMM/DM, it may take possession of such assets and documents relating thereto, and consequently, forward the same to the secured creditors.

For a diagrammatic representation of the key steps of enforcement of security interest under the SARFAESI Act, see Figure 3.2 below.

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3. Law Making Process in India

The elements of RIA need to be incorporated in the law making process, and therefore, as mentioned above, review of the law making process is imperative for the purpose of effectively undertaking RIA. This section sets out a brief analysis of the general law making process in India. Further, the same is compared with law making procedure adopted under the DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act, on the basis of literature review and stakeholder consultation, to identify any lacunae in the law making procedure of the select legislations vis-à-vis the general law making process in India.

3.1. Legislative Process in India

In India, the law making bodies are Parliament at the central level and Legislative Assemblies and Councils (wherever applicable) at the state level. Parliament consists of two Houses: the Lok Sabha, or “House of the People,” and the Rajya Sabha, or “Council of States.” The process of law making, in relation to Parliament, may be defined as the process by which a legislative proposal brought before it, and then is translated into the law of the land. It can be broadly divided into three stages / phases – Pre-legislative phase, Legislative phase and Post-legislative phase.
Pre-legislative phase comprises identification of need for a new law or an amendment to an existing legislation, drafting of the proposed law, seeking inputs / comments from different ministries and public, revision of the draft bill to incorporate such inputs, and getting the same vetted by the Law Ministry. It is then presented to the Cabinet for approval.\textsuperscript{57}

The Government has issued a Pre-legislative Consultation Policy to ensure efficient pre-legislative scrutiny of a legislative proposal, in consultation with the stakeholders. It includes publishing/placing in public domain:\textsuperscript{58}

- the draft legislation or at least the information that may \textit{inter alia} include brief justification for such legislation, essential elements of the proposed legislation, its broad financial implications, and an estimated assessment of the impact of such legislation on environment, fundamental rights, lives and livelihoods of the concerned/affected people, etc;
- an explanatory note explaining key legal provisions of the draft legislation or rules, in a simple language;
- summary of feedback/comments received from the public/other stakeholders.

In addition, the Department/Ministry concerned is also required to include a brief summary of the feedback received from stakeholders (including Government Departments and the public) along with its response in the note for the Cabinet along with the draft legislation. The summary of pre-legislative process is also required to be placed before the Department Related Parliamentary Standing Committee by the Department/Ministry concerned when the proposed legislation is brought to the Parliament and is referred to the Standing Committee.

After the Cabinet approves the Bill, it is introduced in the Parliament. On introduction of the Bill, the Minister of the concerned Department may send notice demonstrating the intention that the Bill may be moved, considered and passed; be referred to the Select Committee of the House/Joint Committee of both Houses or for eliciting public opinion. Once the Bill is taken for consideration, perusal must be made on clause-to-clause basis and the same may be accepted, amended or rejected. Subsequently, the House votes on the Bill with amendments, if any. If the Bill is passed in one House, it is then sent to the other House. In case of a deadlock between the two houses or in a case where more than six months lapse in the other house, the President may summon, though is not bound to, a joint session of the two houses which is presided over by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha and the deadlock is resolved by simple majority. Once the Bill is passed by both the Houses, a copy of the Bill is sent to Legislative Department of Ministry of Law and Justice for scrutiny. Post scrutiny by the Ministry of Law and Justice, it is presented to the President for assent. The President has the right to seek information and clarification about the Bill, and may also return it to the Parliament for reconsideration.\textsuperscript{59}

After the President gives assent, the Bill is notified as an Act. Subsequently, the Bill is brought into force, and rules and regulations to implement the Act are framed by the concerned ministry. The same are then tabled in Parliament.

3.2. Challenges in relation to legislative process

The manner in which policy or legislations are drafted is often questioned by both the experts as well as those who practice. The legislative process is itself inherited with numerous challenges / lacunas. Some of them are outlined below:
3.2.1. Deficit of elements of impact assessment in Manual on Parliamentary Procedures in India (Manual)\(^{60}\) and Pre-legislative Consultation Policy (PLCP)

As indicated earlier, the law making process in India in general includes certain aspects of impact assessment (IA) such as inviting public comments on the draft legislation, consultation with relevant stakeholders, and study of social and financial costs / benefits.\(^{61}\) However, it seems that the requirement is often not complied with as it is not mandatory and the process has led to certain ambiguities. While the Manual on Parliamentary Procedures in India (Manual) does not mandate any stakeholder consultation \textit{per se}, but the PLCP requires undertaking stakeholder consultations. Yet neither the Manual nor the PLCP describes the process of conducting these stakeholder consultations and manner in which all interested parties would need to be represented. Lack of availability of information in public domain acted as one of the challenges in determination of quality of public consultation under the legislations under consideration.

3.2.2. Dearth of interconnection between Manual and PLCP

The Manual is the principle document for ascertaining law making process in India that exhaustively explains the process. However, the PLCP has an over-riding effect over the Manual (to the extent of pre-legislative process) and it is difficult to ascertain the junctures at which provisions under PLCP will be read along with the Manual.

3.2.3. Lack of transparency in inviting and accepting Public Comments

The Manual and PLCP mandates the concerned department to invite public comments on draft legislations. But, there are no specific provisions that mandate the relevant department concerned for providing rationale as to acceptance or non-acceptance of any recommendations. A mechanism of feedback to the stakeholders in terms of providing rationale is important to ensure transparency and to also ensure a sense of ownership on part of the stakeholders towards the draft legislations.

3.2.4. Cabinet note in the Office Memorandum

Cabinet Note is part of the office memorandum that explains objective behind the draft legislation. However, it is not a public document, making it difficult for the stakeholders to ascertain rationale and objective behind the legislation.

3.3. Legislative Procedure of the select debt recovery laws (DRT Act / SARFAESI Act)

On the basis of available literature in public domain and stakeholder consultations, the SARFAESI Act and the DRT Act, seems to be subject to following gaps:

3.3.1 Deviation from standard procedure of law making

The Manual mandates that a bill needs to be referred to a related Standing Committee. Deviation from the standard procedure was observed in adoption of DRT Act and Securitisation Act as instead of referring the relevant bills of the concerned legislations to Standing Committee on Finance, the Ordinance route\(^{62}\) was taken to ensure their passage.\(^{63}\)
3.3.2. Non availability of reports

The Lok Sabha debates refer to formation of several Committees and their reports highlighting the problems faced by the economy, leading to requirement of the legislations. Unfortunately, these reports were not easily available in the public domain. For example, the Committee on Estimates (1998-1999) of the 12th Lok Sabha worked on the issue of bad debts and accordingly made certain recommendations in a Report.

In addition, owing to availability of limited information in public domain, it is not clear if the primary legislations were subject to in-depth discussions or with all concerned stakeholders. However, research with respect to amendments of legislations revealed that text of certain amendments was changed after introduction and certain amendments were introduced in Rajya Sabha,64 and not in Lok Sabha, indicating to the practice of discussion of amendments in Parliament.

While this chapter sets out the procedure in relation to debt recovery, as stipulated under the aforesaid legislations in addition to general law making process, the next chapter will discuss the legislative issues / problems under the said legislations. This will help to identify possible lacunae impending achievement of objectives of speedy debt recovery.
Chapter 4: Understanding the baseline

1. Background

As discussed in the previous chapters, legislations selected to undertake RIA are the DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act. This chapter intends to correctly understand the current scenario/baseline in relation to low debt recovery, on the basis of in-depth analysis of the two legislations to identify lacunae/sub-optimal provisions impending speedy debt recovery. In addition, issues left uncovered under these legislations, if any, but important for achievement of legislative objectives, have been highlighted.

The analysis has been done through literature review, review of existing research and expert reports, primary data collection, analysis, and stakeholder consultations undertaken under this project. In order to collect relevant data and information, various publicly available sources such as websites of RBI, Ministry of Finance, RTs, etc. and publications in international journals were reviewed. Also, an analysis of select cases pending before/disposed of by Chennai DRAT was undertaken to gain in-depth understanding.

Stakeholders consulted for collection of quantitative and qualitative information included banks, (public and private sector), legal practitioners and consultants, rating agencies, government/regulatory bodies, sector experts, and members of national reference group (NRG) of the project, comprising sitting and former government officials. The process involved finalisation of survey tools i.e. semi-structured questionnaires, followed by one-to-one interviews/interactions and focus group discussions. Banks and financial institutions were consulted to understand the practical problems faced in debt recovery, and obtain relevant data in relation to amount and time involved in the recovery process. Legal consultants/advisers provided insights of legal proceedings in relation to debt recovery. Government/regulatory bodies (including former government officials) helped understanding the law making process, and role of regulators/government in recovery of debt. Sector experts were consulted to understand problems in relation to recovery of debts and obtain their views on the feasible alternatives.

The following sections are divided into two broad heads of DRT Act and SARFAESI Act. Each section provides an analysis of issues under the specific legislations, and highlights the findings of data collection and stakeholder interaction exercise, wherever relevant.

2. DRT ACT

As discussed earlier, DRT Act established RTs as dedicated adjudicatory bodies to deal with issues of debt recovery, and enable speedy recovery of due amounts. However, it failed to achieve this objective by a significant mark. This is evident from the fact that as on 31 March 2014, 66,971 matters amounting to Rs.1,415 billion are pending at DRTs.

This is because its provisions leave the scope for delay in decision making at RTs; or otherwise impede performance of DRTs. Table 4.1 provides a summary.
Table 4.1: Issues relating to DRT Act

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Delay in decision making</th>
<th>Issues impeding performance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Absence of the mandatory time limits for disposal of matters</td>
<td>• Inadequate qualifications of Presiding Officers (POs) and Chairperson and sub-optimal composition of RTs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Low benchmark for filing applications</td>
<td>• Inefficient appointment procedure for PO and Chairperson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Insufficient recovery tribunals (RTs, combined reference for DRTs and DRATs)</td>
<td>• Absence of bonus-malus system for PO and Chairperson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Inadequate composition of RTs</td>
<td>• Absence of provisions to ensure adequate performance by staff of RTs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sub-optimal process of filling vacancies</td>
<td>• Lack of clarity on powers of RTs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Inefficient recovery process</td>
<td>• Existing of statutes overriding DRT Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Grant of several adjournments and irregular hearing of matters</td>
<td>• Simultaneous proceedings under the DRT Act and the Securitisation Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Adoption of civil suit procedure</td>
<td>• Absence on clarity on priority of creditors’ claims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Exercise of jurisdiction by other courts/authorities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sub-optimal procedure in relation to issue of summons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Inefficient provisions in relation to filing of written statement by defendant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.1. Delay in decision making process

According to the Annual Review (2011-12) of the Internal Audit Wing of Ministry of Finance, Government of India, out of total 1,113 Original Applications (OAs) (involving total amount of Rs.1,620.84 crore) pending with Chandigarh DRT-II as on March 31, 2011, 429 OAs were pending for more than three years and remaining 684 for more than one year. In other words, not even a single OA pending before the Chandigarh DRT-II in 2011 got disposed of in less than one year. Figure 4.1 provides a diagrammatic representation.

Similarly, recently, a study was conducted in relation to matters pending at Delhi DRT. Comprehensive data in relation to life of 21 matters (randomly selected) was collected and analysed. Matters included OAs, applications filed under SARFAESI Act, recovery matters,
stay applications, etc. One-third of cases analysed were pending for more than 3 years. The review revealed that delays were largely driven by trial failures. Of the number of times matters were listed for hearing, nearly 59 percent of times trial failures were observed. These were because of reasons like RO on leave, applicant’s lawyers stuck in traffic, confused/complicated accounts, etc. Figure 4.2 provides a diagrammatic representation.

The above findings were corroborated by stakeholder consultations under the project, which revealed that it normally takes at least 2-3 years under the DRT route before the actual recovery of bank dues takes place. Problems in obtaining the decree were highlighted as principal reason for delay in recovery. The stakeholders also revealed that even after obtaining the decree, it takes considerable time to obtain and execute the recovery certificate.

Experts have also raised concerns that only about one-fourth of the cases pending at the beginning of the year get disposed of during a particular year – suggesting a four year wait even if the tribunal focus only on old cases.

Following factors are attributable to the delay in decision making:

**2.1.1. Absence of the mandatory time limits for disposal of matters**

An application made to DRT is required to be dealt expeditiously and the DRT must make an endeavour to dispose of the same within 180 days. An appeal against the order of DRT may be filed with DRAT within 45 days of receipt of the order of DRT. The DRAT can entertain appeal after the expiry of 45 days if it is satisfied that there was a sufficient cause for not filing the same within the prescribed 45 day period. In addition, a DRAT is required to deal with appeal filed expeditiously and make an endeavour to dispose it within six months from the date of receipt of appeal.

Consequently, the DRT Act prescribes a *reasonable effort* obligation on the RTs but does not require them to *mandatorily* dispose of application within a specific period. As evident from figures 4.1, 4.2 and stakeholder consultations under the project, the recommendatory time period is rarely complied with. The proceedings before the DRTs often takes more than 2 years and if the matter goes into appeal to the DRAT, further time is taken and 3 years elapse before any recovery takes place.
This was corroborated with data collected and analysed under the project. A study of randomly selected cases pending before / disposed by select DRTs (Chandigarh DRT, Jabalpur DRT, Jaipur DRT and Lucknow DRT) revealed that around 75 percent of cases were dragged for more than a year. The stakeholder consultations revealed that around 2 months are taken to just number the original applications (OAs) and record the case. Figure 4.3 provides a diagrammatic representation.

In addition, a detailed analysis of lifetime (to the extent available in public domain) of 22 cases (randomly selected) pending at DRAT Chennai was carried out under the project, based on the information available in the public domain (in form of ‘A-Diary’). The results corroborate with the findings in other DRTs, and show that around 73 percent cases were pending for more than one year, and recommendatory time period under the DRT Act was not complied with. It was observed that delays have largely been driven by presumably avoidable reasons like Chairman/ RO on leave, electricity failure/ power cut, strike of lawyers/ advocates’ boycott, etc. Figure 4.4 provides diagrammatic representation.

This is a result of lax enforcement of recommendatory provisions with respect to disposal of applications, and absence of mandatory prescriptions. As no reasons are required to be given in case an application/appeal is not disposed of within the period specified, the RTs are not made accountable for their sub-optimal performance. There is also no requirement for the DRAT to record the reasons for entertaining appeal filed beyond the 45 day period. Such sub-optimal accountability provisions result in overflow and consequent delay in disposing of
applications/ appeals, delaying recovery of debts. In addition, an absence of practice of Judicial Impact Assessment, and inability to correctly estimate the technical and manpower capacity requirement has resulted in non-compliance with the time periods mentioned in the statute.

2.1.2. Low benchmark for filing applications at DRTs

The DRT Act came into force in 1993. It provided that the minimum amount of debt due, eligible for bringing action under DRT Act was Rs.10 lakhs, unless specified otherwise by a notification issued by the government. Consequently, only high value claims were envisaged to be dealt with under the DRT Act. However, after around two decades of promulgation of the DRT Act, the minimum amount eligible for filing of applications has not been revised. Further, the maximum application fee for filing of application has remained Rs.1.5 lakh since 1993.

Collection of fees from the stakeholders, and consequent reduced financial dependence on government resources, is a critical sign of independence for any regulatory institution. However, absence of periodic review and revision of such fee amount impedes achieving such desired financial independence.

As on 31 March 2014, 66,971 matters amounting to Rs.1,415 billion are pending at 33 DRTs. It could be reasonably presumed that had the minimum amount and application fee been periodically revised, the number of matters pending and amount of pendency would not have been as much. Low eligibility criteria increase the possibility of filing of insignificant matters at the RTs, contrary to the objective of DRT Act, resulting in overburdening of adjudicatory officers, and consequent delays in recovery proceedings.

A related point is that at the time of establishment of RTs, the government would have made provision for technical and manpower support to RT, required to deal with high value claims. However, on account of non-revision of minimum permissible amount, and consequent filing of low value claims, the RTs would have been facing capacity constraints.

This was validated during stakeholder consultations wherein it was revealed that RTs have remained under-equipped and short-staffed to deal with increasing volume of cases. Stakeholder interactions also revealed that RTs are facing financial constraints and the fee received by RTs is not sufficient to even meet its office and administrative cost.

Consequently, absence of periodic review of minimum permissible amount and application fee to trigger the RT proceedings, has resulted in overburdening of RTs, resulting in RTs facing resource constraints.

2.1.3. Insufficient RTs

Section 3 of the DRT Act authorises the central government, by way of notification, to establish one or more DRTs, including the areas within which these DRT may exercise jurisdiction. The DRT Act also empowers the central government to establish one or more DRATs, and specify their jurisdiction. The DRT Act, however, does not provide any guidance on the factors which should be considered while establishing RTs, or the need to ensure existence of adequate number of RTs, or the necessity to undertake periodic review of number of RTs in the country.
As a result, as on date, there are 33 DRTs and 5 DRATs, with some states having more than one DRT and some states not having even one exclusive DRT. No intelligible classification is available in public domain justifying neglect of some states and focus on others while establishment of DRTs.

Stakeholder consultations revealed that jurisdiction of these RTs have not been intelligently thought of. It was mentioned that jurisdiction has been divided on the basis of geography and no review of expected pendency was carried out. Consequently, while some of the DRTs are dealing with huge backlog of cases, situation might be better in some others. Lack of proper due diligence for work allocation at DRTs seem to have resulted in this. The situation is no better at DRATs, with each DRAT having appellate jurisdiction over multiple DRTs.

On an average, approximately 2,000 cases are pending per DRT at present, which is virtually 2.5 times of adequate number of cases ought to be pending, in accordance with the recommendations of the Deshpande Committee.

While the government has plans to establish 6 new DRTs, one is not aware by when such DRTs will be functional. Consequently, absence of statutory requirement to ensure establishment of adequate RTs, and review the number of RTs on a periodic basis has resulted inadequate number of RTs, overburdening of existing RTs, and delaying the decision making process.

2.1.4. Inadequate composition of RTs

DRT consists of one person only i.e. a Presiding Officer, who, per DRT Act could be authorised to discharge functions of PO of another DRT. Similarly, a DRAT consists of one person only, i.e. Chairperson, who could be authorised to discharge functions of Chairperson of other DRAT.

DRTs have witnessed exponential increase in matters filed on an annual basis, in last 5 years (2009-10 to 2013-14), from 6,019 to 28,258, (around 469 percent). This means that on a daily basis, around 100 new matters were filed in DRTs in fiscal 2014! And this rate is expected to further rise. It might be beyond the capacity of 33 persons (one PO per DRT), to expeditiously deal with such increase in filing.

Further, if a PO/Chairperson is temporarily absent/ on leave because of any unavoidable circumstances, all cases listed on the day are usually adjourned for two-three months, resulting in delay in decision making. A review of cases filed in Chennai DRT-III revealed that 15 cases listed before the PO on December 31, 2014 were adjourned to different dates, as the PO was away on duty. Similarly, the PO was on leave on December 15, 2014. As a result, 34 cases were adjourned to different dates. Similarly, more than 70 cases listed before the Chairperson of Chennai DRAT in the month of November, 2014 were adjourned to different dates, mostly after a 2 month period, as the Chairperson was on leave. Again, around 90 cases listed in the month of June, 2012 were adjourned to different dates because the Chairperson was on leave. Stakeholder consultations revealed that on several occasions POs have not been available, without ensuring any adequate backup. At times, the Chairperson of a DRAT takes the POs of DRTs under its jurisdiction for an offsite training during working days, resulting in adjournment of matters and thus delay in decision making.

As mentioned earlier, PO/Chairperson could be authorised to discharge functions under other RTs (on account of unavailability of respective officers in such RTs). This often results in
overburdening of PO/Chairperson(s) taking additional burden. During a review of functioning of different DRTs, it was found that for around 6 months (viz., from June to December, 2014), all matters listed for hearing before the PO of Chennai DRT-II were transferred to the PO of Chennai DRT-I. Similarly, the Chairperson, Mumbai DRAT currently has an additional charge of the Chairperson, Chennai DRAT (since December 2014) on account of vacant position of the Chairperson, Chennai DRAT. Consequently, this would overburden the PO/Chairperson taking additional charge of other RTs, resulting in delay in decision making, and consequent recovery of debts due to banks and financial institutions.

The PO is also appellate authority against order of Registrar declining to register an application filed before DRT. This also could increase the number of matters PO has to deal with, consequently delaying decision making.

Possibility of a single PO at DRT is significant reason for the above. The DRT Act does not require the government to ensure existence of sufficient number of POs, efficiently manage POs unavailability or provide reasons or guidance on the time period when PO/Chairperson of a DRT is assigned other DRT as additional responsibilities. This delays the decision making and thus delaying the debt recovery.

### 2.1.5. Sub-optimal process of filling vacancies

In case of any vacancy (other than temporary absence) at RT, the central government appoints another person in accordance with DRT Act, and the proceedings are continued before the relevant RT from the stage at which the vacancy is filled.

As indicated in the table 4.2 below, the position of PO in certain DRTs at Chennai, Delhi, Nagpur and Patna remained vacant for almost 6 months, and in Chandigarh DRT, for a period of almost 4 months. This resulted in delay in decision making, and consequent delay in debt recovery.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No</th>
<th>DRT</th>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Original status</th>
<th>Revised status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Chennai DRT - III</td>
<td>Presiding Officer</td>
<td>Vacant as on June 9, 2014</td>
<td>Appointment on December 17, 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Delhi DRT – I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nagpur DRT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Patna DRT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Chandigarh DRT - I</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tenure up to September 1, 2014</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Department of Financial Services, Ministry of Finance, Government of India

The DRT Act does not envisage any mechanism to detect potential vacancy prior to its occurrence, neither does it provide for a reliable time bound mechanism within which such vacancy must be filled.

Under the current procedures, it could be reasonably assumed that the process to fill vacancy is initiated only after its occurrence resulting in loss of valuable time of stakeholders. The situation worsens absent any statutory requirement to fill vacancy within a prescribed time...
frame. Inability to timely detect and fill vacancy, on account of absence of statutory provisions requiring the same, delays the decision making and recovery process.

2.1.6. Inefficient recovery process

The DRT Act empowers central government to provide DRT with one or more Recovery Officers (RO), as it may deem fit, in order to ensure recovery of due amount. Chapter V of the DRT Act describes the modes of recovery which could be employed by the RO, subsequent to order to that effect is passed by the PO.

During 2011-12, the Internal Audit Wing of Ministry of Finance undertook audits of 9 DRTs and 1 DRAT. The audit revealed huge pendency of recovery certificates (RC) before ROs of certain DRTs. In some cases, RCs were pending even for more than 5 years. On an average, around 60 percent of the RCs were pending for more than 3 years. Figure 4.5 provides a diagrammatic representation.

In addition to long pending of RCs in above 3 RTs, 744 RCs (approximately 74 per cent) out of total 999 RCs were pending before RO-I & II of Chandigarh DRT-II for more than 3 years as on March 31, 2011. Similarly, 1,009 RCs (involving total amount of Rs.194.96 crore) were pending before RO-I & II of Patna DRT for more than 3 years as on July 27, 2011. This could be attributable to absence of statutory provisions requiring ROs to recover the amounts at the earliest possibility.

Separately, it was also observed during the audit of Chandigarh DRT-I that 184 RCs were issued during the period 2008-2011 in which the recovery of Rs.97.85 crore was involved. These cases were subsequently settled at a compromised amount of Rs.34.08 crore. This seems not in conformity with the provisions of the DRT Act. The Act empowers the PO to make necessary corrections in the RCs. However, RO has no power, to amend the RCs including compromising the amount of recovery at a lower amount. As a result, recovery of debts due to banks and financial institutions gets enormously affected.

![Figure 4.5: Delay in recovery at ROs](image-url)
The DRT Act does not provide any indication of time period within which the RO must attempt recovery of amount due. Lack of indicative provisions which require RO to employ best efforts to recover the amount at the earliest, often delays the recovery of due amount.

2.1.7. Grant of several adjournments and irregular hearing of matters

Section 19(5A) of the DRT Act provides that after hearing of the application has commenced, it shall be continued from day-to-day until the hearing is concluded. The DRT may grant adjournments if sufficient cause is shown, but no such adjournment can be granted more than three times to a party and where there are three or more parties, the total number of such adjournments cannot exceed six. In addition, the PO is authorised to grant such adjournments on imposing such costs as may be considered necessary.

This provision was inserted in the DRT Act pursuant to the 2012 amendment with the objective of reducing delays in recovery process. However, stakeholder consultations revealed that this is often not complied with and hearing of matters often suffers on account of multiple and unreasonable adjournments.

