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Untangling
regulatory overlaps
Financial Express, June 19, 2012 |
By
Pradeep S Mehta
Nowhere in the world
are banking mergers outside the remit of competition laws. The
only exception is Turkey, where the central bank oversees banking
mergers, but it is empowered to do so under their competition law
and not banking laws. But exemptions do not prove the rule.
Because competition enforcement and sector regulation are
complementary instruments, and aim at ensuring that markets
functions well.
But ambiguities and
overlapping jurisdiction often create confusion, as is happening
in India currently. There are two proposals before the government
to boost the competition culture in the country. First, to amend
the Competition Act to ensure coherence and efficiency. Second, to
address a huge number of policy-induced competition distortions
through a National Competition Policy. Enabling coherence among
sector regulators and the competition authority to address
overlaps is just one of many forward-looking prescriptions. Alas,
while some business newspapers are on the dot, others are just
adding confusion to the melee.
Competition and sector
regulation are dynamic, intertwined concepts. For them to work,
one needs well-defined laws and policy in both cases. This is
precisely why when jurisdiction over certain areas is not
clear-cut, confusion arises. Legislative ambiguity and lack of
clarity about powers vested in the competition authorities as well
as the sector regulatory bodies aggravates the problem and leads
to conflicts. World over, in many cases, sector regulators were
brought in before competition regimes so they view the work of the
competition agency as an encroachment on their turfs.
The competition agency
in India, the Competition Commission of India (CCI), started
functioning in 2009 under the Competition Act of 2002 (CA, 02). As
of 2011, it has 117 cases pending before it. It is facing
jurisdictional challenges from sector regulators. A recent example
is from the banking and financial sector. The proposed Banking
Regulations Amendment Bill wants RBI to be the only regulator for
banking mergers and the Competition Act amended to disallow
meddling by the CCI. Simultaneously, the Department of
Telecommunication too wants an ab initio exemption for merger
review of telecom companies in the CA, 02. As in all competition
laws, this Act also has provision for exemptions and exceptions.
Therefore, one need not amend the law structurally but seek
exemption and/or exception as and when warranted.
The CA, 02 also
provides for an in-built appeals procedure through a Competition
Appellate Tribunal, but the proposals by the finance ministry and
the communications ministry don’t include any appeals procedure,
if their agencies were to be the arbiters of merger review in
their own jurisdiction. Aggrieved parties cannot run to the
normal, over-burdened courts all the time and waste the taxpayers
money.
In a recent order, the
Delhi High Court stopped the CCI from proceeding with
investigations into alleged anti-competitive practices in aviation
fuel supply at the behest of oil marketing companies. The argument
was that the oil market is regulated by the Petroleum and Natural
Gas Regulatory Board. The case is yet to be decided, but only
points out to the legal muddle that exists because of poor
understanding.
All regulatory laws
are required to promote competition in the sector that they
regulate. This cannot be interpreted to mean that the sector
regulators are also empowered to check anticompetitive practices,
unless specifically empowered to do so.
The Electricity Act is
the only that mentions the competence of the sector regulator to
check anticompetitive practices abut this reflects an inherent
discrepancy in the drafting of the legislation. It provides
overriding effect to the Consumer Protection Act (COPRA) insofar
as consumer interest is concerned, in spite of the fact that the
Object clauses of all regulatory laws also provide protection of
consumer interest. Yet, it fails to offer the same treatment to
the Competition Act, which is also mandated in law and spirit to
inter alia protect the interest of consumers.
In all other sector
regulatory laws, the application of the COPRA is similarly
treated. Furthermore, some sector regulatory laws have precisely
denoted the role of the competition authority to check
anti-competitive practices. A more sound understanding of this
principle is reflected in the Telecom Regulatory Authority of
India (TRAI) Act, which specifically recognises that all
anti-competitive practices will be dealt with by the Monopolies
and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (now replaced by the
CCI). Similarly, the Airport Economic Regulatory Authority (AERA)
Act has kept matters pertaining to consumer complaints under the
Consumer Protection Act and competition matters within the
Competition Act outside the purview of the AERA Act.
One wonders when the
legislators have acknowledged the need for a specialised
competition agency to deal with anti-competitive practices in the
TRAI Act, which is older than the Electricity Act, why was the
electricity regulator empowered to deal with anti-competitive
practices subsequently? This indicates a problem of incoherence in
law-making.
The problem of
conflicts resulting from regulatory overlap is not specific to
India. A majority of countries have adopted an institutional
approach to this problem. There are three main approaches: (i)
primacy to the competition agency, (ii) primacy to the sector
regulator, (iii) concurrent jurisdiction to be shared by both. Of
these, the Planning Commission in 2006 has recommended that the
best approach for India is a type of a concurrent framework, which
involves continuous mutual mandatory cooperation/consultations
between sector regulators and competition authorities.
While the current
framework rightly provides for consultations between the two
regulatory authorities it is not adequate. Section 21 of the
Competition Act provides that any statutory authority may make a
reference to the CCI, whose opinion shall be rendered in 60 days
which shall be considered by the statuary authority. The problem
envisaged is that it is optional for the regulator to consult the
CCI, and not mandatory. One proposal pending before the government
is that the consultation process should be made mandatory.
Sector regulators
should have the leading role in regulating technical issues. For
competition matters, which are largely behavioural and ex post,
the competition authority should take a leading role. In cases of
mergers, which requires an ex ante review by the competition
authority, it should also confer with the sector regulator to
achieve harmony. Finally, both the sector regulator and the
competition authority shall mandatorily consult and cooperate with
each other on matters that are overlapping and thereby avoid
conflicts. If the two regulatory bodies fail to resolve issues
amicably, the same should then be resolved by a referral body
carefully constituted to comprise of a diverse group of members
experienced in the relevant fields.
Finally, to address
another point of confusion in the current policy debate, the
National Competition Policy is proposed to be adopted and
administered through a Cabinet Committee on Competition, to be
serviced by the corporate affairs ministry. Its remit will be to
address the thousands of competition distortions that are created
by ill-informed policies of other ministries and state
governments, and not just regulatory overlaps. Only then can we
expect a healthy competition culture and higher growth in our
country.
The author is
secretary general, CUTS International. Natasha Nayak of CUTS
contributed to this article
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