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Intimations of Insecurity
Financial Express, May 10, 2011 |
By
Pradeep S Mehta
In the latest soap
opera of cartel busting, both Procter & Gamble and Unilever were
fined $457.3 million by the European Commission in April, 2011.
The case was settled after another conspirator, Henkel, spilled
the beans and claimed leniency. In most such cases, it is the
leniency provision that enables the competition authority to nail
the perpetrators with little effort. Alas, despite having such a
provision in our competition law, the Competition Commission of
India, in force since 2009, has not yet been able to bust a single
cartel.
Unlike the MRTP
Commission, CCI is fully empowered under section 27 of the
Competition Act, 2002, to impose financial penalties for
cartelisation, of levels up to 10% of the average turnover for
each company for the three financial years preceding the busting
of the cartel or up to three times the level of profit each firm
enjoyed during the cartel period, whichever is higher. Two years
down the line, we are beginning to lose hope as we are yet to
witness the first attempt at cracking down on them.
A look at recent fines
on cartels across jurisdictions reveals that in most cases
investigations leading to the busting were buttressed by the
invoking of the leniency programme. By being a late comer, CCI
also benefited by having the corporate leniency programme, which
only gained prominence after reforms in the US in 1993. Under
section 46 of the Act, i.e. the leniency provision, CCI has the
powers to impose a lesser penalty on cartel members for
cooperation, which can lead to prosecution.
Many cases across the
world benefited from the leniency programme, which saw competition
authorities gaining access to critical and incontrovertible
information on cartels. A study by a noted US competition expert,
John Connor, showed that about 87 international cartels, affecting
at least two continents during 1990-2008 were detected due to the
leniency provision and about 133 cases of full leniency had been
granted worldwide in connection with these cartels.
The French Competition
Council’s fines on 11 steel products traders for engaging in a
price fixing cartel in 2008 totalling 575 million euro was the
highest fine it had ever imposed. This was also the first time for
the Council to use its leniency powers to grant partial immunity
to a cartel member who shared evidence and cooperated with the
council after the cartel was uncovered. D&C, which applied for
leniency and cooperated with the competition authority, got a 35%
reduction in the fine, although it was identified as one of the
three leaders of the cartel. For PUM Service Acier (subsidiary of
ArcelorMittal) and KDI, the Paris Court of Appeals reduced the
total fine from 575 million euro to only 74 million euro in
January 2010.
The Polish competition
authority’s record fine in December 2009 of 411 million zloty
(almost 100 million euro) was imposed on six cement firms found to
have engaged in a price fixing cartel. The firm Lafarge Polska was
not fined because it fully cooperated with authorities and had
also assisted in exposing the scheme. The cooperation by the firm
helped close investigations that had been going on for long,
leading to firms such as Grupa Ozarow, Cemex Polska, Dyckerhoff
Polska and Warta i Odra being fined.
About a year ago, the
Office of Fair Trading in the UK (one of the two competition
authorities) announced that the 225 million pound fine it imposed
on two tobacco manufacturers—Imperial Tobacco and Gallaher—and 10
retailers for a price fixing cartel was the largest total penalty
it had ever imposed in a case under the Competition Act 1998.
Other retailers, Asda, One Stop Stores, Sainsbury’s and Somerfield
benefited from the OFT’s leniency programme by having their fines
reduced, as they had cooperated in the investigations.
Even examples from
other developing countries reveal that other competition
authorities are making use of the leniency programme. In Brazil,
the leniency programme for cartels was introduced in 2000, with
the first leniency agreement being reached in 2003. The company
benefited 100% from the programme and assisted in the busting of
the cartel, resulting in a total of more than 40 million Real in
fines. By the end of that year alone, the number of leniency
agreements totalled fifteen as companies saw it in their favour to
apply for leniency. Mexico introduced a cartel leniency programme
in 2006, and although the programme suffered some initial setbacks
due to improper procedures; during 2008, five applications for
leniency were received, and by mid-2009 two more had been
received.
However, it could be
some time before India receives such applications if CCI continues
to operate in a business as usual manner. The current record of
CCI is not good enough to provoke companies into applications for
leniency. First, there should be active anti-cartel enforcement
for cartel members to believe that there is a significant risk of
being detected and punished if they do not apply for leniency.
This fear in companies is something yet to be instilled, although
there are indications that some investigations into possible
cartels are ongoing. Second, the members of a cartel should
believe that the competition authority is competent enough to
catch them. Since CCI has senior staff members seconded from the
income tax department, already familiar with some methods of
investigation used in tax law enforcement, we would expect some
competence—and success—in raiding and catching them. However, such
competence remains largely in theory as it is yet to be applied
with meaningful results to cartel enforcement.
Thus, CCI has not done
enough to convince the sceptical public, let alone the cartel
members, that it has any teeth as far as cartel activity is
concerned. CCI does not have to reinvent the wheel for both the
methodology and the harvesting field. Most of the companies
actioned against abroad also operate in India and surely they
import both management systems and ‘business strategies’ from
their affiliates abroad. It is thus in the interest of CCI to be
seen to be active, lest its leniency programme remain embedded on
paper with no takers.
Pradeep S Mehta
Secretary General, CUTS International and Cornelius Dube of CUTS
contributed to this article
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