While the DRT is statutorily required to limit the number of adjournments and conduct day-to-day hearing, there is no corresponding provision in relation to DRAT. Consequently, a review of select matters pending at Chennai DRAT under the project revealed that the matters were adjourned without any significant work (trial failure) more than 60 percent of times, they were listed for hearing. Table 4.3 provides details in this regard.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Amount (Rs. In Lakh)</th>
<th>Period tracked</th>
<th>No. of times listed</th>
<th>Trial failure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Moily Joseph v. PNB</td>
<td>56.50</td>
<td>July 2010 – December 2011</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>S. Geetha v. BoI</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>July 2010 – July 2013</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>G.Umashankar &amp; anr v. ING Vysya Bank ltd</td>
<td>11.21</td>
<td>July 2010 - March 2013</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Praneeth Tobacco Company v. Central Bank</td>
<td>13.00</td>
<td>July 2010 – March 2012</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Precision Fastening v. State Bank of Mysore</td>
<td>72.00</td>
<td>September 2010 – May 2014</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Mr. Shakeel Ahmed I Kalghatgi v. A.O., SBI</td>
<td>135.00</td>
<td>October 2010 - March 2012</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Mr. Srinivasan v. The Indian Bank</td>
<td>52.00</td>
<td>October 2010 - March 2012</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>M/s Rajendra Rice mill v. IOB</td>
<td>130.00</td>
<td>November 2010 - December 2014</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.3: Trial failure in DRAT Chennai

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Amount (Rs. In Lakh)</th>
<th>Period tracked</th>
<th>No. of times listed</th>
<th>Trial failure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>M/s Arunachaleswarar Mills &amp; ors v. The A.O., Indian Bank</td>
<td>356.00</td>
<td>November 2010 - March 2013</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>M/s Janata Seva And Cold Storage Pvt Ltd v. State Bank of India &amp; anr</td>
<td>390.00</td>
<td>December 2010 - March 2013</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>K.K.Palanivelan v. The State Bank of India &amp; ors</td>
<td>1266.00</td>
<td>December 2010 - July 2011</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>S. Purushothaman v. City Union Bank ltd</td>
<td>97.00</td>
<td>January 2011 - January 2012</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>S. Ravi &amp; anr v. AO, ICICI Bank Ltd.</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>January 2011 - March 2012</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>P. Karnan v. A.O., Vijaya Bank</td>
<td>13.00</td>
<td>February 2011 - February 2015</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>H.S.Gangadhar v. The Authorised officer, Indian Bank &amp; ors</td>
<td>207.00</td>
<td>March 2011 - February 2012</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>N. Santhanam v. A.O., Punjab &amp; Sind Bank &amp; anr</td>
<td>86.00</td>
<td>May 2011 - April 2013</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>282</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The DRT Act is silent on action in case of non-compliance with section 19(5A) and grant of multiple adjournments, beyond the number statutory prescribed. No costs are required to be statutorily imposed on the parties requesting adjournments, neither any adverse remark is required to be recorded against the PO granting excessive adjournments, thereby violating the provisions of the DRT Act. Absence of such penal provisions results in failure to comply with critical provisions of the DRT Act, resulting in defeating their purpose, and delaying the recovery process.

2.1.8. Adoption of civil suit procedure

The DRT is not bound by procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), but can follow summary procedure to facilitate speedy recovery. The DRT is required to be guided by principles of natural justice and, shall have powers to regulate their own procedure.

It must be noted that there is no specific provision under the DRT Act requiring the DRT to follow summary procedure. However, as POs are often skilled at, and used to, detailed procedure laid down by the CPC, such procedure is followed at DRTs also, defeating the purpose of establishment of DRTs as special purpose tribunals for speedy recovery of unpaid claims.
This was validated during stakeholder consultations as well wherein it was mentioned that at times detailed cross examination and investigation on evidence is carried out at DRT. Stakeholder consultations also revealed diverge of procedures amongst RTs, resulting in difficulties faced by litigants. A former General Manager in Recovery and Loan Department of a public sector bank pointed out that PO is, more often than not, a former district judge, who has an inherent tendency of granting stays/ interim injunctions, because of which speedy disposal of matters cannot take place. Absence of statutory provisions to follow summary procedure at RTs results in delay in decision making.

2.1.9. Exercise of jurisdiction by other courts/ authorities

Section 18 of the DRT Act bars jurisdiction of any court or any other authority in relation to debt recovery matters covered by the DRT Act, other than writ jurisdiction exercised by High Court or Supreme Court under the Constitution of India.

It was revealed during stakeholder consultations this provision is often overlooked by other civil and constitutional courts, which exercise jurisdiction and often pass adverse orders stalling the recovery process. The Supreme Court has often discouraged this practice, and held that the High Courts should not interfere in the debt recovery proceedings until all alternatives available with the borrower are exhausted. However, the situation seems to not have improved.

The stakeholders revealed that as soon as steps are taken under the DRT Act, the borrower approaches Courts (high court or civil court), BIFR or even RTs itself to obtain interim injunctions/stay against the bank/financial institution. The stay once granted, is for an unlimited time, and is extended at often unreasonable pretext. This results in delay in decision making, and consequent delay in recovery of the due amount.

The DRT Act does not provide any for any remedy in case other courts/ authority exercise jurisdiction, despite such express prohibition. There is no express statutory provision expressly invalidating the proceedings at such other court/ authority, or consider such proceedings void in abitio. The DRT Act also does not levy any penalty or cost on the party approaching such other forum, and violating section 18 of the DRT Act. Absence of provisions explaining consequences of violation of express prohibition under the Act could make such prohibitive provisions inconsequential and ineffective, resulting in delaying the decision making process.

2.1.10. Sub-optimal procedure in relation to issue of summons

The DRT Act provides that on receipt of application, the DRT shall issue summons requiring the defendant to show cause within 30 days of service of summons as to why relief prayed must not be granted.

However, the DRT Act is silent on the course of action in case the summons is returned unserved, even after multiple attempts. It was revealed during stakeholder consultations that defendants often refuse to accept the summons and at times due to change in address, causing delay in disposing of applications by DRTs. The DRT Act does not specify what could be considered as ‘reasonable attempt’ to deliver summons, post which summons could be deemed to be served. The DRT Act does not also specify the means of serving summon, neither any provisions with respect to deemed delivery of summons.
While electronic means to deliver documents (including summons) might not be popular during enactment of the DRT Act, with time, electronic delivery of documents, through emails, has become a norm. Consequently, failure of the DRT Act to recognise e-delivery as permissible mode of delivery of summon could have resulted in inordinate delays in carrying proceedings before DRT. In addition, the DRT Act does not provide for imposition of cost or penalty in case of willful evading of summon by the concerned party. Existence of sub-optimal provisions with respect to issue of summons has the potential to delay the debt recovery process.

2.1.1. Inefficient provisions in relation to filing of written statement by defendant

The DRT Act provides that the defendant shall, within a period of 30 days from the date of service of summons, present written statement of its defence, failing which, the PO may, in exceptional cases and special circumstances in writing, allow not more than two extensions to the defendant to file the written statement.

This provision was inserted pursuant to an amendment to the DRT Act in 2012, and is a step in the right direction to ensure speedy decision making and consequent recovery of debt due. However, stakeholder consultations revealed that this is often not followed. Defendants have been given multiple extensions to file written statement.

There is no provision the DRT Act which spells out penalty or costs in case the provisions with respect to number or time period for extensions are not met. Absence of the provisions imposing costs on stakeholders, and adverse remarks against PO, in case of non-compliance with provisions of DRT Act could make critical provisions of DRT Act ineffective and un-implementable, delaying the decision making process.

In addition, neither the 2012 amendment provides any indication of the time period for which an extension could be granted, nor does it set out any upper time limit with respect to period of extension. Consequently, there might be situations in which the compliance with the DRT Act is observed in letter, but not in spirit. Adjournments for long periods, even if few, might defeat the purpose of the amendment and consequently delay the decision making.

2.2. Structural issues resulting in sub-optimal performance

Delays might not the only reason impeding performance of RTs and thus low recovery of dues. Other reasons for sub-par performance of RTs could be:

2.2.1. Inadequate qualifications of PO and Chairperson and sub-optimal composition of RTs

A person qualified to be a district judge is eligible to be appointed as a PO. Existing and former district judges are also qualified for the position. A person not already in government service, who has been an advocate/pleader for at least seven years, and is recommended by the High Court for appointment, is eligible for appointment as district judge. Consequently, no specific skill set, other than practice of law, is prescribed to man special purpose tribunal like DRT.

Similarly, in relation to DRATs, a person qualified to be a judge of a High Court, or having experience as Grade I Indian Legal Services (ILS) officer for three years is qualified to
appointment as Chairperson. Like DRT, no specific skill set is required to be appointed as Chairperson of a specific purpose appellate tribunal. Judges of High Court or Grade I ILS offices might not be adequately trained to handle complicated debt recovery matters, requiring technical expertise and exposure.

Absence of adequate qualifications for POs and Chairpersons often delays the decision making, protracts the litigation (on account of multiple appeals), consequently, delaying the debt recovery. Stakeholders also mentioned that at times, POs are not able to understand the complexity of the matter, owing to limited expertise and experience, resulting in passing of sub-par orders, sans adequate reasoning. The Supreme Court has often frowned upon the practice of appointment of under-skilled personnel at tribunals like DRT.

The government recently introduced the Tribunals, Appellate Tribunals and Other Authorities (Conditions of Service) Bill, 2014, which seeks to establish uniform conditions of service for the chairpersons and members of 26 tribunals and authorities, including DRAT.

In addition, as discussed earlier, the RTs are manned by one person only. A review of practice at other tribunals and quasi-judicial bodies reveals that such bodies are usually manned by two members, viz. a legal and a technical, the latter being expert in the subject matter. As a result of such expert members at other tribunals, the quality of decisions is usually high and the time taken to reach at the decision is usually less. For instance, the performance of SAT has been remarkable and most decisions are made within months. Also, the decisions of SAT have adequate reasoning to enable the Supreme Court to decide one way or the other. There has never been any adverse observation against the SAT's functioning, judicial or administrative.

Consequently, sub-optimal composition of RTs has the potential to result in inefficient decision making at RTs, procrastinating debt recovery.

2.2.2. Inefficient appointment procedure for PO and Chairperson

As per the rules for appointment of PO and Chairperson, the central government makes appointments to relevant posts on the basis of recommendations of a selection committee. The selection committee consists of:

- Chief Justice of India/ Supreme Court Judge nominated by Chief Justice of India
- Secretary, Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance
- Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice
- Governor, Reserve Bank of India/ Deputy Governor nominated by Governor
- Secretary/ Additional Secretary, Department of Financial Services, Ministry of Finance

The selection committee is required to recommend persons from list of candidates prepared by Ministry of Finance, and from the judges of the High Court nominated by the Chief Justice of such High Courts, for appointment of Chairperson; or the judicial officers nominated by a High Court, for appointment of Presiding Officer.

As can be deduced from above, the selection committee is composed of judicial/ government representatives, and does not have any independent experts in banking/ debt recovery, to provide an impartial perspective. Lack of independent member in the selection increases the possibility of providing post-retirement benefits/ sinecures to former government/ judicial
The Supreme Court has often criticised the selection process which lacks independence and is biased towards government. The structure of selection committee is quite divergent from the best practices, as recommended by expert committees, such as the Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission (FSLRC). The sub-optimal selection process will throw-up under-qualified persons as PO and Chairpersons of RTs, thus compromising their performance.

And this is not enough. While the DRT Act grants wide discretion to the central government in relation to appointment of PO and Chairperson, the order of central government appointing any person as PO or Chairperson shall not be called in question in any manner. Consequently, the central government might virtually appoint any person as it may deem fit to fill the position of PO and Chairperson, without any possibility of challenge of such order. As a result, there is a possibility that persons having limited knowledge/experience in relation to debt recovery might occupy the positions of PO or Chairperson, resulting in sub-optimal functioning of the RT.

### 2.2.3. Absence of bonus-malus system for PO and Chairperson

*Term of office not linked to performance:* The DRT Act provides PO and Chairperson an unimpeded term of five years. The law does not link the term to performance of PO. It also does not set out any performance indicators provided under the law, against which performance of PO or Chairperson could be evaluated. This might result in creeping in of complacency and sub-optimal performance of PO and Chairperson. Absence of performance linked tenure has the possibility to result in sub-optimal functioning of PO/Chairperson, resulting in delays in deciding matters, consequently delaying the recovery.

In addition, the DRT Act does not provide any guidance or prohibit re-appointment of PO/Chairperson. Possibility of re-appointment might affect independence in functioning. Without prejudice to above, it may be argued that reappointment of PO/Chairperson could affect the independence in their functioning during the first term. The Supreme Court has recently pointed out that a provision for reappointment would constrain a member of a tribunal to decide matters in a manner that would ensure his reappointment.

Moreover, a PO or Chairperson can be removed only on the grounds of proven misbehaviour or incapacity, after inquiry. There is no provision to censure/penalize/remove a PO or Chairperson, in case of non-performance/sub-optimal performance. The DRT Act does not even envisage initiation of inquiry in case allegations of non-performance are made against PO or Chairperson. Absence of provisions fixing accountability of PO/Chairperson and linking incentives to their performance, have the potential to result in sub-optimal performance by such officers.

*No linkage of incentives to performance:* The DRT Act provides that salary, allowances, terms and conditions of service of the PO and Chairperson shall be as may be prescribed by the central government. In addition, there is an express prohibition on variation of such salary, allowances, terms etc. to the disadvantage of PO/Chairperson, as the case may be, after appointment.

While section 17A of the DRT Act empowers the Chairperson of a DRAT to appraise the work and record the annual confidential reports of POs of the DRTs under its jurisdiction, the DRT Act does not provide any indication to link the incentives, i.e. salary/allowances etc. to
the performance of PO/ Chairperson, neither there is any provision of disincentives in case of non-performance. In addition, the PO/ Chairperson could be assured of favourable terms and conditions throughout their tenure, as a result of an express prohibition to vary for disadvantage, even in case of underperformance. No linkage of performance to incentives could result in lack of motivation towards efficient performance.

2.2.4. Absence of provisions to ensure adequate performance by staff of RTs

**Recovery Officers (RO):** The DRT Act empowers central government to provide DRT with one or more RO, as it may deem fit. The salaries, allowances, terms and conditions of RO are prescribed by the central government. There is no requirement to ensure adequate number of ROs per DRT, neither there is any statutory requirement to review performance of ROs. This has the possibility of appointment of inadequate number of ROs, or sub-optimal functioning of ROs, consequently, delaying the recovery process. In addition, the DRT Act does not require the central government to ensure that the salaries, allowances, etc., of the RO are linked to the amount of work and performance of the RO. This has the potential to result in sub-optimal performance at the ROs.

Further, the DRT Act is devoid of any general principle which the central government must take into account while appointing or reviewing performance of ROs appointed. Experts have pointed out in the past that ROs must have judicial background. The Central Government even agreed to give preference to only those candidates who either have legal experience or hold a degree of law, include PO of the DRT in selection of ROs, and conduct regular training programmes for ROs along with Registrars/Assistant Registrars to provide minimum working knowledge of the procedures followed in RTs, and the provisions of the DRT Act and SARFAESI Act along with rules made thereunder. One is not certain if periodic training programmes are being conducted, and if they are of appropriate quality, as stakeholder consultations revealed that performance of ROs have not seen much improvement.

**Registrars:** Registrars play an important function at RTs. They are required to scrutinise applications/ memorandum of appeal, as the case may be, for any defects, and register them, after rectification of defects. Consequently, they are the first check point for matters filed at RTs. In addition, Registrars are required to fix a date of hearing of application or other proceedings, and issue notice thereof, dispose of matters relating to service of notice or other processes, etc. Carrying out these functions would usually require knowledge and experience of practice of law.

However, existing qualifications for appointment as Registrars might result in appointment of persons without legal qualifications or limited experience in legal matters, to be appointed as Registrar. This might result in sub-optimal performance and delays at Registrar level.

2.2.5. Lack of clarity on powers of RTs

While the DRT have pecuniary jurisdiction in cases wherein the amount of debt due is more than Rs.10 lakhs, it does not seem to have express power to conclusively determine the amount of debt involved, and is required to rely on documentary evidence presented. The DRT (Procedure) Rules, 1993 provide that every application must be accompanied by statement showing details of debt due, and documents relied on by the applicant. Determination of facts in a DRT may be done by way of affidavits. In addition, a certified copy of entry in banker’s book is regarded as prima facie evidence.
The dispute in relation to amount of debt due would usually arise when (i) a borrower files its written statement to the summons issued by the DRT, or (ii) an appeal is filed in DRAT and the borrower is required to deposit a portion of amount due (75 percent in case of matters under DRT Act and 50 percent in case of matters under Securitisation Act); or (iii) an application is filed against action by lender under Securitisation Act.

The DRT Act does not provide any clear indication with respect to powers of RTs for conclusive determination of amount of debt due, or the procedure till the time the amount of debt due is not determined. This has the potential to result in delays in decision making and consequently debt recovery.

2.2.6. Existent statutes overriding DRT Act

Section 34 of the DRT Act provides it an overriding effect over any other legislation for the time being in force, save specified legislations. The legislations on which the DRT Act does not have overriding effect include the Industrial Finance Corporation Act, 1948, the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, the Unit Trust of India Act, 1963, the Industrial Reconstruction Bank of India Act, 1984, the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 and the Small Industries Development Bank of India Act, 1989.

Consequently, any proceedings under these legislations override the provisions of DRT Act. For instance, if a company is referred to the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR), then no proceedings can be taken under the DRT Act, delaying the recovery proceedings. This delays and disrupts recovery proceedings.

2.2.7. Simultaneous proceedings under the DRT Act and the Securitisation Act

Section 19 of the DRT Act allows the bank/ financial institutions to withdraw the application made before made before DRT, with permission of such DRT Act, for the purpose of taking action under the Securitisation Act. This gives an impression that simultaneous proceedings under the DRT Act and Securitisation Act might not be possible and the proceedings under the DRT Act might have to be discontinued, for initiation of action under the Securitisation Act.

However, this could not have been the legislative intention as the objective of both the legislations is to facilitate speedy debt recovery. After conflicting decisions at various judicial forums, the matter was settled by the Supreme Court in Transcor v. Union of India, which allowed simultaneous proceedings. However, the legislative provision remains unclear, leaving the possibility of confusion in future.

2.2.8. Absence on clarity on priority of creditors’ claims

While the DRT Act provides for different modes of debt recovery to the RO, such as, attachment and sale of property, appointment of receiver for management of property, it does not provide for priority of creditors’ claims, especially when the claims are secured, over other claims, such as statutory claims, even when such claim arose subsequent to creation of charge in favour of secured creditor.

This might lead to a situation wherein the creditor is making efforts and deploying resources to recover the debt, however, when the amount is recovered, statutory claims are required
to be satisfied, prior to satisfaction of debt due to creditors.\textsuperscript{136} This might result in creditors remaining short-changed.\textsuperscript{137}

### 3. SARFAESI ACT

As discussed in earlier chapters, the SARFAESI Act provides for several modes to banks/financial institutions for enforcing their security interest. It envisaged use of such modes without intervention of courts or judicial authorities, thereby avoiding delays hitherto been experienced in (judiciary led) recovery process. The SARFAESI Act was intentionally drafted to serve the needs of lenders, with reasonable due process protection to borrowers.\textsuperscript{138} However, evidence suggests that SARFAESI Act has not been able to meet expectations. The ratio of amount recovered (to the total amount involved) has been steadily decreasing. In fiscal 2012-13, this ratio was 27.1 percent which reduced to 25.8 percent the next year. In absolute terms, the amount remained unrecovered increased from Rs.496 billion to Rs.702 billion, during the given period.\textsuperscript{139}

SARFAESI Act has not been able to achieve its objectives as: its provisions leave scope of delay in recovery; the modes prescribed remained inefficient; provisions, or absence of provisions, otherwise impede debt recovery. Table 4.4 provides a snapshot of such issues, and following sub-sections discuss the same in detail.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.4: Issues relating to SARFAESI Act</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Issues relating to delay in recovery</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Absence of time period within which Magistrate should take possession of the secured asset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Wide scope of challenge of measures taken under SARFAESI Act at the DRT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- No accountability in case application is not disposed of within prescribed period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Possibility to challenge transfer of financial asset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- No clarity on simultaneous proceedings with DRT Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Exercise of jurisdiction by civil/other court</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 3.1. Issues relating to delay in recovery

**3.1.1. Absence of time period within which the Magistrate should take possession of the secured asset**

Section 14 of the Securitisation Act requires the secured creditor to make an application to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (CMM) or District Magistrate (DM), as the case may be, for assistance in taking possession or control of secured asset. The CMM/DM may take
possession, or authorise any officer subordinate to it to take possession, and for the purpose of which it may take such steps as may be necessary.

Section 14 fails to specify any time period within which the direction, steps and consequent possession must be taken, and the time within which possession must be transferred to the secured creditor. This could delay the recovery process.\textsuperscript{140}

It was revealed during stakeholder consultations that when possession of the secured asset is to be taken in areas other than cities, the secured creditor has to approach the District Magistrate, who is also the District Collector (DC). The DM/DC is invariably unavailable to attend to these matters due to their preoccupation with other duties, leading to inordinate delays.\textsuperscript{141}

In addition, there is a lack of clarity on the powers of DM/ CMM. While there have been various judicial pronouncements in the past holding that they are merely executive in nature, the Supreme Court in the matter of \textit{Harshad Govardhan v. IARC}\textsuperscript{142}, held that DM has certain substantial powers, as well.\textsuperscript{143} This has the potential to delay the recovery proceedings.

3.1.2. Wide scope to challenge measures taken under SARFAESI Act at DRT

Under section 17 of the Securitisation Act, any person aggrieved by modes adopted by a secured creditor\textsuperscript{144} to recover its secured debt, can make an application to the relevant DRT, for passing of appropriate orders.\textsuperscript{145} This section has very wide scope, without adequate checks and balances, as described below.

No justification needed: There is no indication of the grounds on which a challenge could be made to the action under section 13(4) of the Securitisation Act. The applicant is not expressly required to substantiate or justify or provide evidence of any injury for making a challenge under section 17. Further, there is no provision for imposition of costs on the applicant in case of unjustifiable challenge. For instance, it was revealed during stakeholder consultations that in case challenge is on low reserve price for sale of assets, the applicant is not required to submit documents from prospective bidder for a price higher than the reserve price set by the secured creditor. Such unbridled power to challenge the measures under SARFAESI Act, without any sufficient justification delays the recovery process.

No pre-requisite for filing application: There is no pre-requisite for making an application under section 17 of the Securitisation Act. For instance, unless the borrower is disputing its status as a borrower and consequently disputing the amount payable to the secured creditor, by making an application under section 17, it is merely alleging non-compliance with procedure under section 13(4), and not the fact of its responsibility to pay the due amount. Despite this, the borrower is not required to deposit any sum with the DRT (other than the application fee) to make an application. Such unrestricted power often delays the recovery process.

While an appeal to DRAT from an order of DRT is not allowed unless the borrower has deposited with DRAT 50 percent of the amount of debt due, which could be reduced to not less than 25 percent by the DRAT, for the reasons to be recorded in writing,\textsuperscript{146} there is no corresponding provision when an application is filed at DRT by the borrower, resulting in delays in recovery of due amount.

\textit{Injunction against secured creditors’ action}: Stakeholder consultations revealed that when an application under section 17 is pending before the DRT, more often than not, DRT orders
suspension of action taken by secured creditor under section 13(4) of the Securitisation Act, resulting in delay in recovery of the due amount. The Securitisation Act does not provide any guidance with respect to the time period for which such suspension can continue. Unrestrained injunctions also result in delays in recovery.

No penal provision in case of fraudulent application: The Securitisation Act does not provide for imposition of any penalty/ fine on any person filing frivolous application under section 17. There is no provision for compensating the secured creditor in case of delay on account of filing of frivolous applications under section 17. This could result in filing of frivolous applications, resulting in delay in recovering the due amount.

3.1.3. No accountability in case application is not disposed of by DRT and DRAT within prescribed period

The Securitisation Act provides that an application made under section 17 shall be dealt with by the DRT as expeditiously as possible and disposed of within 60 days from the date of such application. Section 17 further provides that the DRT may, from time to time, extend the said period for reasons to be recorded in writing, however, the total period of pendency of the application with the DRT, shall not exceed four months from the date of making of such application. If the application is not disposed of by the DRT within the period of four months, any party to the application may make an application to the DRAT for directing the DRT for expeditious disposal of the application. However, such direction by DRAT does not seem to be binding on DRT, owing to lack of explanation of the term ‘expeditious disposal’.

Further, Securitisation Act does not provide for any accountability provision should such statutory prescriptions in relation to time period are not complied. This often delays the recovery process, as validated by interactions with stakeholders.

As indicated in table 4.3 above, under the project, select cases relating to SARFAESI Act, pending at DRAT Chennai were analysed. The analysis reveals that the matters in relation to SARFAESI, as indicated in the table 4.5 below have been pending for long duration mostly on account of delay in settlement and non-appearance of parties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Matter</th>
<th>Period of pendency</th>
<th>Reason for delay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moily Joseph v. PNB</td>
<td>July 2010 - December 2011</td>
<td>Delay in conclusion of settlement talks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Geetha v. AO</td>
<td>July 2010 - July 2013</td>
<td>Delay in conclusion of settlement talks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Umashankar v. ING Vyasa</td>
<td>3 July 2010 - March 2013 months</td>
<td>No representation from parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precision fasting v. State Bank of Mysore</td>
<td>September 2010 - May 2014</td>
<td>No representation from parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arunachaleshwar Mills v. Indian bank</td>
<td>November 2010 - March 2013</td>
<td>Delay in conclusion of settlement talks and no representation from parties</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The situation is not unique to Chennai DRAT, and many DRTs across the country, specifically, Chandigarh DRT, Lucknow DRT and Jaipur DRT, are facing similar delays in disposing of securitisation applications, as revealed by analysis undertaken under the project.
Such long pendency of securitisation applications at DRT frustrates the purpose of recovery measures granted to secured creditor under Securitisation Act. This also results in delay in disposing of applications by RTs, resulting in delays in recovery of due amount.

