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Cartelisation: Blue Collar
Corruption
Space for Transparency, September 24, 2009
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By Pradeep S Mehta
“Our
competitors are our friends, our customers are the
enemy” is an actual statement made by an executive
of Archer Daniel Midland, in the famous case of
the lysine (a feed additive) cartel, which was
caught on videotape by the FBI.
In
common parlance, the cartel of oil producing
nations (OPEC) is something which is well known,
but it is not illegal as it is operated by
governments. Albeit, drug cartels are illegal as
these are run by criminal elements to market
illegal drugs and narcotics. In the competition
law lexicon, a cartel is a collusive agreement
between firms not to compete with each other,
which is illegal and prosecutable. It is
considered as the most egregious form of
anti-competitive practice.
Typically, cartel members may agree on: price
fixing (the price they will charge or the
discounts/credit terms they will offer their
customers for goods or services), bid rigging
(deciding who should win a contract in a
competitive tender process), output
quotas/restrictions (limiting the levels of
products or services supplied to a market in order
to increase the price) and market sharing
(choosing which customers or geographic areas they
will supply, or preventing competitors from
entering the market). It is usually a civil
offence but in many countries, such as the USA, it
is also a criminal offence.
Cartels can occur in almost any industry and can
involve goods or services at the manufacturing,
distribution or retail level. Some sectors may be
more susceptible to cartels than others because of
their structure or the way in which they operate.
For example, a cartel may be more likely to exist
in an industry where there are few competitors;
the products have similar characteristics (which
leaves little scope for competition on quality or
service); communication channels between
competitors are already established (trade
associations); and the industry is suffering from
excess capacity or there is general recession. For
example, the cement industry is one of the worst
offenders and has been hauled up wherever a
competition law exists.
How do
cartels affect consumer and business interests?
Cartels also operate across borders, as was
witnessed in many sectors, such as the vitamin,
citric acid, bromine, seamless steel tubes,
graphite electrodes and lysine industries. These
resulted in overcharges of US $1.71 billion, US
$67 million, US $8 million, US $1.19 billion, US
$975 million and US $43 million, respectively from
developing countries.
Competition laws across the world differ in
various aspects; however, as said, there is one
universal feature: condemning cartel agreements.
Globally, competition authorities are beefing up
enforcement and looking for evidence of price
fixing in a wider range of markets and industries.
Executives are routinely sent to jail and their
companies are forced to pay fines equal to three
times the estimated harm. Fines, dawn raids and
use of leniency provisions have reached new
heights.
Effective measures need to be taken against the
evil of cartelisation. The harm caused by
cartelisation is greater in the developing world
as compared to developed nations, because the
former often lack effective competition regimes.
Further, the affected consumers from the
developing world are not able to legally claim any
compensation from international prosecution. Given
the global impact of cartels, it is fair and
judicious that a portion of these fines should
ideally be used in favour of the affected
consumers based in developing countries. Thus, a
decisive step towards remedying the situation
could be the creation of an “International
Competition Fund”. The establishment of the Fund
would contribute to not only deterring
cartelisation but also the promotion of a
competition culture, better harnessing of the
development potential of globalisation and the
disciplining of anticompetitive practices in
global markets.
The author
is
Secretary General, CUTS International
and can be reached at
psm@cuts.org.
This article can also be viewed at:
http://blog.transparency.org/
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