In addition, a review of proceedings at DRAT Chennai revealed that out of 444 hearings during the month of October 2014, 150 (around 34 percent) related to Securitisation Act. Similarly, an analysis of matters pending at DRT-1 Chennai and DRT Coimbatore reveals that securitisation matters comprise approximately half of the pendency. Pendency of large number of securitisation matters at RTs has been corroborated by a study conducted by Centre for Public Policy Research in 2010, which revealed the following table 4.6 with respect to Ernakulum DRT:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total number of securitisation applications filed in 2010</th>
<th>730</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number of securitisation applications disposed of in 2010</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of securitisation applications disposed of in 2010</td>
<td>39.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The study further found that since the establishment of the Debt Recovery Tribunal in Kerala, 2,031 securitisation applications have been filed up to December 2010. It estimated that of these, the number of SAs still pending could be between 1,200 and 1,300, or close to 60 percent. This reveals the unfortunate state of affairs under the SARFAESI Act, wherein, armed with strong powers, the secured creditors are not able to recover the due amounts. One of the significant reasons for this is the absence of accountability provisions resulting in cases not being disposed of by DRTs within the prescribed time frame.

3.1.4. Possibility to challenge transfer of financial asset

The Securitisation Act authorise transfer of financial assets from secured creditors to Securitisation or Reconstruction companies. Under section 5(5) of the Securitisation Act, SC/RCs may with the consent of the secured creditor, file an application before the RT for the purpose of substitution its name in any pending suit, appeal or other proceedings.

However, the section does not prohibit challenge of transfer/assignment or prevent DRT from looking into validity of transfer/assignment. Assignment does not change the adversely impact rights of borrower in any manner. Absence of such express prohibition has the potential of being misused, delaying the recovery process.

3.1.5. No clarity on simultaneous proceedings under DRT Act and Securitisation Act

Section 13(10) of the Securitisation Act provides an impression that application before DRT can be filed by a secured creditor only where its dues are not fully satisfied with sale proceeds of the secured assets. This could not have been legislative intention, as that would have stifled the purpose of debt recovery. While the Supreme Court, in the matter of Transcore v. Union of India held that withdrawal of application pending before RT is not a precondition for taking action under Securitisation Act, and it was for the bank/ financial institution to exercise its discretion as to cases in which it may apply for leave and in cases where they may not apply for leave to withdraw, stakeholder consultations revealed that this provision has often being misused by non-genuine borrowers to stifle the recovery proceedings.
3.1.6. Exercise of jurisdiction by other judicial foras

Section 34 of the Securitisation Act bars civil courts from entertaining any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which a RT is empowered to determine. Further, no injunction can be granted by any court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under the Securitisation Act or DRT Act.

However, the legislation fails to prescribe consequences of entertaining suit, or grant of injunction, by civil courts or any other court, contrary to provisions of the Securitisation Act. Absence of provisions specifying accountability/adverse consequences in case of violation of provisions of the Securitisation Act, make its provisions ineffective, and inconsequential.

Such concerns have been validated by stakeholder interactions wherein it was pointed out that civil courts, high courts and other judicial forums often ignore the provisions of the Securitisation Act and exercise jurisdiction, passing orders that have adverse impact on the rights of banks and financial institutions.

3.2. Issues relating to sub-optimal modes of recovery

3.2.1. Taking over of management by secured creditor for a limited time period

Section 15(4) of the Securitisation Act allows the secured creditor to take over management of borrower’s business for the purpose of recovery of debt. The section further requires a secured creditor to restore the management of business to the borrower upon realisation of its debt in full. The intention of such provisions seems to prevent unjust enrichment of secured creditor.

However, it must be realised that it is the duty of borrower to manage its business efficiently, and repay the debt due to the secured creditor. The secured creditor will be required to put in additional efforts and resources to turn around the business of the borrower, from which the borrower will be benefitted as it gets back management of the business in a healthy state. The secured creditor will not benefit from putting in any additional efforts, save recovering the original debt, repaying which was responsibility of the borrower. Such sub-optimal provisions often make the measures available for debt recovery unattractive. This was validated during stakeholder consultations, as it was mentioned that stakeholders do not prefer recovery through use of this mode. This has also resulted in limited expertise amongst stakeholders in taking over and turning around of management of borrowers.

3.2.2. Lack of clarity on process of taking over of possession, when actual possession is with third party

While the Securitisation Act allows secured creditors to recover debt by speedily taking possession of secured assets and affecting its transfer, there might be situations wherein the secured assets are already in possession of third parties, claiming interest in the secured assets, such as, tenants. In such cases, a difficulty might arise should the secured creditor require actual possession of the property. In addition, it has been often argued that Securitisation Act provides for power to take symbolic possession and not actual possession.
Absence of statutory clarity on tenant rights, differentiation between rights created after the initiation of securitisation proceedings, and power to take actual possession, often delays the recovery of debt.

3.2.3. Requirement for consent of borrower for sale of moveable property

The Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 provides that sale of moveable property/security by any method other than public auction or public tender shall be on such terms as may be settled by parties in writing. It is not clear if consent of the borrower is required to sell moveable property by a private treaty. In the matter of *J. Rajiv Subramaniam v. Pandian*\(^\text{157}\), it was held that in case of sale by private treaty, there needs to be consent of the defaulter. This makes the sale by private treaty very difficult, costly, time consuming and hinders the debt recovery process.

3.2.4. Absence of priority of secured creditor claims

The Securitisation Act does not provide priority to the charge of secured creditor, over other claims, such as statutory claims,\(^\text{158}\) even when such statutory claim arose subsequent to creation of charge in favour of secured creditor. This might lead to a situation wherein the secured creditor is making efforts and deploying resources to recover the debt, however, when the amount is recovered, statutory claims are required to be satisfied, prior to satisfaction of debt due to secured creditors.\(^\text{159}\) This might result in secured creditors remaining short-changed.

Stakeholder consultations revealed that above was often the case. It was recalled that there have been cases where entire amount recovered by a bank was directed to be deposited in government treasury.\(^\text{160}\)

Further, crown debt has historically been given first preference in laws of many countries, even though these dues were unsecured. Priority has been given to government tax claims to protect public revenue. However, in recent times, there is a global trend to reduce tax priorities. Countries such as Australia, UK, and Germany have eliminated all tax priorities, whereas in Canada they have eliminated all but withholding taxes. This trend is based on the view that the government does not need revenue at the expense of other creditors and can make up for its position as an involuntary creditor by using special collection tools at its disposal.\(^\text{161}\)

3.2.5. No definition of agriculture land

The Securitisation Act is not applicable to any security interested created in agriculture land. However, it does not define the term ‘agriculture land’. It is not clear if the revenue records would have primacy over the current use and condition of the property, and there have been conflicting decisions by adjudicatory authorities on this issue.\(^\text{162}\) Lack of clarity encourages litigation and prolongs the recovery of the debt.

3.2.6. Absence of provisions to determine correct valuation of the security

The Securitisation Act allows acquisition of rights or interest in financial assets by a securitisation company or a reconstruction company from a bank or financial institution.\(^\text{163}\) The terms and conditions of the sale are required to be agreed between the parties, and there are no guiding principles in this regard under the Securitisation Act.
Moreover, there is no provision in the Securitisation Act allowing transfer of rights or interest in financial assets by a securitisation/reconstruction company to other.\textsuperscript{164} Such arrangement handicaps the securitisation/reconstruction company and prevents price discovery of the stressed assets,\textsuperscript{165} consequently resulting in sub-optimal returns from the securitisation and reconstruction company for the bank/financial institution as well as the borrower.

Stakeholder consultations revealed that there have been concerns in relation to ARCs purchasing assets at low price and eventually selling them to original promoters or their related parties, on beneficial terms. This seems to be on account of lack of statutory provisions mandating adequate valuation and transparency of assets.\textsuperscript{166}

3.2.7. Sub-optimal securitisation and asset reconstruction process

\textit{Problems faced by lenders:} The stakeholder consultations revealed that majority of sales of secured assets to SC/RCs have been on the basis of issue of security receipts (SRs). Lender banks hold over 80 percent of the SRs, resulting in limited transfer of risk.\textsuperscript{167} In this form of the sale transaction, the NPA risk remains in the bank balance sheets - it is merely being reclassified as investment in SRs. Further, there is little improvement in the overall economic efficiency in resolution of NPAs. Consequently, the securitisation model has been proving to be sub-optimal and inefficient.

In recent past, the annual management fee of ARCs (typically around 1.5-2 percent of the acquisition value of the asset) had no linkages with the recovery from the asset. Hence, ARC had little incentive to recover or resolve assets. They just needed to hold the assets till maturity of the SRs, during which they continue to earn the management fee income. However, with some recent regulatory changes, situation seems to be improving a bit.\textsuperscript{168} However, the securitisation model has been to be costly and sub-optimal for lenders, on account of hefty up-front fee, and sub-optimal returns on investment.

\textit{Problems faced by ARCs:} Stakeholders revealed that there were a variety of procedural problems with the process of banks selling NPAs including auctions. These include inadequate time for due diligence by ARCs, and auctions that are cancelled after bids are received.

In addition, it was mentioned that a company in distress needs funds for reviving itself but, as a matter of policy, banks do not infuse fresh funds in an NPA case. An ARC can, and wants to, but is not allowed to do so - unless it acquires at least a part of the NPA first (which is not feasible if banks do not want to sell) - even though entities like private equity fund are allowed to do so. As a result, ARCs cannot contribute to reviving distressed cases. Further, in cases of rehabilitation/revival or take-over of management under Section 9(a) of SARFAESI Act, an ARC would invariably need to infuse fresh funds in the company. If, after fresh funds have been infused, a statutory authority serves an order on the borrower company impounding all or a part of the cash available (which may have either been generated from operations or resulted from fresh infusion of funds by way of debt and/or equity by the ARC) or attaching its assets in order to realize any past dues, it would not only jeopardize the company’s revival but would also put at risk the new funding arranged by the ARC.\textsuperscript{169} Consequently, the securitisation/asset reconstruction model has proven to be complicated and sub-optimal for ARCs as well.
3.3. Other issues impeding debt recovery

3.3.1. Excessive powers to the RBI

Section 12 of the Securitisation Act gives powers to the RBI to determine policy and issue directions in public interest, or to regulate financial system of the country to its advantage or to prevent the affairs of any securitisation company or reconstruction company from being conducted in a manner detrimental to the interest of investors or in any manner prejudicial to the interest of such securitisation company or reconstruction company.

These are very wide powers without any guidance in relation to usage, and thus capable of being misused. Existence and usage of such powers without necessary justification and accountability mechanisms has the potential to impose unjustifiable costs on stakeholders.

3.3.2. Discretionary application of Securitisation Act

The central government may, by way of a notification in public interest, direct that any of the provisions of the Securitisation Act shall not/ shall apply to such class or classes of banks or financial institutions, with such exceptions, modifications and adaptations as may be specified in the notification. However, there is no statutory requirement to provide rationale and justification of such action. Grant of such discretionary powers to the central government without consequent accountability provisions might result in abuse of discretion.

3.3.3. Sub-optimal provisions regarding registration of security interests

The Central Registry, as envisaged under the Securitisation Act, was operationalised in March 2011, to enable registration of security interests. The Securitisation Act, while providing for mandatory registration, does not provide priority to security interests on the basis of date of registration.

The particulars of every transaction of securitisation, asset reconstruction or creation of security interest are required to be filed on payment of fee, within thirty days, by the SC/ RC/ secured creditor, as the case may be. The SC/ RC/ secured creditor are also statutorily required to report modification/ satisfaction of security interest. Any default in filing of registration, modification or satisfaction of security interest is punishable with fine up to Rs.5000 per day of default.

The Central Registry Rules have currently been implemented only in case of equitable mortgages. The stakeholder consultations revealed that, once the provisions are fully implemented, on any given business day, lots of security interests may be modified or get satisfied. All of these will need to be registered by the bank with the Central Registry. Failure to do so will attract a fine of up to Rs.5,000 every day. One will have to think if banks will be able to handle the magnitude, or be in a position to pay the penal charges.

This provision is inspired by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code of USA which provides for registration of security interests, and provides priority to security interests based on the date of registration. Consequently, the stakeholders revealed that internationally, the perceived benefit of central registration is to enable searching of security interests, so that a lender, wanting to give a loan against an asset, may search whether a security interest already
exists. If a security interest is not registered on an asset, a lender may presume the asset is free from security interests. This benefit does not apply to India, as the Securitisation Act provides that the non-filing of security interest will not affect priority. This would mean, a lender may have obtained security interest, and not filed it, and yet claim priority over a second lender who would have searched the Central Registry, not found the charge, and hence, went ahead and sanctioned a loan on the same asset. If the fact of non-registration does not affect the validity or priority of a security interest, then the very reliability of the searching process gets negated. 176

3.3.4. Lack of competitive neutrality amongst financial institutions

Benefits of debt recovery under Securitisation Act have been accorded to banks and notified financial institutions.177 Non-bank finance companies have not been notified as yet. This creates an uneven playing field and handicaps the NBFCs, which have recourse of limited recovery options. An amendment in this regard has been proposed in the Union Budget 2015-16. 178

Having understood the baseline and the prevailing scenario with respect to the DRT Act and the Securitisation Act in detail under this chapter, the subsequent chapters will delve on the cost of the baseline scenario, possible legislative alternatives and costs and benefits thereof.
Chapter 5: Estimation of costs

1. Background

The previous chapter identified the sub-optimal nature of provisions and other issues remained uncovered under the SARFAESI Act and DRT Act. Further, the chapter corroborated the deficient nature of provisions and absence of provisions under the aforesaid legislations, through literature review, review of existing research and experts reports, primary data collection, and stakeholder consultations undertaken under this project.

This chapter intends to undertake a theoretical estimation of additional costs on multiple stakeholders owing to existence of such sub-optimal provisions and absence of optimal provisions, for ascertaining and highlighting their impact on various stakeholders.

2. Identification of Costs

Regulations/ legislations usually have widespread impacts, which affect the multiple stakeholder groups in different ways. A sub-optimal regulation / legislation can lead to higher costs of compliance, increased complexity and uncertainty associated with regulatory obligations, and most importantly, limits the likelihood of achievement of intended objectives.

The costs of legislations can be broadly classified into two broad categories – Direct Costs and Indirect Costs. **Direct costs** involve direct financial costs, costs of compliance with the regulation / legislation, administrative costs, etc. These include regulatory charges such as fees, levies and fines paid directly to the enforcing agency and / or government. Further, compliance cost includes ‘hassle cost’, reflecting time and resources spent in complying with relevant laws / regulations. Thus, with respect to debt recovery, the cost of compliance is what banks and financial institutions, and borrowers incur in meeting legal and regulatory requirements stipulated under the SARFAESI Act and DRT Act. Administrative cost is the cost incurred by the government in implementation of law/ regulation, including its effective enforcement.

**Indirect costs**, on the other hand, include the costs which are additional costs and are not accounted for by the direct costs. These include costs of delays (calculated as revenue loss/ opportunity costs), impact on market structure, facilitation payments, etc.

Figure 5.1 illustrates different types of costs that sub-optimal provisions / absence of provisions can impose on banks and financial institutions, government, regulators and public at large.
The following sections are divided into two broad heads – the DRT Act and SARFAESI Act. Each section provides a theoretical estimation of superfluous costs imposed on various stakeholders, owing to sub-optimal provisions/ absence of optimal provisions in the DRT Act and SARFAESI Act.

2.1. DRT Act

As discussed in the previous chapter, cases in RTs are subject to long delays, and consequently result in incremental costs on stakeholders’ involved as amounts locked up in legal proceedings results in severe under-utilisation of resources. In other words, delay in decision making and consequent recovery of bank dues increases cost for different categories of stakeholders, viz., banks and financial institutions, government / regulators and society. The costs are computed on the basis of delay in decision making at RTs and other issues impending performance of RTs.

2.1.1. Opportunity Cost

The concept of opportunity cost emphasises the problem of choice. Opportunity costs are technically referred to as implicit cost of capital raised and invested. It may be defined as the rate of return associated with the best investment opportunity that would be foregone. In other words, opportunity cost is the potential additional return on the opportunity foregone by not putting funds elsewhere because they have been invested in other investment avenues. With respect to recovery of bank dues, opportunity cost includes the interest gains foregone on amount stuck in NPA cases locked up in legal proceedings for substantially longer periods.

In this regard, a study of randomly selected cases pending before / disposed by four DRTs (Chandigarh DRT, Jabalpur DRT, Jaipur DRT and Lucknow DRT) was carried out under the project (as mentioned in the previous chapter). It was observed that the recommendatory timeframe of 180 days (approximately 6 months) to dispose of the application (as provided under the DRT Act), is hardly complied with. Around 75 per cent of the cases were dragged on for more than a period of one year. As a result, approximately 6 months of interest gains are foregone on these cases.
An illustrative list of cases pending before / disposed by above mentioned DRTs, and the actual time taken along with approximate delay in disposing the cases is summarised in Table 5.1 below. For a diagrammatic representation of figure 5.1, see figure 4.3 in the earlier chapter.

Table 5.1: List of cases with actual time taken (along with approximate delay)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Name</th>
<th>DRT</th>
<th>Date of filing</th>
<th>Date of disposal</th>
<th>Actual time taken</th>
<th>Approximate delay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kamesh Bhargava Hospital vs. DRAT &amp; Ors.</td>
<td>Chandigarh</td>
<td>June 2007</td>
<td>July 2011</td>
<td>&gt;4 years</td>
<td>43 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/s A Private Limited (Borrower) vs. Public Sector Bank*</td>
<td>Chandigarh</td>
<td>March 2012</td>
<td>Yet to be disposed of</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>30 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. B (Borrower) vs. Public Sector Bank*</td>
<td>Jabalpur</td>
<td>July 2010</td>
<td>December 2012</td>
<td>2 years &amp; 5 months</td>
<td>23 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/s C Private Limited (Borrower) vs. Public Sector Bank*</td>
<td>Jaipur</td>
<td>March 2008</td>
<td>December 2009</td>
<td>1 year &amp; 8 months</td>
<td>14 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSL &amp; Industries Limited vs. M/s Arihant Threads Limited and Ors.</td>
<td>Chandigarh</td>
<td>December 2001</td>
<td>July 2003</td>
<td>1 year &amp; 7 months</td>
<td>13 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/s D &amp; Sons (Borrower) vs. Public Sector Bank*</td>
<td>Lucknow</td>
<td>February 2010</td>
<td>March 2011</td>
<td>1 year &amp; 1 month</td>
<td>7 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/s E Private Limited (Borrower) vs. Public Sector Bank*</td>
<td>Jaipur</td>
<td>July 2013</td>
<td>May 2014</td>
<td>10 months</td>
<td>4 months</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Information in relation to these cases has been provided on the condition of anonymity. Hence, names remain undisclosed.

Accordingly, delay in disposing of the matter (average delay of 19 months) was noticed in all cases, and not even a single case got disposed of within the recommendatory time frame of 180 days. This has the potential to foist additional costs in the form of interest gains foregone (opportunity cost), on banks and financial institutions. Table 5.2 below depicts additional cost on account of amount stuck in cases pending for extended time beyond recommendatory time period provided under the DRT Act.

Table 5.2: Calculation of opportunity costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Name</th>
<th>Amount (Rs. in crores)</th>
<th>Present Value(^{180}) (Rs. in crores)</th>
<th>Opportunity Cost(^{181}) (Rs. in crores)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kamesh Bhargava Hospital vs. DRAT &amp; Ors.</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.2: Calculation of opportunity costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Name</th>
<th>Amount (Rs. in crores)</th>
<th>Present Value (^{180}) (Rs. in crores)</th>
<th>Opportunity Cost (^{181}) (Rs. in crores)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M/s A Private Limited (Borrower) vs. Public Sector Bank</td>
<td>4.96</td>
<td>6.02</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. B (Borrower) vs. Public Sector Bank</td>
<td>5.17</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/s C Private Limited (Borrower) vs. Public Sector Bank</td>
<td>4.54</td>
<td>4.97</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSL &amp; Industries Limited vs. M/s Arihant Threads Limited and Ors.</td>
<td>25.27</td>
<td>27.47</td>
<td>2.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/s D &amp; Sons (Borrower) vs. Public Sector Bank</td>
<td>6.47</td>
<td>6.77</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/s E Private Limited (Borrower) vs. Public Sector Bank</td>
<td>52.41</td>
<td>53.81</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.60</strong></td>
<td><strong>107.38</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.78</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table reveals that the total additional cost of Rs.6.78 crore (in the form of interest loss) is put on secured creditors, owing to delayed recovery of outstanding debts, by around 19 months. Simply stated, the average time period for recovery of every Rs.100 cr. due is around 25 months (statutory period of 6 months and average delay of 19 months), resulting in opportunity cost of around Rs. 6 cr.\(^{182}\) This results in distrust in the banking sector, which has an adverse impact on economy as a whole.

While the average time taken to dispose of matters is around two years, often, cases are dragged beyond two years, up to four years. This has been validated by stakeholders as well.

Experts have indicated that only about one-fourth of the cases pending at the beginning of the year get disposed of during a particular year – suggesting a four year wait even if the DRTs focus only on old cases.\(^{183}\) Accordingly, approximately 75 per cent of cases remain pending for 2 years. Similarly, 50 per cent and 25 per cent of cases remain pending for 3 years and 4 years respectively, which consequently have cost attached to it (assuming that around 25 per cent of the cases get disposed of within the recommendatory period of 180 days).

As on March 31, 2014, a total of 66,971 matters / cases involving Rs.141,500 crore are pending at 33 DRTs across the country.\(^{184}\) Considering a four year wait to dispose all the pending cases, the amount which banks and financial institutions can hope to recover is a pittance. Consequently, delay in obtaining decisions in relation to outstanding debts leads to incremental opportunity cost to banks and financial institutions.

Assuming that of the amount due at the end of fiscal 2014, 25 percent will be recovered every subsequent fiscal, table 5.3 below depicts the additional costs on account of cases pending beyond recommendatory time period provided under the DRT Act.
Table 5.3: Calculation of opportunity costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No.</th>
<th>Proportionate Share recovered (in %)</th>
<th>Amount recovered (Rs. in crores) (A)</th>
<th>Period of additional pendency</th>
<th>Present Value(^{186}) (Rs. in crores) (B)</th>
<th>Opportunity Cost Rs. in crores) (B-A)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>35,375</td>
<td>36 months</td>
<td>44,562</td>
<td>9,187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>70,750</td>
<td>24 months</td>
<td>82,523</td>
<td>11,773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>106,125</td>
<td>12 months</td>
<td>114,615</td>
<td>8,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>29,450</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table reflects that the total additional cost to be borne by banks and financial institutions is as high as Rs.25,000 crore. In addition, when recovery actually takes place, the enterprise has usually been stripped clean of value.\(^{187}\)

DRATs are also subject to similar problem, as cases before DRATs are disposed of with protracted delays. A detailed analysis of 22 randomly selected cases pending before / disposed by DRAT Chennai under the project reveals that around 73 per cent were pending for more than one year, and recommendatory time period under the DRT Act is complied with in rare cases.\(^{188}\)

A list of cases pending before / disposed by DRAT Chennai, and the actual time taken along with approximate delay is disposing the cases is summarised in Table 5.4 below. For a diagrammatic representation, see Figure 4.4 in the previous chapter.

Table 5.4: List of cases with actual time taken (along with approximate delay)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Amount (Rs. in Lakh)</th>
<th>Period involved</th>
<th>Actual time taken</th>
<th>Statutory time period</th>
<th>Approximate delay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moily Joseph v. PNB</td>
<td>56.50</td>
<td>July 2010 – December 2011</td>
<td>1 year and 5 months</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>9 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Geetha v. BoI</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>July 2010 – July 2013</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>30 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.Umashankar &amp; anr v. ING Vysya Bank Ltd</td>
<td>11.21</td>
<td>July 2010 - March 2013</td>
<td>2 years and 8 months</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>26 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Praneeth Tobacco Company v. Central Bank</td>
<td>13.00</td>
<td>July 2010 – March 2012</td>
<td>1 year and 8 months</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>14 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precision Fastening v. State Bank of Mysore</td>
<td>72.00</td>
<td>September 2010 – May 2014</td>
<td>3 years and 8 months</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>38 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr.Shakeel Ahmed I Kalghatgi v. A.O., SBI</td>
<td>135.00</td>
<td>October 2010 - March 2012</td>
<td>1 year and 5 months</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>9 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr.Srinivasan v. The Indian Bank</td>
<td>52.00</td>
<td>October 2010 - March 2012</td>
<td>1 year and 5 months</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>9 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/s.Rajendra Rice mill v. IOB</td>
<td>130.00</td>
<td>November 2010 -</td>
<td>4 years and 1</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>43 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Amount (Rs. in Lakh)</td>
<td>Period involved</td>
<td>Actual time taken</td>
<td>Statutory time period</td>
<td>Approximate delay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/s Arunachaleswar Mills &amp; ors v. The A.O., Indian Bank</td>
<td>356.00</td>
<td>December 2014 month</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/s Janata Seva And Cold Storage Pvt Ltd v. State Bank of India &amp; anr</td>
<td>390.00</td>
<td>December 2010 - March 2013 2 years and 4 months</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>21 months</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K.K.Palanivelan v. The State Bank of India &amp; ors</td>
<td>1266.00</td>
<td>December 2010 - July 2011 7 months</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>1 month</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.Purushothaman v. City Union Bank Ltd</td>
<td>97.00</td>
<td>January 2011 - January 2012 1 year</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Ravi &amp; anr v. AO, ICICI Bank Ltd.</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>January 2011 - March 2012 1 year and 2 months</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>8 months</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. Karnan v. A.O., Vijaya Bank</td>
<td>13.00</td>
<td>February 2011 - March 2012 4 years</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>42 months</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.S. Gangadhar v. The Authorised officer, Indian Bank &amp;ors</td>
<td>207.00</td>
<td>March 2011 - February 2012 11 months</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>5 months</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Santhanam v. A.O., Punjab &amp; Sind Bank &amp; anr</td>
<td>86.00</td>
<td>May 2011 - April 2013 1 year and 11 months</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>17 months</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Gopalakrishnan V/S Indian Bank</td>
<td>8000.00</td>
<td>April 2011 – August 2013 2 years and 4 months</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>22 months</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Marys Hotel (P) Ltd V/S A.O., The Kottayam Dist Co-operative Bank ltd</td>
<td>341.00</td>
<td>May 2011 – June 2014 3 years and 1 month</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>31 months</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ravindra G. Kolle &amp; anr V/S SBI</td>
<td>912.00</td>
<td>August 2010 – October 2010 3 months</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>No delay</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/s Landmark Infrastructures V/S IOB</td>
<td>533.00</td>
<td>October 2010 – March 2011 5 months</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>No delay</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manrish Textile Corporation &amp; ors V/S BOB &amp; anr</td>
<td>1100.00</td>
<td>January 2011 – April 2011 4 months</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>No delay</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.S. Suganya V/S IOB</td>
<td>135.00</td>
<td>March 2011 – June 2011 3 months</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>No delay</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Accordingly, delay (average delay of 16 months) was noticed in more than 80 per cent of the cases studied, which consequently has costs attached to it.

Table 5.5 below depicts additional cost on account of amount stuck in cases pending for extended time period beyond recommendatory time period provided under the DRT Act.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Amount (Rs. in Lakh)</th>
<th>Approximate delay</th>
<th>Present Value(^{189}) (Rs. in Lakh)</th>
<th>Opportunity Cost (Rs. in Lakh)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moily Joseph v. PNB</td>
<td>56.50</td>
<td>9 months</td>
<td>59.89</td>
<td>3.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Geetha v. BoI</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>30 months</td>
<td>4.85</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.Umashankar &amp; anr v. ING Vysya Bank ltd</td>
<td>11.21</td>
<td>26 months</td>
<td>13.25</td>
<td>2.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Praneeth Tobacco Company v. Central Bank</td>
<td>13.00</td>
<td>14 months</td>
<td>14.23</td>
<td>1.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precision Fastening v. State Bank of Mysore</td>
<td>72.00</td>
<td>38 months</td>
<td>91.90</td>
<td>19.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr.Shakeel Ahmed I Kalghatgi v. A.O., SBI</td>
<td>135.00</td>
<td>9 months</td>
<td>143.10</td>
<td>8.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr.Srinivasan v. The Indian Bank</td>
<td>52.00</td>
<td>9 months</td>
<td>55.12</td>
<td>3.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/s.Rajendra Rice mill v. IOB</td>
<td>130.00</td>
<td>43 months</td>
<td>171.40</td>
<td>41.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/s.Arunachaleswarar Mills &amp; ors v. The A.O., Indian Bank</td>
<td>356.00</td>
<td>22 months</td>
<td>410.11</td>
<td>54.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/s. Janata Seva And Cold Storage Pvt Ltd v. State Bank of India &amp; anr</td>
<td>390.00</td>
<td>21 months</td>
<td>446.47</td>
<td>56.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K.K.Palanivelan v. The State Bank of India &amp; ors</td>
<td>1266.00</td>
<td>1 month</td>
<td>1274.44</td>
<td>8.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.Purushothaman v. City Union Bank ltd</td>
<td>97.00</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>100.88</td>
<td>3.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Ravi &amp; anr v. AO, ICICI Bank Ltd.</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>8 months</td>
<td>21.07</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.Karan v. A.O., Vijaya Bank</td>
<td>13.00</td>
<td>42 months</td>
<td>17.03</td>
<td>4.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.S.Gangadhar v. The Authorised officer, Indian Bank &amp; ors</td>
<td>207.00</td>
<td>5 months</td>
<td>213.90</td>
<td>6.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.Santhanam v. A.O., Punjab &amp; Sind Bank &amp; anr</td>
<td>86.00</td>
<td>17 months</td>
<td>95.98</td>
<td>9.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.Gopalakrishnan V/S Indian Bank</td>
<td>8000.00</td>
<td>22 months</td>
<td>9216</td>
<td>1216</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{189}\) Present Value calculated using discount rate of 15%.
Table 5.5: Calculation of opportunity cost

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Amount (Rs. in Lakh)</th>
<th>Approximate delay</th>
<th>Present Value(^{189}) (Rs. in Lakh)</th>
<th>Opportunity Cost (Rs. in Lakh)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>St. Marys Hotel (P) ltd V/S A.O., The Kottayam Dist Co-operative Bank ltd</td>
<td>341.00</td>
<td>31 months</td>
<td>416.30</td>
<td>75.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ravindra G. Kolle &amp; anr V/S SBI</td>
<td>912.00</td>
<td>No delay</td>
<td>912.00</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/s Landmark Infrastructures V/S IOB</td>
<td>533.00</td>
<td>No delay</td>
<td>533.00</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manish Textile Corporation &amp; ors V/S BOB &amp; anr</td>
<td>1100.00</td>
<td>No delay</td>
<td>1100.00</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.S. Suganya V/S IOB</td>
<td>135.00</td>
<td>No delay</td>
<td>135.00</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>13929.71</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>15445.92</strong></td>
<td><strong>1516.21</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table reflects the total additional cost of Rs.1516.21 lakhs (or Rs.15.16 crore) is to be borne by banks and financial institutions on account of loss of interests gains, because of delay in disposing appeals by Chennai DRAT. Simply stated, the average time period for recovery of every Rs.139 cr. due is around 22 months (statutory period of 6 months and average delay of 16 months), resulting in opportunity cost of around Rs.15 cr\(^{190}\).

Currently, there are 5 DRATs functioning across the country.\(^{191}\) As on December 31, 2014, total number of cases collectively pending before 5 DRATs is 1,010.\(^{192}\) This means that around 200 cases are pending per DRAT on an average. Given that DRATs are overburdened with colossal number of cases and consequently, it might be beyond the capacity of merely 5 persons (one Chairperson per DRAT), to expeditiously deal with such huge pendency. As a result, banks and financial institutions have to bear the cost, owing to such delay.\(^{193}\)

### 2.1.2. Market Costs

Market costs are the costs on other stakeholders in the market, such non-defaulting borrowers, depositors, and taxpayers.

Experts have noted that when the large promoter defaults and secured creditors fails to recover the outstanding bank dues, the hard working savers and honest taxpayers of the country pay for such default.\(^{194}\) In other words, while the unscrupulous borrowers enjoy a privileged existence, risking other people’s money, the latter have to suffer in form of higher interest rates, increased tax burden, and other social costs.

It has also been noted that the promoter who misuses the system ensures that banks then charge a premium for bank loans. The average interest rate on loans to the power sector is 13.7 per cent even when the policy rate is around 8 per cent. The excess of interest rate on power sector loans over the policy rate (commonly known as credit risk premium) to the extent of 5.7 per cent, is largely compensation banks demand for the risk of default and non-payment. Even comparing the interest rate on power sector loan with average rate available
on home loan of 10.7 per cent, it is obvious that genuine power sector firms are paying much more than the average household (precisely by 300 basis points) because bank worries about whether they will recover loans.\textsuperscript{195}

In addition, experts have noted the social cost of the amount of loans (i.e., Rs.161,018 crore, equivalent to 1.27 per cent of GDP) written off by commercial banks in last five years is as huge as it would have allowed 1.5 million of the poorest children to get a full university degree from top private universities of the country.\textsuperscript{196}

Further, as seen in past, several governments have utilised taxpayers’ funds to prevent bank failures, of which one of the reasons could be insufficient recovery of due amount. The Indian government has also indicated that it will recapitalise public sector banks, as and when required, and it believed that the government will not let large banks fail.\textsuperscript{197} Such sub-optimal allocation of funds prevents utilisation of public money for public good. As a result, society as a whole has to bear the cost of mis-utilisation of public money by few impish borrowers.\textsuperscript{198}

\subsection*{2.1.3. Direct financial costs}

Direct financial costs include regulatory charges such as fees, levies and fines, which are paid directly to the enforcing agency and / or government. Further, litigation cost is also part of direct financial cost. Accordingly, application fee paid to initiate the RT proceedings, and litigation cost constitutes direct financial costs.

The minimum and maximum fee for filing of application at DRT (original application / securitisation application) is Rs. 12,000 and Rs.1.5 lakh respectively.\textsuperscript{199} Similarly, maximum fee for filing appeal against the order of DRT is Rs.30,000.\textsuperscript{200} Interestingly, even after two decades of promulgation of the DRT Act, the fee structure under the Act has not changed. Further, when an appeal is filed in DRAT, then the borrower is required to deposit a portion of amount due with the DRAT (75 per cent in case of matters under DRT Act and 50 per cent in case of matters under Securitisation Act).

In addition, litigants have to bear advocates’ fee and other litigation expenses as well. Stakeholder interactions revealed that total cost of litigation is approximately 4-5 per cent of the due amount. With exponential increase in cases (involving large sum of outstanding debts) referred to DRTs, the opportunity cost of litigation is exceedingly high.

During the year 2013-14, a total of 28,258 cases (involving Rs.55,300 crore) were referred to DRTs.\textsuperscript{201} Consequently, the opportunity cost of litigation for the same period comes out to be around Rs.2,000 crore.\textsuperscript{202}

\subsection*{2.1.4. Administrative cost}

Administrative cost is the cost incurred by the government in administering law, including its effective enforcement. In other words, the expenses associated with the management and direction of a program, policy or law is termed as administrative cost. It typically includes executive compensation, office costs and other expenses not directly associated with the execution of the activity.

The Union Budget for 2015-16 allocated Rs.102.28 crore for RTs for the year 2015-16, which is around 35.38 per cent higher than the revised budget estimate of Rs.75.55 crore for the year 2014-15.\textsuperscript{203} Similar jump in budget allocations to RTs can be noticed in the
immediately previous year, where the revised budget estimate for the year 2014-15 is around 44.58 per cent higher than actual budget allocation of Rs.52.25 crore for the year 2013-14. Consequently, considerable administrative cost is incurred by the government for effective management and administration of RTs.

2.2. SARFAESI Act

As discussed in the previous chapter, the SARFAESI Act was enacted with the objective to make the debt recovery swifter. The intent of law makers was to enable banks and financial institutions enforce their security interest, without going through the stringent court procedure so that debts could be recovered speedily. But the SARFAESI Act has not been successful in achievement of its objectives. Sub-optimal provisions/ absence of optimal provisions under SARFAESI Act have resulted in inordinate delays in debt recovery, leading to imposition of significant costs on stakeholders.

2.2.1. Opportunity Cost

The recovery rate of matters pending under SARFAESI Act in the fiscal 2011-12 was 28.62 percent, which subsequently reduced to 27.16 percent and 25.80 percent in 2012-13 and 2013-14, respectively. Therefore, the average recovery ratio comes out to be around 27 percent, which means that even assuming that the entire amount would be recovered in due course, still it will take at least 3.5 years to recover that amount.

As on March 31, 2014, total amount remain unrecovered under the SARFAESI mode was Rs.70,200 crore. Considering that three and half years would be required to recover the total amount, table 5.6 below depicts the additional costs on account of inordinate delay in recovery of due debt under the SARFAESI mode.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No.</th>
<th>Proportionate Share recovered (in %)</th>
<th>Amount recovered (Rs. in crores) (A)</th>
<th>Period of additional pendency (months)</th>
<th>Present Value (Rs. in crores) (B)</th>
<th>Additional Cost (B-A)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>19.00</td>
<td>13,338</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>16,802</td>
<td>3,464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>46.00</td>
<td>32,292</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>37,665</td>
<td>5,373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>73.00</td>
<td>51,246</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>55,345</td>
<td>4,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12,937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Estimated loss</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table reflects that the total additional cost to be borne by banks and financial institutions is as high as Rs.10,000 crore.

The above opportunity cost would further be increased by the costs put on secured creditors, owing to delay in decision making at RTs since the SARFAESI matters are also referred to RTs. Table 4.5 in the previous chapter lists out select cases which remained pending for prolonged period on account of delay in settlement and non-appearance of parties. Similarly, most DRTs and DRATs across the country are also subject to similar delays in disposing of securitisation applications. This has been revealed by analysis undertaken under the project, and further corroborated by stakeholders consulted.
In addition, a review of select cases under the project suggests that even when borrowers fail to discharge their liability within the stipulated time period; considerable time passes before banks or financial institutions are in a position to take relevant actions under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act. This incurs costs on banks and financial institutions in the form of interest gains foregone.

Table 5.7 below depicts an illustrative list of cases where action under section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act was taken after substantial period of time, resulting in additional costs on secured creditors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Name</th>
<th>Date of 13(2) notice</th>
<th>Date of taking action u/s 13(4)</th>
<th>Delay in taking action</th>
<th>Amount involved (Rs. in lakhs)</th>
<th>Present Value 212 (Rs. in Lakh)</th>
<th>Additional costs (Rs. in Lakh)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M/s A Private Limited vs. Public Sector Bank*</td>
<td>November 7, 2013</td>
<td>April 29, 2014</td>
<td>83 days</td>
<td>77.54</td>
<td>78.95</td>
<td>1.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shri Siddeshwara Cooperative Bank Limited vs. Ikbal and Ors. (SC)</td>
<td>June 30, 2005</td>
<td>December 18, 2005</td>
<td>81 days</td>
<td>10.43</td>
<td>10.61</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/s B &amp; Sons (Borrower) vs. Public Sector Bank*</td>
<td>September 10, 2009</td>
<td>February 3, 2010</td>
<td>56 days</td>
<td>600.47</td>
<td>607.84</td>
<td>7.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somnath Manocha vs. Punjab &amp; Sindh Bank &amp; Ors. (Delhi HC)</td>
<td>November 20, 2004</td>
<td>April 13, 2005</td>
<td>53 days</td>
<td>384.60</td>
<td>389.07</td>
<td>4.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jayant Agencies vs. Canara Bank and Anr. (Jharkhand HC)</td>
<td>January 13, 2010</td>
<td>May 31, 2010</td>
<td>48 days</td>
<td>56.92</td>
<td>57.52</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/s C Private Limited vs. Public Sector Bank*</td>
<td>October 14, 2010</td>
<td>February 25, 2011</td>
<td>43 days</td>
<td>72.45</td>
<td>73.13</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. D (Borrower) vs. Public Sector Bank*</td>
<td>June 12, 2007</td>
<td>October 18, 2007</td>
<td>37 days</td>
<td>85.00</td>
<td>85.69</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dauli Kumari vs. the State of Bihar (Patna HC)</td>
<td>August 18, 2006</td>
<td>December 15, 2006</td>
<td>28 days</td>
<td>11.52</td>
<td>11.59</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1298.93</strong></td>
<td><strong>1314.40</strong></td>
<td><strong>15.47</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Information in relation to these cases has been provided on the condition of anonymity. Hence, names remain undisclosed.

The above table reveals that the total additional cost of Rs.15.47 lakhs, equivalent to 1.19 percent (in the form of interest loss) is put on secured creditors, owing to delay in taking action, by approximately 54 days.
2.2.2. Market costs

When a borrower defaults and as a result, while bank suffers loss, someone has to pay for it. These are the honest taxpayers of the country, who actually pays for the default of the defaulting borrowers. Therefore, market costs are the costs on imposed taxpayers and citizens of the country.

To make securitisation process efficient, government has proposed setting up of specialised securitisation and asset reconstruction companies. Setting up of such specialised agencies by the government, with public money and selling bad loans outright at market price to them, has cost attached to it. Desk research reveals that the government is looking at the option of setting up of National Asset Management Company (NAMCO) with public money for transferring bad assets to it. NAMCO will have Rs.20,000 crore of equity capital and it will issue Rs.80,000 crore of government-guaranteed bonds. Therefore, setting up of a specialised entity like NAMCO has an opportunity cost as Rs.1,00,000 crore of public money could retire Rs.1,00,000 crore of public debt or build 10,000 crore of six-lane expressways.

2.2.3. Direct financial costs

As mentioned above, direct financial costs comprise regulatory charges such as fees, levies and fines, which are paid directly to the enforcing agency and / or government.

Every securitisation application/ appeal filed with RTs is accompanied by a fee, which could be as high as Rs.100,000.

In addition, banks and financial institutions have to bear litigation fee, payment to enforcement agencies, publication cost, and other litigation expenses as well. Stakeholder interactions revealed that total cost comes out to be approximately 7-8 per cent of the due amount.

While this chapter estimated the cost imposed by sub-optimal provisions/ absence of optimal provisions under the DRT Act and SARFAESI Act, the next chapter discusses the statutory alternatives to select provisions in these legislations and estimates costs and benefits thereof.
Chapter 6: Alternatives and their impact

1. Background

The previous chapters have discussed the baseline scenario with respect to the DRT Act and the Securitisation Act, unreasonable costs imposed on stakeholders on account of sub-optimal provisions of these Act, or the absence of adequate provisions.

This chapter attempts to provide legislative alternatives to select provisions in these legislations, with the objective of reduction in costs, and consequent improvement in benefits. The chapter is divided in two broad sections discussing legislative alternatives to select provisions of DRT Act and Securitisation Act, and their consequent impact.

2. DRT Act

2.1. Threshold for filing applications at RTs

*Alternative 1: Increase in threshold limit and placing the same in schedule, subject to periodic review*

In order to ensure that number of matters filed at DRTs remain manageable, and prevent filing of insignificant matters, it is suggested that the eligibility criteria for filing application at DRT be revised. The DRT Act should not provide any financial eligibility criteria, which must be put in its Schedule. As the financial threshold has not be revised since enactment of the DRT Act, a review of the amount must be undertaken and the same should be revised on the basis of rate of inflation/ inflation index since enactment of statute. Further, a specific section could be added in the DRT Act that amount in the Schedule be reviewed every three years on the basis of inflation index, and revision of amount will be possible through executive order, notified to the Parliament. This would also require an amendment in section 1(4) of the DRT Act. Similarly, it is suggested that a periodic review of application fees be carried out, and same should be suitably amended.

*Costs of alternative 1*

As a result of alternative 1, assuming an average annual risk free interest rate of around 5 percent, the threshold limit needs to be revised to around Rs. 25 lakhs, from current Rs. 10 lakhs. Similarly, the minimum application fee needs to be revised to around Rs. 30,000. As a result, potential applicants of threshold below Rs. 25 lakhs, or not in a position to pay minimum application fee of Rs. 30,000, will have to approach civil courts for recovery of debts. Estimates suggest that time taken for hearing of matters at civil courts is significantly longer, when compared with the RTs. This will increase the opportunity cost for such applicants.

*Cost of alternative 1: Increase in opportunity cost of potential applicants who will not be in a position to pay the increased application fee of Rs. 30,000 or with matters valued below Rs. 25 lakh*

*Benefits of alternative 1*

While evidence does not suggest a direct causal relationship between reduction in number of cases and increase in disposal rate (see figures 6.1 below), an increase in threshold limit is
expected to reduce the number of matters filed at RTs, thereby lighten the burden on DRTs and have a positive impact on disposal rate. An improvement in disposal rate is also expected to reduce the pendency and consequently save the opportunity cost for existing litigants.

**Benefit of alternative 1: Reduction in the rate of increase of pendency at RTs**

![Image of Trends in Debt Recovery Graph](image)

*Figure 6.1. Trends in debt recovery*

*Source: Statistical Tables Relating to Banks in India, Table 19: NPAs of scheduled commercial banks recovered through various channels, December 2014*

As is evident from figures 6.1, the amount recovered/ disposal rate has not undergone significant changes with change in number of cases referred at RTs and consequent amount involved.

**Alternative 2: Power to central government to determine the threshold limit in rules**

It is suggested that the threshold limits for application of DRT Act must not be stated in the statute. The central government must have the power to determine the limit through Rules, in consultation with the RTs, on the basis of capability and efficiency of RTs, measured on an on-going basis. Further, deciding the application fees must also be prerogative of RTs, which should keep in mind that applicants are financial institutions who can afford to pay for speedy recovery of loans.221

However, central government must be required to provide reasons and undertake a regulatory impact assessment, estimate and highlight additional cost and benefits of the revised threshold limits, before adopting the same.

**Costs of alternative 2**

There might not be any immediate costs of alternative 2, other than the cost of undertaking a regulatory impact assessment should the government wish to revise the threshold limits. The
costs will be accrued once the threshold limits are changed. Owing to absence of immediate change on account of alternative 2, the baseline scenario is expected to continue.

**Costs of alternative 2: Cost to undertake regulatory impact assessment**

**Benefits of alternative 2**

There might not be any immediate benefits of alternative 2, other than greater flexibility with the central government to revise the threshold limits to approach the RTs. The benefits will accrue once the threshold limits are changed. Owing to absence of immediate change on account of alternative 2, the baseline scenario is expected to continue.

**Benefits of alternative 2: Increased flexibility with central government**

### 2.2. Number of RTs

**Alternative 1: Increase in the number of RTs**

As discussed earlier, the average number of cases currently pending per RT is around 2.5 times the ideal pendency per DRT (as recommended by Deshpande Committee). Consequently, there is a need to increase the number of DRTs.\(^{222}\)

Budget 15-16 allocates Rs. 102.28 cr. for debt recovery tribunals.\(^{223}\) Assuming that the six additional DRTs, as proposed by government in budget 14-15, will be functional during fiscal 16, the average allocation per DRT comes to around Rs. 2.62 cr. (exclusive of DRATs, and additional infrastructure cost for setting up of DRT).

The cost and benefits of increase in number of DRTs is expected to be positively correlated to the number of additional DRTs proposed to be established. This will depend on the number of cases expected to be pending at DRTs.

- **Scenario 1: High pendency**

Assuming an increase in pendency by around 50 percent, that the total number of matters pending at DRT on 31 March 2015 are expected to be close to 90,000\(^{224}\), making average pendency around 2300 cases per PO.\(^{225}\) In order to reach ideal pendency of 800 cases per DRT, the total number of DRTs required would be around 112, i.e. 73 additional DRTs.

**Cost of scenario 1**

The cost of establishing and operationalising additional 73 DRTs is expected to be close to Rs. 192 cr. (in addition to infrastructure cost) In addition, significant efforts for identification of skilled candidates capable of manning DRTs, strategic planning of location and jurisdiction of DRTs etc. would be required.

**Direct cost of scenario 1:** Rs. 192 cr., additional infrastructure cost  
**Indirect cost of scenario 1:** significant efforts and costs in identification of skilled candidates, planning of location and jurisdiction of DRTs.
Scenario 2: Low pendency

Average annual pendency during last few years has been around 50,000 cases. Assuming no change in average pendency during fiscal 2015, the total number of DRTs required to achieve ideal pendency would be around 63, i.e. 24 more than the existing number.

The cost of establishing and operationalising additional 24 DRTs is expected to be close to Rs. 63 cr. (in addition to infrastructure cost) In addition, reasonable efforts for identification of skilled candidates capable of manning DRTs, strategic planning of location and jurisdiction of DRTs etc. would be required.

Direct cost of scenario 2: Rs. 63 cr., additional infrastructure cost

Indirect cost of scenario 1: Reasonable efforts and costs in identification of skilled candidates, planning of location and jurisdiction of DRTs.

In addition, an amendment in the DRT Act requiring government to ensure adequate RTs and POs/Chairpersons will be needed. The amendment should require the government to justify the location and jurisdiction of the proposed RTs and how the government proposal is expected to aid in meeting the objective of DRT Act.

Benefits of alternative 1

Alternative 1 is expected to reallocate matters across DRTs, and consequently reduce the pendency per RT. This is expected to improve the disposal rate and also the quality of orders passed by RTs. However, the rate of accrual may vary depending on the number of RTs set up. As a result the opportunity cost on account of delay in disposal of matters is expected to significantly reduce. Studies have shown positive impact of establishment of DRTs.

Benefits of alternative 1: Improvement in disposal rate, reduction in pendency and saving of opportunity cost. The benefits may vary depending on scenario

Alternative 2: E-governance in RTs

The central government had launched an e-DRT project to significantly benefit from information and communication technology (ICT) interventions in RTs. E-governance of RTs comprised putting in place a state of art information technology system to provide parties hassle free access to intervention, publication of timely and accurate MIS reports, efficient case management, case tracking, availability of technological and state of art tools for recovery, and provision for hassle free administrative services.

It is suggested that the e-DRT project be revived and efforts be made to benefit from information technology.

Cost of alternative 2

News reports have indicated high costs of e-DRT project, of around Rs. 200 cr. (around Rs. 5.25 cr. per RT). This was one of the reasons for the government putting on hold the plan. Even if the e-DRT is project is implemented in phased manner of around three years, the annual expenditure is estimated to be around 67 cr.

Cost of alternative 2: Rs. 200 cr.
Benefits of alternative 2

Estimated benefits of the e-DRT project include increase efficiency, improvement in recovery rate and reduced delays in decision making. Studies have indicated that use of technology in courts have the potential to improve court performance to a significant extent. 230

Benefits of alternative 2: Improvement in disposal rate, reduced pendency and saving of opportunity cost

2.3. Performance of adjudicatory officers and staff

Alternative 1: Revision of eligibility criteria

It is suggested that eligibility criteria for adjudicatory officers and staff (registrars, recovery officers, etc.) be revised. In case of adjudicatory officer, a requirement of minimum experience of practice in banking/ debt recovery; or qualifications suggesting knowledge in banking/ debt recovery could be included in the selection criteria. A written test might be conducted to ascertain the knowledge in these areas. Similarly, in case of staff of RTs, adequate educational qualifications or expertise, in form of legal and banking background, could be prescribed for selection. However, to avoid delays in selection procedure, a time limit must be prescribed within which the selection procedure must be completed. Alternative 1 would require amendments in sections 5 and 10 of the DRT Act. In addition, an additional provision in the DRT Act requiring government to ensure adequate staff at DRT would need to be inserted.

Costs of alternative 1

Alternative 1 is expected to impose administrative costs in the process of selection of candidates. In addition, in order to complete the selection procedure within the prescribed time frame, additional officers might have to be deputed for RTs. Table 6.1 below provides a snapshot of staff at RTs and their respective remuneration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.1: Staff at RTs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Position</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary / Registrar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Registrar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recovery Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts Assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recovery Inspector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steno Grade ‘C’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steno Grade ‘D’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (monthly) (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (annual) (B= A*12)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (44 RTs) (B*44)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
One additional officer per RT with basic remuneration cost per officer per year of Rs. 6 lakhs could be sufficient for managing the selection process.

Costs of alternative 1: Rs. 2.64 cr. (44 RTs) (annual)
Indirect costs of alternative 1: Reasonable efforts to administer the revised selection process

Benefits of alternative 1

The revised eligibility criteria are expected to improve the quality of adjudicatory officers and staff at RTs. Knowledge about banking and debt recovery is expected to aid in improvement of performance of RTs, speedy disposal of matters, and passing of quality orders.

Benefits of alternative 1: Selection of better quality candidates and improvement in performance of RTs

Alternative 2: Provision of technical member at RTs

As discussed earlier, the composition of RTs is one adjudicatory officer, with legal background. Consequently, in order to provide support to the existing adjudicatory officers, it is suggested that a provision for one technical member – having experience or expertise in banking and debt recovery, be made.

Costs of alternative 2

It is estimated that average basic annual remuneration of a PO/ Chairperson is around Rs. 15 lakhs. Parity in remuneration is expected between legal member i.e. PO/ Chairperson and technical member on a RT. In addition, the government would have to incur cost in search and selection process of technical members.

Direct costs of alternative 2: 6.6 cr. (44 RTs) (annual)
Indirect costs of alternative 2: Costs for search and selection of technical members

Benefits of alternative 2

Reconstitution of RTs and existence of a technical member is expected to improve the quality of orders and increase efficiency of RTs. In addition, high quality orders are expected to reduce the possibility of challenge of orders of DRTs and DRATs, consequently reducing the delay and litigation cost.

Benefits of alternative 2: Improved quality of orders and reduction in challenge of orders of RTs

Alternative 3: Provision of performance linked incentives

It is suggested that performance link incentive system be developed for adjudicatory officers and staff of RTs. Such system must assess the quality and quantity of orders passed for estimating the incentives. Transparent performance indicators would need to be developed against which the performance of adjudicating officers could be the assessed. One of the ways to assess the quality of orders is to track the number of orders getting appealed at the appellate authorities and the number of orders getting overturned.
In addition, the term of office of adjudicatory officers and staff must be linked to their performance and subject to review every year. There must be provisions to censure/penalize/remove adjudicatory officers and staff, in case of continued unjustifiable non-performance/sub-optimal performance.

Such performance review must be conducted by a committee comprising government and experts. Such committee must follow principles of natural justice, and provide an opportunity of hearing to the concerned officer, before making a reasoned decision in relation to performance.

It must also be possible to vary the salary, allowances, terms and conditions of service of the PO and Chairperson, on the basis of recommendations of such expert committee, and reasons must be provided to the concerned officer should the terms and conditions of its service are proposed to be altered. Such officer must be given adequate opportunity of hearing and should such officer not agree to the revised terms and conditions, she should be allowed to leave the office, with adequate notice. The performance review committee must work in tandem with the selection process, and should there be a possibility of removal/resignation of existing officer(s), the selection process must kick in well in advance, to avoid delay in the decision making and disruption in smooth functioning of RTs.

Similarly, the incentive of the staff of RTs, especially registrars and ROs must be linked to performance. Specific time periods must be prescribed for completion of tasks, and the staff must be required to provide reasons for sub-par performance, including non-compliance with the statutory time limits.

Sections 13, 14, 15 of the DRT Act would have to be accordingly amended. Moreover, provisions with respect to performance review of officers of RTs and constitution of a performance review committee would have to be included in the DRT Act.

**Costs of alternative 3**

The performance review committee must include a mix of government and independent experts. It is proposed that Joint Secretary, Department of Financial Services, Nominee of Governor of Reserve Bank of India, and senior-most chairperson of DRAT, be government representatives and three independent experts in the field of banking, management and judiciary be part of the performance review committee. The independent experts could be appointed on the basis of transparent selection process inviting applications from interested persons.

The independent experts must be adequately compensated for the task of performance review. Basic annual compensation of around Rs. 12 lakh each member could be reasonable. In order to smoothly conduct aforementioned functions, the performance review committee would have to be supported by efficient staff. It is proposed that four dedicated officers be attached to the performance review committee. The annual basic remuneration cost of each such officer is expected to be around Rs. 6 lakhs. In addition, physical and technological infrastructure cost will have to be incurred, for setting up of secretariat and make it operational.

*Direct cost of alternative 3: Rs. 60 lakh (annual)*

*Indirect cost of alternative 3: physical and technological infrastructure cost*
Benefits of alternative 3

Linkage of performance to incentives is expected to motivate adjudicatory officers and staff for improved performance, and in turn, reduce the delay and improve the disposal rate. Studies indicate that performance linked incentives improve quality of performance.\(^{235}\)

Benefits of alternative 3: Improvement in performance of RTs

Alternative 4: Public disclosure of performance

In order to enable public scrutiny of the performance of RTs, it is necessary to put information in relation to performance of RTs in public domain.\(^{236}\)

Consequently, it is suggested that every RT must be mandated to produce periodic reports having details of number of decisions made, the matters wherein mandatory time limit was not met, the reasons thereof, and the action plan to prevent failure to meet statutory timelines in future. The reasons for delay must also be mentioned in the reasoned order made by the adjudicatory officers.

For instance, in case the RT adopted civil suit procedure instead of summary procedure, it would be required to explain why it felt the need to adoption civil suit procedure. Unjustifiable use of civil suit procedure must invite negative marking in performance review. Similarly, stakeholder consultation revealed that insistence of RTs to approve settlement terms have resulted in the delay in recovery.\(^{237}\) Should an RT insist on approval of settlement terms, it must provide explanation on the necessity of its approval.

The periodic reports must also provide details of matters in which appeals were made to appellate bodies and the number of decisions which were overturned. An assessment in relation of kind of decisions overturned must be provided in the periodic reports. The periodic reports must be available in soft copy in public domain, and in hard copy, subject to payment of minimum fee. In addition, number of matters disposed of and pending; and the number of matters in which the statutory time limit was not met, could be released in public domain on a quarterly basis.

Greater transparency and public disclosure of information on the part of RTs would require an enabling provision in the DRT Act, mandating the same. In addition, performance related disclosure of staff of RTs must be made in the annual reports of RTs. Appropriate amendments in the DRT Act must be made in this regard.

Cost of alternative 4

In order to enable preparation of quarterly and annual reports, it is suggested that a dedicated officer at each of the RTs be appointed. Basic annual remuneration of each such officer could be estimated at around Rs. 6 lakh. In addition, basic information technology infrastructure would be needed to put in place to ensure that performance reports are published in public domain.\(^{238}\)

Direct costs of alternative 4: Rs. 2.64 cr. (44 RTs) (annual)

Indirect costs of alternative 4: Basic information communication technology infrastructure cost

Benefits of alternative 4
As discussed earlier, greater transparency and public disclosure of performance related information is expected to improve public scrutiny and accountability of adjudicatory officers and staff of RTs.

**Benefits of alternative 4: Improved accountability and disposal rate at RTs**

2.4. Process of filling vacancies

*Alternative 1: Reforming the selection committee*

It is proposed that in addition to two regulators and three government officials of the existing selection committee, three independent part-time experts in banking/debt recovery be part of the selection committee for selection of POs and Chairperson. The decisions of selection committee will be required to be taken by majority with views of minority recorded separately. This would require an amendment in the DRT (Procedure for Appointment As Presiding Officer of the Tribunal) Rules, 1998 and DRAT (Procedure for Appointment As Chairperson of the Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1998.

It must be noted that selection of appropriate adjudicatory officers and staff of RTs would require some time and by the time adjudicatory officers are selected, the setting up of additional RTs (as proposed earlier) would still be under process. Consequently, it is suggested that till the time the additional DRTs are not operational, the POs and staff recruited be attached to the existing RTs. To facilitate this, amendments in sections 3 and 9 of the DRT Act would be required to enable more than one PO/Chairperson at a RT. Such amendments would also aid in efficiently managing transfers and postings of POs and in case a PO is facing overload of cases, another PO could be stationed at that RT for efficient handling of matters.

**Costs of alternative 1**

It is proposed that the independent part-time expert members be provided a compensation of Rs. 10,000 per meeting, in addition to the travelling and daily allowance per meeting at the highest rate admissible to group ‘A’ government servants. In addition, to fill future vacancies on time, the selection committee will be required to meet well in advance (at least 3 months) of arising of vacancy and begin the selection procedure to select PO/Chairperson to avoid any unnecessary delays and smooth functioning the requisite RTs. This would require a full functioning secretariat for selection committees, manned with appropriate staff. It is expected that this would require at least four officers having annual basic remuneration of around Rs. 6 lakh each.

*Direct costs of alternative 1: Rs. 45,000 per meeting (members), i.e. Rs. 1.80 lakh (annual) (assuming four meetings)*

*Additional costs of alternative 1: Rs. 24 lakh (secretariat) (annual)*

**Benefits of alternative 1**

Existence of selection committee with independent expert members in place will aid in selection of high quality candidates for the position of adjudicatory officers at RTs. Experts have recommended for balanced selection committees comprising government representatives as well as independent experts, for various judicial forums, including tribunals.
Benefits of alternative 1: Improved selection procedure, increased possibility of selection of better quality candidates, resulting in the improvement in quality of personnel manning RTs

Alternative 2: Constitution of independent advisory body to recommend candidates

It is recommended that a three member independent advisory body be constituted to recommend candidates to the existing selection committee for the purpose of appointment of adjudicatory officers at RTs. The advisory committee will recommend at least three candidates for each of the vacant position and the selection committee will have to choose from the given choices. This would require an amendment in the DRT (Procedure for Appointment As Presiding Officer of the Tribunal) Rules, 1998 and DRAT (Procedure for Appointment As Chairperson of the Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1998.

Costs of alternative 2

It is proposed that the advisory committee be provided a compensation of Rs. 15,000 per meeting, in addition to the travelling and daily allowance per meeting at the highest rate admissible to group ‘A’ government servants. The difference in compensation from alternative 1 is on account of the requirement to suggest higher number of candidates, as compared to alternative 1. In addition, to ensure filling of future vacancies on time, the advisory committee will be required to meet well in advance (at least 3 months) of arising of vacancy and begin the selection procedure to select PO/ Chairperson to avoid any unnecessary delays and smooth functioning the requisite RTs. This would require a full functioning secretariat for selection committees, manned with appropriate staff. It is expected that this would require at least three officers having annual basic remuneration of around Rs. 6 lakh each. The difference in composition from alternative 1 is on account of the requirement to suggest higher number of candidates, as compared to alternative 1.

Costs of alternative 2: Rs. 60,000 per meeting (members), i.e. Rs. 2.40 lakh annually (assuming four meetings per year)
Additional costs of alternative 2: Rs. 18 lakh (secretariat) (annual)
Indirect cost of alternative 2: Time costs of selection committee to select candidates from the suggested list

Benefits of alternative 2

Alternative 2 will ensure a balance between independence and discretion in selection process. The existence of an independent advisory committee is expected to act without any prejudices or pressure from government, and hence is expected to recommend most suitable names for the purpose of selection of adjudicatory officers.

Benefits of alternative 2: Improved selection procedure of adjudicatory officers of RTs

2.5. Adjournments and irregular hearing of matters

Alternative 1: Disclosure of reasons to litigants

It is recommended that the adjudicating officers be mandated to provide specific reasons for every adjournment which is granted. In addition, a time limit must be prescribed within which next hearing of the matter must be made necessary.
Stakeholder consultations during the project revealed that often adjournments are taken by lawyers of litigants without the consent or awareness of litigants. To address this situation, a short-messaging-service facility could be provided to the litigants briefly providing the details of proceedings and the next date of hearing (including the fact of adjournment sought and costs imposed on the parties). The litigants must be able to access such facility on the basis of payment of fee, and additional details in relation to order of RT and progress of matter must be available on the website of the relevant RT, accessible by the relevant party on keying the username and password provided to the party at the time of initiation of the matter. Setting up of this service will require incurring significant initial capital cost, however, the service could be adequately priced to recover the cost, at least partially, from the consumers.

The practice of grant of the adjournments by adjudicatory officers must also be considered in the performance review. Insufficient reasons for grant of adjournments must result in negative marking. The annual report of RTs must also provide assessment of matters wherein the statutory number of adjournments was crossed, the period of adjournments, and average number of adjournments granted by the RT. Adoption of the aforesaid suggestions would require appropriate amendments section 19(5A) of the DRT Act.

**Costs of alternative 1**

The public disclosure mechanism/ SMS service suggested under alternative 1 is expected to require high information communication and technology infrastructure cost. However, such cost is expected to be met by the reasonable fee charged by the users of the proposed SMS service. In addition, adequate number of officers would have to be recruited to prepare the disclosure reports and ensure timely uploading on websites.

It is expected that around two officers per RT would be sufficient for carrying out the tasks prescribed under alternative 1. Basic annual remuneration of the each such individual could be reasonably estimated to be around Rs. 6 lakhs per annum.

*Direct cost of alternative 1: Rs. 5.28 cr. (44 RTs) (annual)*

*Indirect cost of alternative 1: Information communication technology infrastructure*

**Benefits of alternative 1**

Increased public disclosure and information to litigants about the progress of the case, the costs imposed, and the next date of hearing are expected to check and rein the unhealthy practice of lawyers to take adjournments without the consent of litigants. This is expected to improve transparency, accountability, reduce pendency and delays in disposal of matters at RTs.

*Benefits of alternative 1: Improved transparency and accountability*

**Alternative 2: Increasing cost of adjournments to litigants**

At times, grant of adjournments is on account of litigants not being adequately prepared or adopting delaying tactics. It is often been observed that the existing court fees regime does not deter litigants from filing false and vexatious claims or seeking adjournments to delay the proceedings. Litigants who prolong matters and abuse the court’s process pay the same court
fees as litigants who do not indulge in such practices. Experts have recommended that court fees should be related to the time consumed by the litigants in the conduct of their case. Consequently, it is recommended that the application fee in RTs be proportional to the number of hearings. As discussed in previous chapters, adjournments are, more often than not, on account of trial failure (adjournment without any work done on the assigned date). The party responsible for trial failure must be made to pay an additional amount and adjournments beyond a reasonable minimum (say, two) must invite costs at increasing rate.

- **Option 1**

At present, the maximum application fee for matters at RTs is Rs. 1.5 lakh. A matter is supposed to run for not more than six months on payment of such fee. Any matter which runs for more than this period due to fault of litigants (including advocates) must attract higher application fee, say Rs. 1.5 lakh for additional six month period, to be paid up front.

**Costs of option 1**

On the basis of stakeholders’ consultation, it has been estimated that litigants/ advocates are a cause of around 75 percent trail failures (see table 5.3 above). Assuming an average pendency of around 10,000 cases (20 percent of the total pendency) at any given point of time attracting application fee of Rs. 1.5 lakh (matters involving value of more than Rs. 1.5 cr.), and around 7,000 cases being pending for more than six months (around 70 percent), cases delayed on account of litigants would be around 5,000 (around 75 percent). Additional application fee of Rs. 1.5 lakh on such cases will result in consolidated cost of around Rs. 75 cr.

**Total cost of option 1: Rs. 75 cr.**

**Benefits of option 1**

Option 1 is expected to result in additional revenue generation for RTs which could contribute significantly to RTs achieving financial independence. Judicially used, such additional revenue could help improving performance of RTs, improvement of disposal rate and reduction of delays.

In addition, the possibility of steep increase in cost of litigation, should the matter remain pending for more than six months is expected to make the litigants and advocates attentive and put best efforts to ensure disposal of matters within the six month timeline, thereby reducing pendency at RTs.

**Benefits of option 1: Increase in revenue of RTs, avoidance of delaying tactics by litigants, and reduction in pendency**

- **Option 2**

Additional cost on litigants could be mandatorily imposed at an increasing rate on the adjournments sought beyond a reasonable number. Consequently, it is suggested that beyond the statutorily allowed three adjournments, the cost for each additional adjournment should start with 0.1 percent of the value of the matter, doubling per adjournment. Such cost must be
levied on only such matters which attract maximum application fee of Rs. 1.5 lakh (matters valuing at least around Rs. 1.5 cr.), to avoid excess cost on small-scale litigants.

Cost of option 2

Assuming the minimum value of matter at Rs. 1.5 cr., the minimum cost of first additional amendment would be around Rs. 15,000 (0.1 percent). Assuming at least 20 percent of matters (around 10,000) have value of more than Rs. 1.5 cr. and require at least one additional adjournment, the consolidated cost for one additional adjournment under Option 2 will be around Rs. 15 cr.

Cost of option 2: Rs. 15 cr. (first additional amendment)

Benefits of option 2

Option 2 is expected to result in additional revenue generation for RTs, albeit less than option 1. Judicially used, such amount could help in improving performance of RTs, thus improving disposal rate, and reducing pendency.

However, as the cost of the amendment is mere 0.1 percent of the value of matter, it is likely that it would be absorbed in litigation cost, and might not be as effective as Option 1 in stopping the practice of additional amendments.

Benefits of option 2: Increase in revenue of RTs, avoidance of delaying tactics by litigants, and reduction in pendency

3. Securitisation Act

3.1. Taking of possession of secured asset by Magistrate

Alternative 1: Specific time period

A specific time period could be proposed within which the Magistrate must be required to take possession of secured assets. As discussed in earlier chapters, the Bombay High Court had proposed a time limit of two months for the Magistrates in the state to take possession. This would require amendment to section 14 of the Securitisation Act.

Cost of alternative 1

This is not expected to impose significant additional costs on Magistrate, other than administration and management costs. However, the pressure of meeting the timelines might result in orders with limited application of mind. Consequently, it is suggested that the Magistrate be required to pass reasoned orders.

Cost of alternative 1: Increase in administration and management costs of Magistrate

Benefits of alternative 1

Existence of statutory time period is expected to ensure that the Magistrate issues orders for taking of possession of secured assets in a time bound manner, resulting in improved recovery process.
**Benefits of alternative 1: Taking over of possession by Magistrate within a specified time period**

**Alternative 2: Right to secured creditor to approach DRT**

In case the Magistrate is not able to order taking over of possession within a reasonable time period, the secured creditor must be statutorily authorised to approach the DRT for directing the Magistrate to take over the possession at the earliest, and provide reasons for not doing the same within a reasonable time frame. This will require amendment to section 14 of the Securitisation Act.

**Costs of alternative 2**

The possibility of secured creditor approaching DRT is expected to put pressure on Magistrate to order taking over of possession within a reasonable time frame, resulting in increase in its administration and management cost.

In addition, alternative 2 is expected to increase the number of matters filed at DRTs, thereby increasing the burden on RTs.

**Costs of alternative 2: Increase in administration and management costs of Magistrate and increase in burden on DRTs**

**Benefits of alternative 2**

As a result of alternative 2, the Magistrate is expected to issue orders of taking possession within a reasonable time frame, resulting in improvement in debt recovery.

**Benefits of alternative 2: Issuance of orders by Magistrate within a reasonable time frame resulting in improvement of debt recovery**

**3.2. Challenge of measures taken under Securitisation Act**

**Alternative 1: Statutory pre-requisite for challenging action**

The applicant challenging action of the lender taken under section 13 of the Securitisation Act must be statutorily required to explain and establish its locus standi, for admission of application at DRT. The Registrar and PO must be authorised to the summarily dispose of the application in case the applicant is not in a position to justify the damage done to itself, or potential damage, either directly or indirectly, by the action taken under section 13 of the Securitisation Act. Further, no adverse order must be passed by DRT before admission of the application challenging action under Securitisation Act.

**Costs of alternative 1**

Alternative 1 is expected to impose additional litigation cost on applicants under section 17, as the applicants will have to make a strong case, with adequate evidence, should they want their application to be admitted at the DRT.

**Costs of alternative 1: Increase in litigation cost**
**Benefits of alternative 1**

Alternative 1 is expected to result in reduction of fraudulent applications made under section 17. Consequently, the recovery process is not expected to be unnecessarily delayed.

**Benefits of alternative 1: Prevention of fraudulent applications and prevention of recovery process being stymied**

**Alternative 2: Statutory penalties in case of unjustifiable challenge**

In case DRT (Registrar/ PO) is of the opinion that the application made under section 17 is fraudulent in nature and needs to be disposed of, a penalty could be statutorily imposed on the applicant. The applicants must be required to provide adequate details at the time of making an application, to establish its genuineness. In addition, the DRT should be required to provide reasons for its findings relating to fraudulent challenge and disposal of application.

**Costs of alternative 2**

Alternative 2 is expected to put reasonable burden on the litigants for providing evidence to prevent imposition of penalties in case the application is found to be fraudulent in nature. In addition, the alternative is expected to put reasonable costs on DRTs to scrutinize the applications in detail, for ascertaining genuineness of applications.

It is suggested that one officer per RT (as appeals could be preferred at DRATs) be appointed to assist the Registrar in ascertaining genuineness of applications. Basic remuneration cost per such officer could be estimated to be around Rs. 6 lakh per annum.

**Costs of alternative 2: Rs. 2.64 cr. (44 RTs) (annual)**

**Additional costs of alternative 2: Increase in litigation costs**

**Benefits of alternative 2**

The possibility of imposition of penalty is expected to reduce the inflow of fraudulent applications under section 17, thus improving the recovery process. In addition, the levy of penalty is expected to result in additional source of revenue for RTs, which if judicially used, could aid in improvement of performance of RTs, consequently improving debt recovery.

**Benefits of alternative 2: Improvement in recovery and additional revenue generation for RTs.**

**3.3. Taking over of management**

**Alternative 1: Management fee to secured creditor**

It is suggested that in addition to the recovery of debt by the lender/financial institution upon taking over of management, in lieu of putting in efforts in turning around of borrowers’ business, the lender/financial institution should be eligible to receive a management fee from the borrower. Should the borrower not be in a position to pay the management fee, the lender/financial institution must be permitted to manage former’s business for a reasonable time to recover the management fee. The management fee could be set as a specific percentage of debt due.
Costs of alternative 1

Alternative 1 is expected to impose additional financial burden on borrowers. In addition to repayment of the debt due, they would be required to pay management fee on account of turnaround of their business. In addition, this might result in delayed repossession of the secured asset to borrower.

Costs of alternative 1: Additional financial burden on the borrower. In addition, possibility of delay in repossession of secured asset.

Benefits of alternative 1

The provision of management fee, over and above the due amount is expected to motivate the lenders/financial institutions to resort to this mechanism for recovery of debt. This, in effect, is expected to improve the rate of debt recovery.

Benefits of alternative 1: Greater usage of this mechanism of debt recovery resulting in improvement in debt recovery

Alternative 2: Expansion of scope of debt

It is suggested that the scope of debt be expanded to include cost of turnaround of borrowers’ management by secured creditor. Recovery of such cost will be accorded priority over the original debt due to the secured creditor, from the amount recovered pursuant to taking over of management.

Costs of alternative 2

Alternative 2 is expected to impose additional financial burden on borrowers. In addition to repayment of the debt due, they would be required to reimburse the cost of turnaround of their business. In addition, this might result in delayed repossession of the secured asset to borrower.

Costs of alternative 2: Additional financial burden on the borrower. In addition, possibility of delay in repossession of secured asset.

Benefits of alternative 2

The provision of recovering the cost of turnaround of borrowers’ management, over and above the due amount is expected to motivate the lenders/financial institutions to resort to this mechanism for recovery of debt. This, in effect, is expected to improve the rate of debt recovery.

Benefits of alternative 2: Greater usage of this mechanism of debt recovery resulting in improvement in debt recovery

3.4. Provisions to determine correct valuation of secured asset
Alternative 1: Transfer of financial assets amongst securitisation/reconstruction company

As present, the Securitisation Act does not allow transfer of rights or interest in financial assets by a securitisation/reconstruction company to other. This hinders ascertainment of correct valuation of the security. It is suggested that such restriction be removed from the legislation. However, in order to prevent circular transactions amongst securitisation/reconstruction companies, public disclosure in relation to valuation methodology must be mandated.

Costs of alternative 1

Alternative 1 might increase the cost of securitisation/reconstruction of financial assets and the requirement of the public disclosure of valuation methodology might result in imposition of additional burden on such entities.

Benefits of alternative 1

Alternative 1 is expected to result in ascertainment of correct valuation of secured asset and improve the realisation of secured creditor. In addition, it is expected to create viable market for transfer of the secured assets, and interest therein, resulting in increase in competition and specialisation in the securitisation/reconstruction market.

Benefits of alternative 1: Increased recovery for secured creditor and the development of market for secured interests

Alternative 2: Insertion of general guiding principles in the SARFAESI Act

General guiding principles in relation to valuation of the secured assets could be inserted in the Securitisation Act. These could comprise requirement of arm-length transactions, transparency, and valuation on the basis of market value, etc.

Costs of alternative 2

Alternative 2 is expected to impose costs on securitisation/reconstruction companies as they would need to ensure compliance with the principles mentioned in relation to valuation under the Securitisation Act. In order to determine true value of secured, greater efforts might be required in relation to due diligence, engagement with expert valuers, etc.

Benefits of alternative 2

Alternative 2 is expected to help improve transparency and accountability in the securitisation/reconstruction market. In addition, it is expected to improve the returns to the secured creditor and prevent vested arrangements between securitisation/reconstruction companies and borrowers.
Benefits of alternative 2: Greater transparency and accountability in the securitisation/reconstruction market, and greater returns to the secured creditors

3.5. Registration of security interest

Alternative 1: According priority to security interest from the date of registration

As discussed in previous chapters, while it is currently compulsory to register creation, change and satisfaction of security interest with the Central Registry, priority of claims is not based on the date of registration. Consequently, there seems to be no perceived benefit of registration. It is suggested that the security interests be accorded priority on the basis of date of registration.

Costs of alternative 1

The possibility of loss of priority on failure to register/possible benefit on timely registration of security interest is expected to nudge the SC/RC/secured creditors to register the security interest. However, increase in cost is not expected to be significant given hitherto, the possibility of penalties on failure to register security interest would have motivated SC/RC/secured creditors to register security interest. The increase in registration of security interests is also expected to put additional burden on the Central Registry, and it might require additional resources to manage the increase in registration.

Costs of alternative 1: Minimal increase in costs to securitisation/reconstruction companies. Reasonable increase in costs to Central Registry to manage increased flow of registration applications.

Benefits of alternative 1

Priority of claims on the basis of registration is expected provide clarity, in case of dispute, and is also expected to make the Central Registry much useful, in addition to providing the existing benefits, such as search and inspection of claims. This is also expected to bring with the international best practice with respect to the central repository of secured interests.

Benefits of alternative 1: Greater clarity with respect to priority of claims in registration of security interest improving the possibility of recovery.

Alternative 2: Making penalties proportional to the amount of security interest

The current system seems be disproportionate to small value transactions while have to register with the Central Registry merely to avoid severe penalties, with limited consequent benefits. Also, the capacity of Central Registry to impose such penalties also seems to be limited. Thus, it is suggested that the penalties on delay in registration under the Securitisation Act be made proportional to the value of security interest.

Costs of alternative 2

Alternative 2 is expected to increase the possibility of imposition of additional costs on parties dealing with high value securities, should they fail to register the transaction within the specified time period. The loss of income to Central Registry from reduction in penalty on
small value transactions is expected to be compensated by increase in penalty on high value transactions

Costs of alternative 2: Increased possibility on imposition of higher penalties on parties engaging in high value transactions, should they fail to register the secured interest

Benefits of alternative 2

Alternative 2 is expected to provide relief with parties dealing with small value of secured interest, on account of reduction in amount of penalty should they delay the registration of security interest.

In addition, the Central Registry will have the freedom to focus on high value transactions and ensure their registration on time. This is also expected to improve the capacity of Central Registry to impose penalties on defaulting parties.

Benefits of alternative 2: Reduction in cost of small value transactions and focused efforts of Central Registry

4. Common issues

Some of the impediments to debt recovery under DRT Act and Securitisation Act are common. These include delay in disposal of applications by RTs, exercise of jurisdiction by other judicial forums, and absence of clarity on priority of claims of creditors under respective Acts. Statutory alternatives with respect to relevant provisions under the DRT Act and Securitisation Act are discussed below

4.1. Time limit for disposal of matters

Alternative 1: Provision for mandatory time limit with reimbursement of application fees on non-compliance

It is suggested that sections 19 and 20 of the DRT Act and section 17 of the SARFAESI Act be amended to provide for mandatory time-limits for disposal of matters by RTs. To ensure compliance with such suggestion, it is proposed that in cases where the mandatory time limits are not complied with by the adjudicatory officers, the application fees be reimbursed to the concerned party.

Costs of alternative 1

The minimum application fee chargeable for filing an application under the DRT Act is Rs. 12,000. Assuming that of 28,258 cases referred to DRTs in fiscal 13-14, around 20,000 matters are not expected to be disposed of within the six month period, the minimum refundable application fee would be around Rs. 24 cr. This is close to 25 percent of the annual allocation for RTs for fiscal 15-16. Consequently, the financial position of RTs is expected to have severe adverse impact as a result of alternative 1. The consequent resource constraints at RTs could result in further sub-optimal performance by RTs.

Estimated direct cost: Rs. 24 cr. (annual)
Estimated indirect cost (additional): Sub-optimal performance by RTs
Benefits of alternative 1

The benefit of alternative 1 would be refund of court fee. Assuming an average pendency of around two years, refund of application fee on crossing of six month period is estimated to save the opportunity cost for litigants. In addition, the fear of reimbursement of application fee could improve the disposal rate of matters by RTs.

Estimated direct benefit: Rs. 24 cr. (annual)
Estimated indirect benefit: Rs. 3 cr. (opportunity cost saved annually)
Estimated indirect benefit (additional): Improvement in disposal rate

Alternative 2: Public disclosure of non-compliance with time limits and reasons thereof

In order to improve accountability and enable public scrutiny of performance of RTs, it is suggested that RTs make public disclosure of non-compliance with time limits and the reasons thereof, on a quarterly basis, in form of reports, on their websites. Further, submission of such performance related information should be mandatorily submitted to a select committee of Parliament, which should be in a position to inquire reasons of non-compliance from RTs. This will serve as performance check of RTs. Consequent amendments would be required in sections 19 and 20 of the DRT Act and section 17 of the SARFAESI Act.

Costs of alternative 2

In order to collect and collate relevant information and prepare reports for uploading at websites of RTs and submission to a select committee of Parliament, a dedicated officer would be required at each of the RTs. Estimated annual basic remuneration for such officer is estimated to be around Rs. 6 lakhs. In addition, significant information, communication and technology costs would need to be incurred for putting in place websites and processes to upload relevant reports.

Estimated direct costs: Rs. 2.64 cr. (44 RTs) (annual)
Estimated indirect costs: Information, communication and technology costs

Benefits of alternative 2

Scrutiny by public and a select committee of Parliament following such disclosure of information is expected to improve efficiency of RTs and reduce the time taken to dispose of matters. Further, it is expected that public disclosure of the performance related information will improve efficiency of RTs, resulting in increase in disposal of matters.

Studies indicate that public disclosure of information enhances public confidence on justice system, enables people to make better decisions about preferred dispute resolution mechanism. Such system also creates more efficient judicial system by availability of information with government to make better policy decisions.

Estimated benefits: Greater public scrutiny of RTs performance, increase in disposal rate, improvement in efficiency and saving of opportunity cost for litigants
4.2. Exercise of jurisdiction by other courts/judicial authorities

**Alternative 1: Public disclosure of matters pending on account of orders of other courts/judicial authorities**

Details of matters which are pending are RTs on account of orders of other courts/judicial authorities must be public, in form of quarterly and annual reports. The details must include the party approached the other judicial authority, summary of the order, the period for which the matter is pending since the order of other judicial authority, the amount involved in the matter, whether the action is under DRT Act or Securitisation Act. This would require amendments in DRT Act and Securitisation Act.

**Cost of alternative 1**

In order to collect information in relation to matters pending on account of orders of other judicial authority and prepare periodic report, one officer per RT seems to be sufficient. Average annual basic remuneration of one such officer is expected to be around Rs. 6 lakh. In addition, information communication technology infrastructure would be required to put in place for implementation of alternative 1.

*Direct cost of alternative 1: Rs. 2.64 cr. (44 RTs) (annual)*  
*Indirect cost of alternative 1: Information communication technology infrastructure cost*

**Benefits of alternative 1**

As discussed earlier, public scrutiny of details of matters pending at RTs, including details of matters pending on account of orders of other judicial authorities/courts, is expected to dissuade litigants from approaching other judicial forums. Consequently, the instances of the other judicial authorities exercising jurisdiction are expected to reduce.

**Benefits of alternative 1: Reduction in the practice of approaching other judicial forums**

**Alternative 2: Penalising the party approaching other courts/judicial authorities**

Should a party approach an alternative judicial forum when a matter is pending at RT, a penalty could be imposed on such party by the relevant RT. The penalty could be in proportion to the amount involved in the matter. The penalty could be imposed on only such matters wherein the maximum application fee of Rs. 1.5 lakh has been levied.

**Cost of alternative 2**

Assuming the total numbers of matters having value of at least Rs. 1.5 cr. (attracting application fee of Rs. 1.5 lakh) around 10,000 and that around 10 percent of such pendency is on account of interference of other judicial authorities, a levy of around Rs. 1 lakh per such matter is expected to cost around Rs. 10 cr. to litigants.

*Cost of alternative 2: Rs. 10 cr.*
Benefits of alternative 2

Possibility of imposition of penalty on approaching other judicial forums is expected to dissuade litigants from approaching other judicial forums. This is expected to reduce the interference of other courts/ judicial authorities in matters pending at RTs.

Benefits of alternative 2: Reduced interference of courts/other judicial authorities

While this chapter analysed statutory alternatives to select provisions of DRT Act and Securitisation Act, and estimated costs and benefits thereof, the next chapter compared such alternatives and recommends such statutory alternatives having the potential to achieve maximum net benefit.
Chapter 7: Selection of alternatives

1. Background

In the previous chapters, the impacts of existing sub-optimal provisions/ absence of provisions have been estimated and the statutory alternatives, with respective costs and benefits have been highlighted. This chapter compares select alternatives in order to recommend the most suitable alternative, having the potential to achieve maximum net benefit to the society.

2. DRT Act

2.1. Threshold for filing applications at DRTs

Table 7.1 compares the baseline scenario with respect to threshold of filing applications and the suggested alternatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Particulars</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Alternative 1</th>
<th>Alternative 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>● Minimum threshold for matter: Rs. 10 lakhs ● Minimum application fee: Rs. 12,000</td>
<td>● Revised threshold of matters: Rs. 25 lakhs ● Revised minimum application fee: Rs. 30,000 Amendment to DRT Act to put threshold limit in Schedule, subject to change by executive order</td>
<td>Power to central government to determine the threshold limit in Rules, on the basis of RIA, from time to time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costs</td>
<td>High pendency at RTs on account of high small value claims</td>
<td>Increase in opportunity cost of potential applicants who will not be in a position to pay the increased application fee of Rs. 30,000 or with matters valued below Rs. 25 lakh, and have to approach alternate judicial forums/ adopt other measures for debt recovery</td>
<td>No immediate impact but cost to undertake RIA to change threshold value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits</td>
<td>Similar treatment to all claims, irrespective of the amount involved</td>
<td>Reduction in pendency and focus on high value claims</td>
<td>No immediate impact but benefit of arriving optimal threshold value on the basis of RIA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.1.1. Recommendation

Table 7.1 reveals that alternative 2 is not expected to change the baseline scenario (unless the government decides to amend the threshold limit after an in-depth RIA). The benefits under alternative 1, of reduced burden on RTs, focus on high value claims seems to outweigh its costs, i.e. probable estimated costs to potential low value litigants. Consequently, adoption of alternative 1 is recommended. This would require amendment in section 1(4) of the DRT Act, and insertion of a Schedule.
2.2. Number of RTs

Table 7.2 compares the baseline scenario with respect to the number of RTs and the suggested alternatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Particulars</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Alternative 1</th>
<th>Alternative 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>39 DRTs and 5 DRATs</td>
<td>Establishment of 73 additional DRTs</td>
<td>Establishment of 24 additional DRTs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costs</td>
<td>Low efficiency, high pendency, low disposal rate</td>
<td>Rs. 192 cr., additional infrastructure cost</td>
<td>Rs. 63 cr., additional infrastructure cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits</td>
<td>Low administration cost</td>
<td>Significant reduction in pendency and significant increase in disposal rate</td>
<td>Reasonable reduction in pendency and reasonable increase in disposal rate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.2.1. Recommendation

Table 7.2 reveals that while scenario 1 under alternative 1 and alternative 2 are expected to impose significant costs, the consequent benefits of the former are expected to be greater than the latter. However, scenario 2 is expected to impose modest cost with reasonable benefits. Implementation of scenario 1 in a phased manner of around three years would be akin to implementation of scenario 2. Consequently, it is recommended that suggestions under scenario 2 of alternative 1 be implemented, subject to review of impact, after one-year period. This would require insertion of an enabling provision in DRT requiring government to ensure adequate number of RTs in the country.

2.3. Performance of adjudicatory officers and staff

Table 7.3 compares the baseline scenario with respect to the performance of adjudicatory officers and staff and the suggested alternatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Particulars</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Alternative 1</th>
<th>Alternative 2</th>
<th>Alternative 3</th>
<th>Alternative 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Description | • Sub-optimal eligibility criteria  
• One PO / Chairman per RT  
• No performance review or performance linked | Revision of eligibility criteria to include experience/ knowledge in banking/ debt recovery | Provision of technical members at RTs | Provision for performance linked incentives for adjudicatory officers and staff, by a performance review committee | Periodic public disclosure of performance |
Table 7.3: Performance of adjudicatory officers and staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Particulars</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Alternative 1</th>
<th>Alternative 2</th>
<th>Alternative 3</th>
<th>Alternative 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>incentives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• No public disclosure of performance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costs</td>
<td>Sub-optimal performance, high pendency, low disposal rate</td>
<td>• Salary: Rs. 2.64 cr. (annual)</td>
<td>• Salary: Rs. 6.6 cr. (annual)</td>
<td>• Salary: Rs. 60 lakhs (annual)</td>
<td>• Salary: Rs. 2.64 cr. (annual)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Reasonable efforts to administer the revised eligibility criteria</td>
<td>• Costs in search and selection of technical members</td>
<td>• Significant physical and infrastructure cost</td>
<td>• Basic information communication technology infrastructure cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits</td>
<td>Low administration cost</td>
<td>Selection of better quality candidates and improvement in performance</td>
<td>Improved analysis and quality of orders, reduction in pendency and reduction in challenge rate</td>
<td>Increased motivation for better performance, improvement in quality</td>
<td>Increased public scrutiny of RTs performance, and improvement in accountability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.3.1. Recommendation

Comparison of costs and benefits of different alternatives as listed in table 7.3 reveals that net benefits of alternative 2 are expected to surpass the net benefits under any other alternatives. While alternatives 1 and 3 deal with the issue of quality and quantity at RTs, alternatives 2 and 4 deal with issues of both quality and quantity. While alternative 4 is expected to put external pressure to improve performance, alternative 2 attempts to deal with the problem from within. Consequently, adoption of alternative 2 is recommended. This would require amendment in sections 4 and 9 of the DRT Act.

2.4. Process of filling vacancies

Table 7.4 compares the baseline scenario with respect to process of filling vacancies and the suggested alternatives.

Table 7.4: Process of filling vacancies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Particulars</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Alternative 1</th>
<th>Alternative 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Selection committee comprising government representatives</td>
<td>Inclusion of part time experts in selection committee</td>
<td>Constitution of independent advisory body to recommend candidates</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7.4: Process of filling vacancies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Particulars</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Alternative 1</th>
<th>Alternative 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Costs</td>
<td>Sub-optimal quality of adjudicatory officers, resulting in low quality orders and high pendency</td>
<td>• Salary cost: Rs. 25.80 lakh (annual)</td>
<td>• Salary cost: Rs. 20.40 lakh (annual)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Reasonable efforts to implement the revised selection process</td>
<td>• Reasonable time costs in search, recommendation and selection of candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits</td>
<td>Low administration cost</td>
<td>Reasonable possibility of selection of better quality candidates and improvement in RTs performance</td>
<td>Reasonable possibility of selection of better quality candidates and improvement in performance of RTs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.4.1. Recommendation

Comparison of alternatives under table 7.4 suggests that the net benefits of alternative 2 are expected to surpass the net benefits of alternative 1. This is because the independent advisory committee is expected to work without any pressure from the government, and is expected to recommend high quality candidates, from whom the government would be bound to make selection. Consequently, adoption of alternative 2 is recommended. This would require amendment in section 5, 10, 14 of the DRT Act and the corresponding rules made thereunder.

2.5. Adjournments and irregular hearing of matters

Table 7.5 compares the baseline scenario with respect to adjournments and irregular hearing of matters and the suggested alternatives

Table 7.5: Adjournments and irregular hearing of matters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Particulars</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Alternative 1</th>
<th>Alternative 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Non-compliance with the statutory prescribed limit on adjournments</td>
<td>Disclosure of adjournment, reason and cost to litigants through SMS facility</td>
<td>Increasing cost of adjournments to litigants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Option 1: Increasing application fee for matters running beyond six months</td>
<td>• Option 2: additional cost for grant of adjournment at increasing rate (0.1 percent of matter) beyond reasonable number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costs</td>
<td>Sub-optimal performance, high pendency, low disposal rate</td>
<td>• Salary cost: Rs. 5.28 cr. (annual)</td>
<td>Cost to litigants due to increased application fee: Rs. 75 cr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• High information communication technology infrastructure cost</td>
<td>Cost to litigants for first additional amendment: Rs. 15 cr.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7.5: Adjournments and irregular hearing of matters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Particulars</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Alternative 1</th>
<th>Alternative 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benefits</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Reduction in the practice of lawyers taking uninformed adjournments, reduction in pendency and improvement in disposal rate</td>
<td>Significant increase in revenue generation for RT resulting in improved financial independence, avoidance of delaying tactics by litigants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reasonable increase in revenue generation for RTs resulting in improved financial independence, avoidance of delaying tactics by litigants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.5.1. Recommendation

A comparison of different alternatives under table 7.5 would reveal that net benefits under option 2 of alternative 2 are expected to surpass the net benefits under other alternatives. The high costs under option 1 under alternative 2 might not result in commensurate benefits however, under option 2, the defaulting litigants are expected to directly feel the adverse impact of increased cost of additional amendments, resulting in reduction in the practice of delaying the matters. Consequently, adoption of option 2 of alternative 2 is recommended. This would require amendments to section 19(5A) of the DRT Act.

3. Securitisation Act

3.1. Possession of secured asset by Magistrate

Table 7.6 compares the baseline scenario with respect to possession of secured assets by Magistrate under SARFAESI Act and the suggested alternatives

Table 7.6: Possession of secured assets by Magistrate under SARFAESI Act

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Particulars</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Alternative 1</th>
<th>Alternative 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>No specific time period for the Magistrate to take possession under the SARFAESI Act</td>
<td>Specific time period within which the Magistrate will be required to take possession under the SARFAESI Act</td>
<td>Specific provision in the SARFAESI Act authorising secured creditor to approach RTs to direct Magistrate to take possession, and justify the delay, in case the position is not taken within a reasonable time</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Costs                | Inordinate delays in ordering taking over of possession by Magistrate | Increase in administration and management costs of Magistrate | • Increase in administration and management costs of Magistrate • Possibility of increase in matters filed at RTs, thereby increasing the
Table 7.6: Possession of secured assets by Magistrate under SARFAESI Act

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Particulars</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Alternative 1</th>
<th>Alternative 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benefits</td>
<td>Low administrative cost</td>
<td>Reduction in delays to order taking over of possession by Magistrate</td>
<td>Reduction in delays to order taking over of possession by Magistrate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost burden at RTs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.1.1. Recommendation

The comparison of impact of alternative 1 and 2 would reveal that net benefits under the former are expected to surpass those under the latter. This is because alternative 2 is expected to impose additional burden on RTs as well, and further delay debt recovery. Consequently, adoption of alternative 1 is recommended. This would require amendment in section 14 of the SARFAESI Act.

3.2. Challenge of measures taken under SARFAESI Act

Table 7.7 compares the baseline scenario with respect to challenge of measures taken under SARFAESI Act and the suggested alternatives

Table 7.7: Challenge of measures taken under SARFAESI Act

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Particulars</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Alternative 1</th>
<th>Alternative 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Wide scope to challenge measures taken under SARFAESI Act, at DRTs</td>
<td>Statutory pre-requisite of establishing <em>locus standi</em> for challenge of action</td>
<td>Statutory penalties in case of unjustifiable challenge</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Costs       | Impediment to recovery resulting in delays | Increased cost of litigation for applicants challenging action under SARFAESI Act | • Increase in litigation cost to fraudulent litigants  
• Salary cost: Rs. 2.64 cr. (annual) |
| Benefits    | Protection of interests of parties affected by measures taken under SARFAESI Act | Increase in summary disposal of fraudulent claims and reduced impediments to debt recovery | • Reduction in the practice of filing of fraudulent claims, consequent improvement in recovery rate  
• Additional revenue generation for RTs |

3.2.1. Recommendation

Comparison of impact of alternatives 1 and 2 reveals that net benefits under alternative 2 are expected to surpass those under alternative 1. Alternative 2 is expected to adversely impact fraudulent litigants directly, and reduce the practice of filing of fraudulent applications at the RTs. Consequently, adoption of alternative 2 is recommended. This would require amendment in section 17 of the SARFAESI Act.

3.3. Taking over of management by secured creditors/ securitisation/ reconstruction agencies
Table 7.8 compares the baseline scenario with respect to taking over of management under the SARFAESI Act and suggested alternatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Particulars</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Alternative 1</th>
<th>Alternative 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Statutory requirement to restore management of business to borrower upon realisation of debt</td>
<td>Statutory provision of additional management fee for the secured creditor, who could stay in control of possession of secured asset, up to recovery of management fee, in addition to debt</td>
<td>Amendment to scope of debt to include priority to recover cost of turnaround of borrower’s management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costs</td>
<td>Cost to secured creditor in turning around borrower’s business without commensurate compensation, resulting in limited take up of this measure</td>
<td>Increase in cost to borrower in terms of greater fund outflow and delayed repossession of secured asset</td>
<td>Increase in cost to borrower in terms of greater fund outflow and delayed repossession of secured asset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits</td>
<td>No need for the borrower to file for bankruptcy, and it remains afloat</td>
<td>Greater motivation to secured creditors to use this measure and consequent increase in debt recovery</td>
<td>Greater motivation to secured creditors to use this measure and consequent increase in debt recovery</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3.1. Recommendation

A comparison of alternatives 1 and 2 reveal that the net benefits under alternative 1 are expected to surpass those under alternative 2. This is because while alternative 2 mandatorily increases the time of possession of secured asset with the secured creditor, same is not the case under alternative 1. Consequently, adoption of alternative 1 is recommended. This would require amendment to section 13 of the SARFAESI Act.

3.4. Determination of correct valuation of secured asset

Table 7.9 compares the baseline scenario with respect to provisions to determine correct valuation of secured asset under the SARFAESI Act and suggested alternatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Particulars</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Alternative 1</th>
<th>Alternative 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>No provision directing determination of correct valuation of secured asset Prohibition to transfer secured assets amongst securitisation/ reconstruction</td>
<td>Removal on prohibition of transfer of secured assets amongst securitisation/ reconstruction companies, and public disclosure of valuation methodology</td>
<td>Insertion of general principles in SARFAESI Act regarding transparency and arm-length principle during valuation of secured asset</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 7.9: Determination of correct valuation of secured asset under SARFAESI Act

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Particulars</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Alternative 1</th>
<th>Alternative 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Costs</strong></td>
<td>Transfer of secured asset often not at the market rate, hurting interests of secured creditors – resulting in limited use of this measure</td>
<td>Increase in cost of securitisation/reconstruction process to securitisation/reconstruction agencies</td>
<td>Increase in cost of securitisation/reconstruction process to securitisation/reconstruction agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Benefits</strong></td>
<td>Prevention of circular and fraudulent trading amongst securitisation/reconstruction companies</td>
<td>Significant possibility of ascertaining correct valuation resulting in increased returns for secured creditors – resulting in greater uptake of this measure</td>
<td>Reasonable possibility of ascertaining correct valuation resulting in increased returns for secured creditors – resulting in greater uptake of this measure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 3.4.1. Recommendation

A comparison of alternatives under table 7.9 reveals that net benefits of alternative 1 are expected to surpass those under alternative 2. Alternative 1 is also expected to result in deepening the market of non-performing loans and emergence of specialised entities. Consequently, adoption of alternative 1 is recommended. This would require amendment to section 5 of the SARFAESI Act and consequent rules made thereunder.

### 3.5. Registration of security interest

Table 7.10 compares the baseline scenario with respect to registration of security interest under the SARFAESI Act and suggested alternatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Particulars</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Alternative 1</th>
<th>Alternative 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Description</strong></td>
<td>Requirement on securitisation/reconstruction companies of compulsory registration of creation, transfer, satisfaction of security interest, with the Central Registry</td>
<td>According priority to security interest from the date of registration</td>
<td>Making penalties proportional to the amount of security interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Costs</strong></td>
<td>High penalties on failure to register within the prescribed time period No priority of charge from the date of registration</td>
<td>Minimal increase in cost to securitisation/reconstruction companies Reasonable increase in costs of Central Registry to manage increased flow of registration applications</td>
<td>Increase in cost of delay of parties to high value transactions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 7.10: Registration of security interest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Particulars</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Alternative 1</th>
<th>Alternative 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Benefits</strong></td>
<td>Facility of search and ascertainment of security interests</td>
<td>Clarity in priority of security interests improving possibility of recovery Greater usage of Central Registry</td>
<td>Reduction in cost of delay of parties to small value transactions Greater focus of Central Registry</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 3.5.1. Recommendation

A comparison of different alternatives discussed under table 7.10 reveals that net benefits of alternative 1 would surpass those under alternative 2. Consequently, adoption of alternative 1 is recommended. This would require amendment to Chapter IV of the Securitisation Act and the related rules made thereunder.

### 4. Common issues

#### 4.1. Time limits for disposal of matters

Table 7.11 compares the baseline scenario with respect to time limits for disposal of matters and the suggested alternatives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Particulars</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Alternative 1</th>
<th>Alternative 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Description</strong></td>
<td>Recommenatory time limit for disposal</td>
<td>Provision for mandatory time limit with reimbursement of application fee on non-compliance</td>
<td>Periodic public disclosure of non-compliance with time lines and reasons thereof</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Costs</strong></td>
<td>Low compliance with the statutory time period, high opportunity and litigation costs</td>
<td>• Reimbursement cost to RTs/ government: Rs. 24 cr. (annual) • Reduction in performance quality</td>
<td>• Salary cost: Rs. 2.64 cr. (annual) • Additional information, communication and technology cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Benefits</strong></td>
<td>Low administration cost</td>
<td>• Reimbursement benefit to litigants: Rs. 24 cr. (annual) • Opportunity cost saved: Rs. 3 cr. (annual) • Improvement in disposal rate</td>
<td>Greater public scrutiny of RT performance, reduction in pendency and increase in disposal rate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 4.1.1. Recommendation

A comparison of alternative under table 7.11 reveals that the net benefits under alternative 1 are expected to surpass those under alternative 2. The possibility of reimbursement of application fee will push the government to take measures for improvement of performance.
of RTs. Consequently, adoption of alternative 1 is recommended. This would require amendments to sections 19 and 20 of the DRT Act and section 17 of the SARFAESI Act.

4.2. Exercise of jurisdiction by other courts/judicial authorities

Table 7.12 compares the baseline scenario with respect to exercise of jurisdiction by other courts/judicial authorities and the suggested alternatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Particulars</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Alternative 1</th>
<th>Alternative 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Unrestricted exercise of jurisdiction by other courts/judicial authorities despite contrary provisions</td>
<td>Public disclosure of matters pending on account of orders of other courts/judicial authorities, amount involved</td>
<td>Penalising the party approaching other courts/judicial authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costs</td>
<td>Low compliance with the statutory time period, high opportunity and litigation costs</td>
<td>• Salary cost: Rs. 2.64 cr. (annual) • Additional information, communication and technology cost</td>
<td>Penalty on parties approaching other judicial authorities: Rs. 10 crore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits</td>
<td>Low administration cost</td>
<td>Greater public scrutiny resulting in reduction of injunction orders by other courts/judicial authorities</td>
<td>Reduction in the practice of approaching other judicial authorities, consequent improvement in disposal rate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2.1. Recommendation

A comparison of alternatives under table 7.12 reveals that the net benefits under alternative 2 are expected to surpass those under alternative 1, and ensure greater compliance of the relevant statutes. Consequently, adoption of alternative 2 is recommended. This would require amendments to section 18 of the DRT Act and section 34 of the SARFAESI Act.

5. Other recommendations

5.1. Priority of claims

As discussed in previous chapters, lack of priority of creditors’ claims over other dues, such as statutory and workmen dues, often act as a deterrent for debt recovery. It is thus suggested that secured creditors’ claims are accorded priority to all the claims (including statutory claims) created subsequent to such secured creditors’ claims. This would require an enabling amendment to the DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act. Similar suggestions have been made by experts and the stakeholders, during consultation under the project.

5.2. Clarificatory amendments to DRT Act and SARFAESI Act

There are various provisions under the DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act which have been intensely litigated and the position seems to be settled, for the time being, by the Supreme Court. These include possibility of simultaneous proceedings under DRT Act and SARFAESI
Act, definition of agriculture land, etc. However, possibility of confusion and misinterpretation in the future cannot be disregarded. Multiple protracted litigations, on account of lack of statutory clarity have imposed significant burden on the stakeholders and the judicial machinery. Consequently, it is suggested that settled interpretation be reinforced by making relevant amendments to the DRT Act. This would prevent future disputes and avoid unnecessary litigation cost.

5.3. Periodic training and capacity building

One of the findings of the project was limited knowledge and capacity constraints of staff of the RTs. While the government has promised on various occasions to conduct periodic training and capacity building, this seems not to happen.266

Accordingly, it is suggested that a statutory provision be made in the DRT Act requiring government to ensure that the staff of the RTs have adequate knowledge and remain technically equipped to efficiently conduct their respective functions. The training could be provided by independent experts and practitioners in the sector. This is expected to result in incurrence of reasonable training costs, however, the benefits of training are expected to surpass the costs.267 This would require insertion of an enabling provision in the DRT Act.

5.4. Periodic impact assessment

As highlighted under the project, absence of periodic assessment of effectiveness of provisions of DRT Act and SARFAESI Act has resulted in inadequate implementation and sub-optimal results, such as the efficiency of securitisation and reconstruction process. The impact needs to be assessed on all the stakeholders such as government, financial institutions, judiciary268 et al.

Consequently, periodic ex-post review of its provisions is necessary to ensure relevance of provisions which keep track with changing realities. An enabling provision to this effect would be required in the DRT Act and SARFAESI Act. In addition, specific provisions must be inserted in the DRT Act and SARFAESI Act requiring RBI to justify any regulatory interventions it intends to make, the expected costs and benefits and objectives of the proposed interventions. This would also require amendments to sections 12 and 31A of the SARFAESI Act.
Endnotes

2 “Financial intermediation is the process bringing together those who need financing, such as businesses and governments, with those who provide financing, such as lenders/ depositors and private investors, and facilitating the flow of capital between them”, Global Association of Risk Professionals, 2009
3 Key concept definitions, Global Association of Risk Professionals, 2009. For instance, banks collect deposits worth Rs. 1 lakh from different small depositors and provide long term loan to power production companies.
4 An asset, including a leased asset, becomes non-performing when it ceases to generate income for the bank (RBI Glossary). A loan is termed as non-performing when the amount due is not repaid within a specified period (as determined according to RBI regulations) after the due date
5 Gross NPA = Net NPA + (Balance in Interest Suspense account + DICGC/ECGC claims received and held pending adjustment + Part payment received and kept in suspense account + Total provisions held).
6 (NPAs + Restructured advances)
9 In addition to approaching civil courts
10 Percentage of amount recovered during a year to total amount involved. However, the amount recovered during the given year could be with reference to cases referred during the given year as well as during the earlier years.
11 Supra note 8
13 It should be noted that with the recent grant of licenses to new banks in India, the number of players in banking sector is expected to increase
16 Such as South-Africa, South Korea
17 The Report of the Working Group on Business Regulatory Framework (Planning Commission, 2011) notes, “It is recommended that Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) has to be adopted for improving the quality of business regulatory governance in India. RIA will help with the identification of unreasonable burdens on business and in devising ways through which such burdens are kept to a minimum, if not eliminated altogether. Because RIA includes consultation with a wide range of stakeholders, it also provides ample opportunity to bring up unforeseen consequences or real life experiences for consideration while weighing and measuring the impact of any regulation or policy. It thus increases the accountability of the whole regulatory governance process.” The Report of the Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission (2013) recommends adoption of cost-benefit analysis in regulation making and review. The Damodaran Committee Report (2013) and the Tax Administration Reforms Commission also recommends adoption of RIA in India
18 When market forces are unable of meet the desired objectives
19 Primary legislation is a main law passed by the legislative branch of government. In contrast, secondary legislation is a subordinate law / delegated legislation made by the executive branch within the boundaries laid down by the legislature.
20 Principal legislation governing the NBFCs is the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 (RBI Act). However, certain categories of NBFCs are under supervision of other regulators such as Housing finance companies are regulated by National Housing Bank (NHB); merchant banker, venture capital fund, stock brokers, etc. by the Securities & Exchange Board of India (SEBI) and insurance companies by the Insurance Regulatory & Development Authority (IRDA). Similarly, Chit Fund Companies are regulated by the respective state governments and Nidhi Companies by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA). As a result, products issued by various NBFCs are regulated differently, resulting in market to be subjected to loose regulations.
21 Supra note 1
Scope of the project envisaged undertaking regulatory impact assessment (RIA) on the primary financial sector laws only since much focus has already been given on RIA of secondary regulations, but not much work has been done in relation to primary legislations.

SICA, 1985 was repealed and replaced by the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Repeal Act, 2003. Under this, BIFR and AAIFR (Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction) was dissolved, and replaced by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) respectively. However, legal hurdles prevented the NCLT and NCLAT from being constituted and accordingly, the 2003 Act is yet to be made effective.

The Committee was set up to examine the legal and other problems faced by the banks and financial institutions in rehabilitation of sick industrial units, and to suggest remedial measures for effective tackling the problem of industrial sickness.

Section 22 of SICA, 1985


A sub-standard asset is one, which has remained NPA for a period less than or equal to 12 months.

An asset would be classified as doubtful if it has remained in the sub-standard category for a period of 12 months or more.

A loss asset is one which has been identified by the bank or internal or external auditors or the RBI inspection but the amount has not been written off wholly.


About 15 lakh cases pertaining to debt recovery were pending at various civil courts in India as on September 30, 1990. The amount stuck in litigation amounted to INR 5,622 crores pertaining to PSBs and INR 391 crores pertaining to FIs. This forced the government to set up the Narasimhan Committee in 1991 to study the possibilities of a revamp this situation. It, among other recommendations, endorsed the proposal of the T. Tiwari Committee regarding the establishment of DRTs for the recovery of debts, leading the government to pass the DRT Act.


Realising the gravity of the low debt recovery crises in the banking sector, the government was quick to implement the recommendations of the Narasimhan Committee – II and Andhuarjun Committee leading to the enactment of the SARFAESI Act, 2002.


As specified under section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act

Chapter XIX of the Companies Act, 2013 (relating to Revival and Rehabilitation of Sick Companies)

In accordance with the provisions of the section 253 of the 2013 Act, a company is assessed to be a sick company, if the company is unable to pay or secure or compound the payment on demand by its secured creditors representing 50 percent or more of its outstanding debts.

Section 253(2) of the 2013 Act

Section 253(3) of the 2013 Act


Section 20 of the DRT Act


Pre-Legislation Consultation Policy, 05 February 2014

Ibid

On Parliamentary Procedures of Government of India, Lok Sabha Rules

See, the Pre-legislative consultation policy (PLCP) (issued in the year 2014)

Such as the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Ordinance, 1993, the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest (Second) Ordinance, 2002, etc.

On expiration of both the ordinances, the bills were subsequently introduced and passed in the parliament.

In 2012, amendments to sections 5(1)(5), 9(g) and 13(9) of Securitisation Act, and amendments to sections 15 (proviso), 19(3A), 19(5), 19(5A), 36(2)(cc) to the DRT Act were introduced in Rajya Sabha and not in Lok Sabha


Annual Review of Internal Audit Wing of Ministry of Finance, 2011-12

*Study on Understanding cases at the Debt Recovery Tribunal*, undertaken by the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (NIPFP) and Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research (IGIDR) in August, 2014

A trial failure means an event when the courts / tribunals are prevented from conducting its business

Supra note 41

Section 19(24) of the DRT Act

Section 20(6) of the DRT Act

See, *"A Hundred Small Steps", A Report of the Committee on Financial Sector Reforms, Planning Commission of India*

The information in public domain is for a limited period (say, 2010-2014). The cases might have been instituted prior to beginning of that period and could continue subsequent to end of such period

Chennai DRAT, A Diary, available at [http://www.drat.tn.nic.in/ADIary.htm](http://www.drat.tn.nic.in/ADIary.htm)

However, it must be noted that the analysis is subject to limited publicly available information, and does not comment on the reasons for delay.

Probable burden of a legislation on judiciary. Judicial Impact Assessment has been recommended by report of Task Force on Judicial Impact Assessment, chaired by Justice M. Jagannadha Rao, (2008). The report notes, “Further, there must be ‘judicial impact assessment’, as done in the United States, whenever any legislation is introduced either in Parliament or in the State Legislatures. The financial memorandum attached to each Bill must estimate not only the budgetary requirement of other staff but also the budgetary requirement for meeting the expenses of the additional cases that may arise out of the new Bill when it is passed by the legislature. The said budget must mention the number of civil and criminal cases likely to be generated by the new Act, how many courts are necessary, how many judges and staff are necessary and what is the infrastructure necessary.”

Section 1(4) of the DRT Act. The cases below the prescribed threshold would generally be referred to lok adalats, civil courts, or the lenders could take action under the SARFAESI Act. Some of these mechanisms have their own minimum thresholds.

The DRT (Procedure) Rules, 1993

Moreover, as per the statutory provisions, the application fees may be remitted either in the form of crossed demand draft drawn on a nationalised bank or through a crossed Indian Postal Order. Non-acceptance of demand draft drawn on a bank other than a nationalised bank, is a competition distortionary policy, which has the potential to result in inconvenience of parties.

Supra note 66
The Supreme Court in the matter of **Union of India v. DRT Bar Association** (decision dated 22 January 2013) highlighted the infrastructure constraints faced by RTs. The government had pledged to fix the situation by taking appropriate measures. However, no improvement has been observed in this regard.


Such as, on the basis of population/case load

List of DRATs/DRTs, available at [http://financialservices.gov.in/banking/ListOfDRATsAndDRTS.asp?pageid=1](http://financialservices.gov.in/banking/ListOfDRATsAndDRTS.asp?pageid=1), last visited on 17 January 2015

Maharashtra has 5 DRTs (three in Mumbai and one each in Nagpur and Pune)

All North eastern states have access to a singular DRT in Guwahati

For instance, as on 31 March 2014, more than 1,000 matters are pending at DRT-Chennai I, but the total number cases pending at DRT-Chennai II and III on a consolidated basis is less than 900, on the same date. Similar is the case with tribunals in Delhi and Mumbai

The DRATs are situated in Allahabad, Chennai, Delhi, Kolkata and Mumbai. Each DRAT is appellate authority of multiple RTs based on a particular geographical area. For example, Allahabad DRAT has jurisdiction over three DRTs viz., Allahabad DRT, Lucknow DRT and Jabalpur DRT covering four States of Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh.

According to the Report of the ‘Working Group to Review the functioning of DRTs’, under the Chairpersonship of Mr. N.V. Deshpande (Former Legal Advisor of RBI), the presiding officer of DRT should not have more than 30 cases on board on any given date and there should not be more than 80 cases pending before it any given point of time.

In terms of press release dated 10 December 2014, the Cabinet approved establishment of six new DRTs (taking the number up to 39), available at [http://pib.nic.in/news/50448255_1_drts-stamps-government-owned-banks](http://pib.nic.in/news/50448255_1_drts-stamps-government-owned-banks), last visited on 17 January 2015. Interestingly, the budget documents do not specify any financial allocation for establishment of such DRTs

Section 3

Section 9 and 8(3)

Report on Trends and Progress of Banking in India, Reserve Bank of India

Available at [http://www.drt3chennai.tn.nic.in/CauseLists/31122014.htm](http://www.drt3chennai.tn.nic.in/CauseLists/31122014.htm), last visited on March 10, 2015

Available at [http://www.drt3chennai.tn.nic.in/CauseLists/15122014.htm](http://www.drt3chennai.tn.nic.in/CauseLists/15122014.htm), last visited on March 10, 2015

This is despite a specific provision in the DRT Act relating to day to day hearings

Available at [http://www.drat.tn.nic.in/A-Diary/01-30%20Nov%2014.htm](http://www.drat.tn.nic.in/A-Diary/01-30%20Nov%2014.htm), last visited on March 10, 2015

Available at [http://www.drat.tn.nic.in/A-Diary/01-30%20June%2012.htm](http://www.drat.tn.nic.in/A-Diary/01-30%20June%2012.htm), last visited on March 10, 2015

Available at [http://www.drt3chennai.tn.nic.in/CauseLists/16122014.htm](http://www.drt3chennai.tn.nic.in/CauseLists/16122014.htm), last visited on March 10, 2015.

Available at [http://www.drat.tn.nic.in/Composition.htm](http://www.drat.tn.nic.in/Composition.htm), last visited on March 10, 2015.

Rule 5(5) of the DRT (Procedure) Rules, 1993

Section 26 of the DRT Act, 1993.

Report of Annual Review of the Internal Audit Wing, Ministry of Finance

In **United Bank of India vs. Satyawati Tondon and Ors.** III (2010) Banking Cases 495 (SC), the Supreme Court observes, ‘….it is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. We hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and circumspection.’

Asha Singh, **Performance of Non-Performing Assets (NPAs) in Indian Commercial Banks**, International Journal of Marketing, Financial Services & Management Research, 2013

The procedure for service of demand notice, as provided under Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002, issued under the Securitisation Act, may provide some guidance in this regard. Rule 3 states that where authorised officer has reason to believe that the borrower is avoiding the service of the notice or that for any other reason, the service cannot be made, the service shall be effected by affixing a copy of the demand notice on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the house or building in which the borrower or his agent ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain and also by publishing the contents of the demand notice in two leading newspapers, one in vernacular language, having sufficient circulation in that locality.

However, it must be noted that the Regulations of Practice, 2010, for DRTs for the states of Maharashtra, Gujarat, Goa, and the Union Territories of Dadra and Nagar Haveli, Daman and Diu provide that summons or notice may also be served by e-mail, fax or courier with the leave of Registrar. Further, where a summons or the Notice is returned with postal remarks such as ‘refused’, ‘unclaimed’, ‘not claimed’, ‘intimated’ or ‘intimation given’ it may be declared that the Summons or the Notice is served. In addition, where the Summons or the Notice properly addressed and properly issued by RPAD is not received back within thirty days from the date of
the posting, it may be declared, on submission of the Affidavit by the applicant regarding correctness of such address and evidence of posting that the Summons or the Notice is duly served. Similarly, where the Summons or the Notice is sent by e-mail or Fax at proper address, it may be declared, on an affidavit and proof of the delivery that it is duly served.


110 Section 19(5) of the DRT Act

111 This provision was not in the version introduced in the Lok Sabha, but was introduced later. Further, the DRT (Procedure) Rules, 1993, seem not to have been amended to showcase this change.

112 Section 5 of the DRT Act

113 Article 233 of the Constitution of India

114 In addition to a PO having 3 years of experience. See Section 10 of the DRT Act.

115 In Union of India v. R. Gandhi (dated 11 May 2010) the Supreme Court criticised the practice of appointing under-skilled persons to tribunals. It observed, ‘what is a matter of concern is the gradual erosion of the independence of the judiciary, and shrinking of the space occupied by the Judiciary and gradual increase in the number of persons belonging to the civil service discharging functions and exercising jurisdiction which was previously exercised by the High Court. There is also a gradual dilution of the standards and qualification prescribed for persons to decide cases which were earlier being decided by the High Courts.’


117 Such as Securities Appellate Tribunal and Income Tax Appellate Tribunal


119 DRT (Procedure for Appointment As Presiding Officer of the Tribunal) Rules, 1998

120 DRAT (Procedure for Appointment As Chairperson of the Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1998

121 In Union of India v. R. Gandhi, dated May 11, 2010, the Hon’ble Supreme Court came down heavily on the practice of providing sinecures to members of civil services, by appointments as members of Tribunals. The Supreme Court observes, ‘…. in India, unfortunately Tribunals have not achieved full independence. The Secretary of the concerned ‘sponsoring department’ sits in the Selection Committee for appointment. When the Tribunals are formed, they are mostly dependent on their sponsoring department for funding, infrastructure and even space for functioning. The statutes constituting Tribunals routinely provide for members of civil services from the sponsoring departments becoming members of the Tribunal and continuing their lien with their parent cadre.’

122 In Union of India v. R. Gandhi (dated 11 May 2010) the Supreme Court came down heavily on the practice of providing sinecures to members of civil services, by appointments as members of Tribunals. The Supreme Court observes, ‘…. in India, unfortunately Tribunals have not achieved full independence. The Secretary of the concerned ‘sponsoring department’ sits in the Selection Committee for appointment. When the Tribunals are formed, they are mostly dependent on their sponsoring department for funding, infrastructure and even space for functioning. The statutes constituting Tribunals routinely provide for members of civil services from the sponsoring departments becoming members of the Tribunal and continuing their lien with their parent cadre.’

123 Supra note 1. Experts have recommended inclusion of expert members in selection committee for regulators.

124 Section 16 of the DRT Act

125 Incentive-disincentive

126 Unless having attained a specific age prior to completing such term

127 Madras Bar Association vs. Union of India, Transfer Case No. 150 of 2006, Supreme Court of India, September 25, 2014. The matter involved discussion on independence of members of the hitherto proposed National Tax Tribunal

128 Submissions of Amicus Curiae in the matter of Union of India vs. Debt recovery Tribunal Bar Association and Anr., dated January 22, 2013

129 Ibid

130 Office Memorandum dated issued 4 December 2014 issued by the Ministry of Finance, in relation to filing up vacancies at deputation basis at DRATs and DRTs, provides qualifications for Registrar as: government or state judicial service officers, scale V officers of public sector banks, et al

131 Rule 9 of the DRT (Procedure) Rules, 1993

132 Rule 12(8) of the DRT (Procedure) Rules, 1993 read with section 4 of the Bankers’ Book Evidence Act, 1891

Enforcement Action Under Securitisation Act – A Bird’s Eye View, RBI Legal News and Views (October-December), 2009
134 AIR 2007 SC 712
135 Such as, taxation dues
136 It must be noted that pursuant to the Finance Act, 2011, the claims of the secured creditors under the DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act, have been provided priority over tax dues under the Customs Act, 1962, Central Excise Act, 1944 and the Finance Act, 1994 relating to service tax
137 The Committee on Financial Sector Assessment (CFSA) suggests that the law should be amended to the effect that the priority of charge for state dues should not operate in respect of prior mortgages created in favour of the secured creditors.

Mardia Chemicals v. Union of India 2004 (4) SCC 311

Statistical Tables Relating to Banks in India, Table 19: NPAs of scheduled commercial banks recovered through various channels, December 2014
140 The Report of Working Group on Banking (2013) notes, ‘Section 14 of SARFAESI (2002) is silent on the time period within which petitions are required to be disposed of by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or District Magistrates. Since no time lines are prescribed, these petitions take longer than required to be disposed of leading to unnecessary delays. The Bombay High Court, noting the significant delay caused in enforcing security interests under Section 14 petitions, prescribed a time line of two months for all petitions filed under Section 14.’
141 F.M. Alexander, Timeframes for disposal of cases, Economic Times, 12 May 2010
142 MANU/SC/0377/2014
143 Such as, to determine the legality of tenancy
144 under section 13(4)
145 In the case of Authorised Officer, Indian Overseas Bank v. Ashok Saw Mills (2010), it was observed that, “intention of the legislature is, therefore, clear that while the Banks and Financial institutions have been vested with stringent powers for recovery of their dues, safeguards have also been provided for rectifying any error or wrongful use of such powers by vesting the DRT with authority after conducting an adjudication into the matter to declare any such action invalid and also to restore possession even though possession may have been made over to the transferee. The consequences of the authority vested in DRT under subsection (3) of Section 17 necessarily implies that the DRT is entitled to question the action taken by the secured creditor and the transactions entered into by virtue of Section 13 (4) of the Act. The Legislature by including subsection (3) in section 17 has gone to the extent of vesting the DRT with authority to even set aside a transaction including sale and to restore possession to the borrower in appropriate cases.”
146 Section 18 of the Securitisation Act. It has often been contended that determination of debt should preceed the power of DRAT to direct depositing of part of the amount due. This was negated in Forum Diamonds v. Bank of Baroda 2010(1) DRTC 345 Bombay (DB) wherein the court held that if such contention was accepted, the very purpose of SARFAESI Act would be defeated. Also see, Diwakars Law Page, Important case laws on Securitisation Act, 16 December 2010
147 R. Gandhi, Banks, Debt Recovery and Regulations: A Synergy, Feb 10, 2015, wherein it was noted, “It is understood that in a number of cases, DRT grants time to borrower / applicant to make payment and subject to payment, bank’s SARFAESI action is stayed and matter lingers on for a long period”
148 For instance, section 19 of the Securitisation Act provides that in case the DRT or DRAT holds that possession of secured assets by the secured creditor is not in accordance with Securitisation Act, and directs secured creditors to return such secured assets to the concerned borrowers, such borrower shall be entitled to the payment of such compensation and costs as may be determined by such Tribunal. However, the Securitisation Act is devoid of any corresponding provision for the benefit of secured creditor in case of delay in recovery of amount due in case DRT or DRAT dismisses as the application as frivolous in nature.
149 R. Gandhi, Banks, Debt Recovery and Regulations: A Synergy, Feb 10, 2015, ‘though section 17 (5) provides that an application under section 17 shall be disposed of within 60 days of date of application (extendable up to 4 months) the said time frame is not being strictly followed in practice. There is long delay in passing orders by the DRTs’
150 Mukund P Unny, A Study on the Effectiveness of Remedies Available for Banks in a DRT - A case study on Ernakulum DRT, Centre for Public Policy Research, February 2011
151 Ministry of Finance, Report of the Key Advisory Group on the Asset Reconstruction Companies, 30 December 2011
152 2006 (12) SCALE 585
153 While the Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India vs. Satyawati Tondon and Ors, (order dated 26 July 2010) has held that the High Courts should not interfere in the debt recovery proceedings before all alternatives available with the borrower are exhausted.
In United Bank of India Vs Satyawati Tondon and others (2010 (2) DRTC 457 (SC)) the Supreme Court observed, “that it is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated pronouncement of the Supreme Court, the High Courts continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. We hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and circumspection.”

The issue whether tenancy created after the mortgage but before the issue of notice under section 13(2) is binding on secured creditor was examined in Business India Builders & Developers v. Union of India, wherein the Kerela High Court held that the combined effect of section 35 and 37 overrides Rent Control Act, disregarding the need for eviction proceedings to evict tenants. However, a contrary view was taken by DRAT Mumbai in Shikshak Sahakari Bank Limited v. Indian Oil Corporation Limited, where in it was held that the bank can step into the shoes of mortgagor and cannot evict the respondent without initiating eviction proceedings under the Transfer of Property Act or the Rent Control Act. Cited from G. Ajith Kumar, Security Interest Enforcement Action Under Securitisation Act – A Bird’s Eye View, RBI Legal News and Views (October-December), 2009

In case of Transcore v. Union of India (2006 (12) SCALE 585), the Supreme Court clarified that the authorised officer has the right to take actual as well as symbolic possession and there is no dichotomy between the two.

MANU/SC/0217/2014

Sales tax legislations in states like Rajasthan, Kerala, Maharashtra have provisions giving priority to states under such statutes. In Central Bank of India v. State of Kerala (decision dated 27 February 2009), the Supreme Court upheld validity of such statutory provisions. See, G. Ajith Kumar, Security Interest Enforcement Action Under Securitisation Act – A Bird’s Eye View, RBI Legal News and Views (October-December), 2009. In addition, in the matter of Bank of India v. Assistant Provident Commissioner, it has been held that dues under EPF will have priority over dues of the secured creditor.

It must be noted that pursuant to the Finance Act, 2011, the claims of the secured creditors under the DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act, have been provided priority over tax dues under the Customs Act, 1962, Central Excise Act, 1944 and the Finance Act, 1994 relating to service tax. However, absence of specific provision in the SARFAESI Act in relation to creating first charge in favour of the bank gives provisions of section 281(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 read with Rule 16 of the Second Schedule of the Income Tax Act, 1961 overriding effect over the provisions of SARFAESI Act, see the Gujarat High Court decision in the case of UCO Bank vs. UOI (182 Taxman 26)

M.R. Umarji, Prioritise secured creditors claims, Economic Times, 12 May 2010

Report of Working Group on Banking, 2013, referring to International Insolvency Institute, 2005

G. Ajith Kumar, Security Interest Enforcement Action Under Securitisation Act – A Bird’s Eye View, RBI Legal News and Views (October-December), 2009. In the matter of Gajula Exim (P) Ltd v. Authorised Officer, Andhra Bank it was held that the borrower failed to prove that any agricultural operations were being conducted in any part of the land under consideration. It was held that mere paying Land Revenue cannot be treated as agricultural property.

Section 5

RBI Circular, Acquisition of Financial Assets by Securitisation/ Reconstruction Companies – Clarifications, 22 April 2009. The Working Group on Banking (2013) notes that while such a provision is useful in preventing cartels amongst the asset reconstruction companies, it also prohibits such companies from cooperating with each other and offering a competitive price in an auction. Other experts (see http://www.iicai.in/images/sarfaesi_papers.pdf), are of the view that, presumably, this was done so as to block the possibility of a group of ARCs indulging in a ponzi operation by going on transferring an asset from one to another, in a circular way, without making much recovery. Such circular transfers from one ARC to another would defeat the very purpose for which ARCs were set up – which was to realize value from the NPAs acquired from banks, within a period of 5 years. But the remedy – de-notifying ARC as a financial institution so that an ARC can acquire NPAs from a bank or financial institution but not from another ARC – has turned out to be worse than the disease. For, it has blocked the transfer of assets between one ARC and another even for a legitimate purpose.


Indian banks and NPAs - IV: SARFAESI Act and its impact, MoneyLife, 16 July 2012

Credit Suisse, Indian Financial Sector, Distressed asset recovery: A reality check, Equity Research, 30 April 2014

Ajay Shah et al, NPAs processed by asset reconstruction companies – where did we go wrong?, 23 August 2014
Section 31A of the Securitisation Act

SARFAESI (Central Registry) Rules, available at http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/docs/Content/PDFs/CERR250411.pdf

Section 20(4) provides that provisions of SARFAESI Act pertaining to Central Registry shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any of the provisions contained in other laws requiring registration of charges and shall not affect the priority of charges or validity thereof under those Acts or laws.

Stakeholder consultations revealed that it is difficult to understand as to why equitable mortgages had to be distinguished. An RBI Press Release (dated 21 April 2011, DBOD. Leg. No. BC. 86/09.08.011 /201011) provides that this has been done to prevent frauds. In fact, the chances of frauds are minimal in case of equitable mortgages, as the title deeds are physically with the lender. If the title deeds are indeed fabricated, then the Central Registry does not help at all, because registration of such mortgage does not validate what is actually invalid.

Vinod Kothari, Futile Central Registry Rules impose a heavy burden on banks, Moneylife, 30 April 2011
Vinod Kothari, Futile Central Registry Rules impose a heavy burden on banks, Moneylife, 30 April 2011

The Union Budget 2015-16 document notes, ‘To bring parity in regulation of Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs) with other financial institutions in matters relating to recovery, it is proposed that NBFCs registered with RBI and having asset size of ₹500 crore and above will be considered for notifications as “Financial Institution” in terms of the SARFAESI Act, 2002.’


Present value is calculated considering an annual inflation/ risk free rate of interest of around 8 percent.

Interest lost

The above calculation is done on the basis of given sample size of cases. Different sample size may lead to variable results.

Assuming normal pendency as one year

Present value is calculated considering an annual inflation of around 8 percent

Analysis of cases pending before / disposed by DRAT Chennai is done owing to availability of data in public domain. Further, we have noticed that majority of DRTs / DRATs either do not have their websites or they do not publish relevant data on their websites.

Present value is calculated considering an annual inflation of around 8 percent.

The above calculation is done on the basis of given sample size of cases. Different sample size may lead to variable results.


However, in the absence of amount involved in 1,010 cases pending before all 5 DRATs, calculation of opportunity cost is not possible.


The DRT (Procedure) Rules, 1993

The DRAT (Procedure) Rules, 1994
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201 Statistical Tables Relating to Banks in India, Table 19: NPAs of scheduled commercial banks recovered through various channels, December 2014
202 Assuming an average 4 per cent litigation cost, based on the stakeholders’ interaction.
204 Ibid
205 Report on Trends and Progress of Banking in India, Reserve Bank of India
206 Stakeholders’ consultation revealed that it should ideally take not more than 6 months to recover amount outstanding dues under the SARFAESI mode.
207 Statistical Tables Relating to Banks in India, Table 19: NPAs of scheduled commercial banks recovered through various channels, December 2014
208 Assuming recovery of around 27 percent amount in first year
209 Present value is calculated considering an annual inflation of around 8 percent
210 Section 17 and 18 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002
211 Delay is calculated after the expiry of 90 days (60 days as specified u/s 13(2) of the Act + a reasonable period of 30 days to take action u/s 13(4)).
212 Present value is calculated considering an annual inflation of around 8 percent.
214 Ibid
215 Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002
216 Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002
217 The Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002
218 “A debt recovery suit against a borrower can be filed in a DRT only if the claim is larger than Rupees 1 million (approximately $20,000). The rationale for this stipulation appears to have been as follows. First, by restricting the size of the claim that would be eligible for DRTs, this avoids overcrowding the DRTs. Second, given the large fixed cost of litigation, the larger non-performing loans are also most attractive to recover. The DRTs were envisioned as helping banks recover bad loans from the larger corporate borrowers. The exact threshold appears to have been chosen because it was a convenient round number. There is no evidence to suggest that there were any economic reasons for this choice”, Visaria, Legal Reform and Loan Repayment: The Microeconomic Impact of Debt Recovery Tribunals in India, Boston University, April 2006, available at http://www.bu.edu/econ/files/2012/11/dp157-Visaria.pdf, last accessed on 27 March 2015
219 www.indiastat.com, inflation related indices
220 Visaria, Legal Reform and Loan Repayment: The Microeconomic Impact of Debt Recovery Tribunals in India, Boston University, April 2006, available at http://www.bu.edu/econ/files/2012/11/dp157-Visaria.pdf, last accessed on 27 March 2015, found that Bombay High Court was taking around twice the time as Mumbai DRTs, for issuance of summons, first hearing, taking on record applicant’s and defendant’s evidence, and start of arguments.
221 Similar suggestions have been made by FSLRC Working Group on Banking (2013). The working group observed, “In our view, the threshold limits for application of RDBDFI (1993) must not be stated in the act. The Central Government must have the power to determine the limit through rules. In addition, the capability and efficiency of DRTs must be measured on an ongoing basis and limitations must be addressed efficiently. The threshold limit after which cases may be filed before the DRT may be decreased only if the efficiency and capability permit,” and “There is merit in empowering the DRTs to determine the filing fees by keeping in mind the overall costs for their effective functioning. The applicants who file petitions before DRBs must have the power to determine the filing fees. Since the recommendation of this WG is to grant more independence to DRTs for allocating resources, deciding the quantum of fees should be their prerogative and is a necessary outcome of such independence.”
222 RBI Discussion Paper on Early Recognition of Financial Distress, Prompt Steps for Resolution and Fair Economy, notes, “Additional DRT benches at centres with large backlogs may be created. A separate bench for speedy disposal of SARFAESI related cases may be established in DRTs. Further, adequate staffing of Recovery Officers may have to be ensured by the Government”. Similar recommendations have been made with respect to civil and constitutional courts. In the All India Judges’ Association Case [(2002) 4 SCC 247], the Supreme Court directed the Central and State governments to consider increasing the number of judges five-fold in a phased manner over a five year period in order to achieve the judge to population ratio as 50 per million.
223 While the government used to provide break-up for capital and recurring expenditure in the budgets previously, the same was not available in latest budget of 15-16
The increase in the cases pending at DRT has been more than 50 percent from 2013 to 2014. As on March 31, 2013, total matters pending were 42,819, and the number increased to 66,971 within one year.

It might be recalled that a DRT is supposed to be manned by a single PO (section 3)

The pendency in 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014 have been around 37,616, 54,061, 63,669, 42,819, 66,971 respectively, resulting an average of around 53,027.

I find that the establishment of tribunals reduces delinquency in loan repayment by between 3 and 11 percent. The effect is statistically significant within loans as well: for the same loan, installments that become due after the loan becomes treated are more likely to be paid up on time than those that become due before. Furthermore, interest rates on loans sanctioned after the reform are lower by 1.4-2 percentage points. These results suggest that legal reform and the improved enforcement of loan contracts can reduce borrower delinquency, and can lead banks to provide cheaper credit”, Visaria, Legal Reform and Loan Repayment: The Microeconomic Impact of DRTs in India, Boston University, April 2006

See, National Institute of Smart Governance, e-drt system in DRT an DRAT, at http://nisg.org/project/37


The Merit Selection Process of Judges in US is a method of “selecting judges chooses on the basis of their qualifications, not on the basis of political and social connections…..Merit selection not only sifts out unqualified applicants, it searches out the most qualified”, American Judicature Society, Merit Selection: the Best Way to Choose the Best Judges, available at http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/ms_descrip_1185462202120.pdf. The National Judicial Appointments Commission is also required to recommend judges on the basis of ability, merit etc. Further, section 15M(2) of the SEBI Act provides that ‘a person shall not be qualified for appointment as member of a Securities Appellate Tribunal unless he is a person of ability, integrity and standing who has shown capacity in dealing with problems relating to securities market and has qualification and experience of corporate law, securities laws, finance, economics or accountancy’

215 Report of the Law Commission of India, L. Chandra Kumar be revisited by Larger Bench of Supreme Court, December 2008, “In view of the enhanced minimum required qualifications of Chairman, Members – Judicial/Administrative, in particular, Administrative, and giving the status of Chief Justice of High Court to the Chairman, and that of Judges of High Court to Members – Judicial/Administrative, the best persons available in the judiciary and administration are now attracted and are being accordingly selected to occupy the respective posts, as mentioned above. The Tribunal is thus now manned by persons having vast experience in judiciary and administration, resulting not only into quick disposal of cases, but quality judgments as well. In the beginning when the Act of 1985 came into being and cases came to be disposed of by the Tribunal, there may have been an impression that Members of the Tribunal may not be having legal expertise to deal with intricate questions of law and fact. With the advent of time, the situation has improved vastly and speedy and quality justice dispensed by the Tribunal has come for appreciation by all.”

In the matter of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (Decision dated 18 March 1997), it was held, ‘The contention that appointment of Administrative members to Administrative tribunals should be stopped cannot be accepted as a judicious mix of judicial members and those with grass-root experience would be better suited for
the purpose of speedy and efficient discharge of justice...To hold that the Tribunal should consist only of judicial members would attack the primary basis of the theory pursuant to which they have been constituted. Since the Selection Committee is now headed by a Judge of the Supreme Court, nominated by the Chief Justice of India, we have reason to believe that the Committee would take care to ensure that administrative members are chosen from amongst those who have some background to deal with such cases.' Also see, 215 Report of the Law Commission of India, L. Chandra Kumar be revisited by Larger Bench of Supreme Court, December 2008, observing, 'The enactment of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 opened a new chapter in the sphere of administering justice to the aggrieved Government servants in service matters. The Act provides for establishment of Central Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative Tribunals. The setting up of these Tribunals is founded on the premise that specialist bodies comprising both trained administrators and those with judicial experience would, by virtue of their specialized knowledge, be better equipped to dispense speedy and efficient justice. It was expected that a judicious mix of judicial members and those with grass-root experience would best serve this purpose.'

234 “In some judicial systems, a judge’s reversal rate might be a critical performance criterion, while in others more weight would be placed on how often a judge’s opinions were cited by other courts or even on the political acumen exhibited by the judge in his opinions. It is a mistake to suppose that one performance criterion or set of such criteria should be applicable to all judges.” Hon. Richard A. Posner, Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic Approach, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1259 (2005).

235 Choi et al, Are Judges Overpaid: A Skeptical Response to the Judicial Salary Debate, 2009, Journal of Legal Analysis, “The public debate over the need to raise judicial salaries has been one-sided. Sentiment appears to be that judges are underpaid. But neither theory nor evidence provides much support for this view. The primary argument being made in favor of a pay increase is that it will raise the quality of judging. Theory suggests that increasing judicial salaries will improve judicial performance only if judges can be sanctioned for performing inadequately or if the appointments process reliably screens out low-ability candidates. However, federal judges and many state judges cannot be sanctioned, and the reliability of screening processes is open to question. An empirical study of the high court judges of the fifty states provides little evidence that raising salaries would improve judicial performance.” Many US states have Judicial Performance Commission, which evaluate judicial performance on factors such as, integrity; legal knowledge; communication skills; judicial temperament; administrative performance; and service to the legal profession and the public. Further, each evaluation includes a narrative with the recommendation stated as “retain,” “do not retain,” or “no opinion.” Available at http://www.coloradojudicialperformance.gov/ last accessed on 31 March 2015

236 The FSLRC Working Group on Banking (2013) also make similar suggestions, “Amend RDDBFI (1993) and SARFAESI (2002) to ensure reporting requirements by appropriate authorities for preparing annual reports which detail revenues received through filing fees, resource allocation, steps taken towards efficient functioning of the tribunals, statistical analysis of cases and workload, time taken to dispose cases, and reasons for delay.”

237 M.R. Umarji, Prioritise secured creditors claims, Economic Times, 12 May 2010, observes, “When banks arrive at settlements with borrowers for repayment of banks dues, consent orders are to be obtained from debt recovery tribunals (DRTs) in pending recovery proceedings in terms of the settlement. Some DRTs have taken a stand that only they can approve such settlement terms and banks have no powers to finalise the settlement terms. It is necessary to amend the law to bring it in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code that requires the court to pass orders in terms of the settlement whenever the suit is settled out of court”

238 As on date, around 12 RTs have websites. See, List of DRTs/ DRATs, http://financialservices.gov.in/banking/ListOfDRATsAndDRTS.asp?pageid=1

239 Available at Office Memorandum issued by the Government of India dated September 23, 2008 regarding travelling allowance rules - implementation of sixth pay commission, available on http://www.nitj.ac.in/News/TA%20RULES.pdf

240 Parliamentary Standing Committee on Human Resource Development, 225th Report on Education Tribunals Bill, 2010, observes “The Committee is not convinced by the justification given by the Department. It believes that the composition of the Selection Committee should be a balanced one as it would be appointing the Chairperson and members of the National Tribunals who would be discharging an important task of adjudicating on disputes primarily related to educational matters. Therefore, adequate representation of the academia should be ensured in the Selection Committee so that the basic spirit behind the proposed legislation is not defeated.” The Selection Committee as prescribed under the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 also includes two eminent persons, other than representatives from judiciary and government. The Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission also recommends a balanced selection committee for selection of members of Financial Sector Appellate Tribunal.

241 Available at Office Memorandum issued by the Government of India dated September 23, 2008 regarding travelling allowance rules - implementation of sixth pay commission, available on http://www.nitj.ac.in/News/TA%20RULES.pdf
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242 R. Gandhi, Banks Recovery and Regulations: A synergy, Workshop for Judges of DRATs and Presiding Officers of DRTs, 29 December 2014, “As per the RDDBFI Act, though the cases are to be disposed of within six months, in some cases, the next date itself is given after six months to one year”.


244 The FSLRC Working Group on Banking (2013) notes, “Indian courts have been slow in adopting information technology. While there has been some improvements in communication to the public through websites; there is no movement towards integrating the entire court process into an electronic form. Digitisation of court records and computerisation of registries would be beneficial in handling the huge backlog of cases. As an example, digitising the registry of the Supreme Court of India has been beneficial in reducing arrears and in facilitating docket management. The Law Commission of India (2009) also recommends a move towards e-filing of documents and video conferencing of proceedings as an effort to save time and costs. For efficient functioning of DRTs, adopting information technology would help in overall reduction of case backlog and would lead to greater efficiency.”

245 D.R. Parera, E-governance in Court System of Sri Lanka, “There are potential benefits of e-court system, Inter alia accountability, transparency, impartiality and responsiveness of judicial procedures by the application of ICT.” Also, Centre for Internet and Society, The Role of ICT in Judicial Reform – An Exploration, 18 November 2009, available at http://cis-india.org/inter-governance/blog/what-will-be-the-role-of-ict-in-indias-judical-reform-process, notes, “It is of no doubt that ICT can reduce the duplicity of the paper world and make courts more green through electronic case filing and video conferencing. Online case filing systems can increase speed in which citizens can have their cases heard, and real time access to online repositories of legal information drastically expedites the case cycle.”

246 The 253rd Report of the Law Commission of India, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts and Commercial Courts Bill, 2015, January 2015 observes, “At present, adjournments are granted too frequently and there are no consequences for lawyers who unnecessarily delay the case. In fact, the present culture of charging fees per hearing incentivises lawyers to delay cases. With costs being imposed infrequently and bearing no relation to actual expenses in a case, litigants have little fear of being punished and frequently indulge in delaying tactics.”

247 The 253rd Report of the Law Commission of India reviewed the practice in Singapore wherein it observed, “Court fees increase depending on the number of days taken up for hearing by the parties to the case. For example, no court fees are payable for the first three hearings, SGD 8000 is payable for the first five hearings, SGD 20000 for the first ten hearings and so on. The scale keeps increasing up to the tenth hearing and the court fee goes up to SGD 5000 per hearing from the eleventh hearing onwards…Pleadings can be struck out by the court at any stage of the hearing if such pleadings do not disclose any cause of action, are vexatious, delay fair trial, or amount to an abuse of process of the court”. Further, the 188th Report of the Law Commission of India on Proposals for Constitution of Hi-tech Fast Track Commercial Divisions in High Courts, December 2003, observes “Kenyan courts are cracking down in inefficiency and laxity. Head of the High Court’s Commercial Division, Judge Tom Mbalute, has proposed various steps, including the refusal to grant adjournments of cases set for hearing. Hearing of matters before the commercial courts could not be delayed unless lawyers for the parties are engaged in other matters in the Appeal Court, he said, and no adjournments would be permitted if the counsel were engaged before other judges or magistrates in the High Court or lower courts.”

248 ‘80:20 Rule’ or ‘Pareto Principle’ states that 80% of outcomes can be attributed to 20% of causes for a given event.

249 The application fee where the amount of debt is above Rs. 10 lakhs is Rs 12,000 plus Rs. 1,000 for every one lakh of debt or part thereof in excess of Rs. 10 lakhs, subject to a maximum of Rs. 1.5 lakh.

250 FSLRC Working Group on Banking (2013)

251 “In many countries the Asset Management Companies (AMCs) failed because the creation of AMCs did not lead to the development of a market for NPLs. Such a market is typically missing in less developed countries because information asymmetries and a lack of creditor coordination make it very difficult to price NPLs…. The development of a NPA market can, therefore, be hardly overemphasized.”

252 The registration fee is modest, within the range of Rs. 50-Rs. 1,000, under the SARFAESI (Central Registry) Rules, 2011, for different transactions requiring registration.

253 https://www.cersai.org.in/CERSAI/JSP/index.jsp

254 Debt Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993


256 Raghuram Rajan, Saving Credit, Verghese Kurien Memorial Lecture, 25 November 2013, notes, “even though the law indicates that cases before the DRT should be disposed off in 6 months, only about a fourth of
the cases pending at the beginning of the year are disposed off during the year – suggesting a four year wait even if the tribunals focus only on old cases. However, in 2013-14, the number of new cases filed during the year was about one and a half times the cases disposed off during the year. Thus backlogs and delays are growing, not coming down.”

Estimating the annual disposal rate of around 25 percent, also validated during project
Justice M. Jagannadha Rao (Retd.), Report of the Task Force on Judicial Impact Assessment, 15 June 2008, available at http://lawmin.nic.in/doi/justice/judicialimpactassessmentreportvol1.pdf, “The public has a right to know what to expect from the court system. If there is delay in the disposal of cases, then they are entitled to know the reasons for the same.” Also, The observation made by FSLRC working group on Banking (2013) is worth noting here, “the laws of these countries [US, UK, Australia] also have provisions on budgeting, preparing annual reports and analysing statistics relating to workload and pending cases. The courts and tribunals also have a duty to ensure efficient services are provided to the users.”

Annual approximate salary of a Section Officer at RT is around Rs. 4.2 lakh and of a RO is around Rs. 6.6 lakh

Currently, there are 33 DRTs and 5 DRATs. The government is in the process of setting up 6 additional DRTs

Management of court information, Ministry of Justice, Government of New Zealand, available at http://www.justice.govt.nz/publications/global-publications/r/regulatory-impact-statement-review-of-the-judicature-act-and-consolidation-of-courts-legislation/2-management-of-court-information, last accessed on 27 March 2015. Also see, World Bank Working Paper, Access to Information and Transparency in Judiciary, 2010, “The dissemination of court statistics would help citizens learn about the true performance of the courts and at the same time generate opportunities for academia and NGOs to analyze the challenges and to formulate reform proposals. In this case, a virtuous cycle is generated through the feedback between access to judicial information, monitoring and analysis by civil society, and accountability by the judicial institutions. In turn, access to information and transparency reforms are also relevant since they can contribute to the improved operation of the Judicial Branch and hence foster inclusive governance.”

Supra Note 261
Not lawyers
FSLRC Working Group on Banking (2013)
The Raghuram Rajan Committee Report (2009) also noted the lack of judicial training for recovery officers
R. Gandhi, Banks Recovery and Regulations: A synergy, Workshop for Judges of DRATs and Presiding Officers of DRTs, 29 December 2014, observes, “The officials of DRTs / DRATs should be given proper training so that they appreciate the very purpose and adjudicate the cases in a way to meet the purpose for which these Tribunals are established”
Also known as Judicial Impact Assessment